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Zusammenfassung
Die Dissertation beschaftigt sich mit der Legitimitat von Ungleichheit und ihren Auswirkun-
gen in China seit Beginn der Reformen in den 1970er Jahren. Bisherige Studien legen
nahe, dass die Akzeptanz von Ungleichheit soziokulturellen Ursprungs ist und durch
die wahrgenommene Stabilitat des Klassensystems erhalten wird. Darauf basierend
versucht die Dissertation herauszunden, ob Ungleichheiten im heutigen China aus
dem vergangenen staatssozialistischen System heraus reproduziert werden und wie in
diesem Falle diese Reproduktion von Ungleichheit funktioniert.
Die soziokulturelle Perspektive erlaubt eine Interpretation von Ungleichheit als un-
gleiche Verteilung symbolischen Kapitals, was konkret heit, dass die strukturelle Ur-
sache fur Ungleichheit in der symbolischen Vermittlung menschlichen Handelns liegt.
Die symbolische Vermittlung uber den Habitus wurde von Pierre Bourdieu systematisch
untersucht, um die Funktionsweise der Reproduktion von Ungleichheiten zu erkluren.
Als Ausdruck der Logik menschlichen Handelns, welches durch Wissen und Erfahrung
in einer symbolischen Welt entsteht, organisiert der Habitus das menschliche Handeln,
um die Bedingungen seines Entstehens zu reproduzieren.
Im Falle Chinas seit Beginn der Reformpolitik sind Hierarchien des staatssozialistis-
chen Systems in Form von post-transformativen symbolischen Ungleichheiten erhalten
geblieben. Diese Strukturen werden in der Dissertation als eine sozialistische Soziokul-
tur deniert, die menschliches Handeln im veranderten Umfeld des Marktes vermittelt.
Die sozialistische hierarchische Ordnung dierenziert chinesische Burger entlang der
Trennlinien sozialistischen symbolischen Kapitals.
Aufeinander aufbauend kommen sowohl quantitative als auch qualitative empirische
Forschungsmethoden zu Anwendung. Die erste statistische Methode ist die multiple
correspondance analysis (MCA), um die Strukturen der Ungleichheit im heutigen China
zu erfassen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sowohl im Kontext des urbanen als auch des
landlichen Chinas die Bestandigkeit des staatssozialistischen hierarchischen Systems
eine wichtige Rolle fur die heutige soziale Struktur spielt, ungeachtet der Dieren-
zierung neuer sozialer Klassen. Insbesondere im nicht-urbanen Kontext manifestiert
sich das sozialistische hierarchische Vermachtnis deutlich. Auf den Ergebnissen der
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quantitativen Forschung aufbauend wurden qualitative Interviews durchgefuhrt, um
Typen des Habitus konstruieren zu konnen und die hypothetischen Mechanismen zu
uberprufen.
Menschliches Handeln wird in der meritokratischen Gesellschaft durch sozialistis-
che hierarchische Vermachtnisse symbolisch ausgehandelt. Gleichzeitig funktioniert die
Persistenz des Habitus des staatssozialistischen hierarchischen Systems als unsichtbarer
Mechanismus der Reproduktion von Ungleichheiten im China der Reformpolitik.
Schlagwrter: Reform- und Onungspolitik; Legitimitat von Ungleichheit; Symbolis-
ches Kapital; Staatssozialistischen Hierarchischen Systems; Habitus; Reproduktion von
Ungleichheiten
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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the legitimacy of inequality and its causes during the re-
form period of China. Building on existing ndings that the human acceptance of
inequality is socioculturally situated and contributed to by the stability of the class
system, this study specically aims to explore whether or not inequality in today's
China is reproduced from the historical state-socialist class system and, if so, how the
reproduction of inequality happens. The sociocultural perspective allows for the in-
terpretation of inequality as an unequal distribution of symbolic capital, which reveals
that the symbolic mediation of human practice is the structural root of inequality. This
symbolically mediated practice is called habitus, which has been systematically devel-
oped by Pierre Bourdieu and utilized to explain how the reproduction of inequality
happens. As the embodied logic of human practice that is acquired from knowledge
and experience within a symbolic world, habitus organizes human practice to seek out
and reproduce the conditions from which the habitus has developed. With regard to
the case of China in this dissertation, some state-socialist hierarchical arrangements
are maintained in the form of symbolic inequalities under reform, and are dened to-
gether as a socialist socioculture that is hypothesized to mediate human practice in
a market environment. These socialist hierarchical arrangements distinguish Chinese
citizens along the lines of socialist symbolic capital. Empirically, I use quantitative and
qualitative research methods sequentially in this study. First, the multiple correspon-
dence analysis (MCA) is adopted as a statistical technique to observe the conguration
of inequality in today's China. The results of MCA demonstrate that in both rural
and urban China, the persistence of the state-socialist hierarchical system plays an
important role in informing the social structure, even with the rise of emerging classes.
Particularly, the socialist hierarchical legacies manifest more evident signs in rural so-
ciety than in urban. Following the ndings from the quantitative research, I conduct
qualitative interviews in China to construct habitus types for verifying the hypothetical
mechanisms. It was found that human practice in a meritocratic society is symboli-
cally mediated by the socialist hierarchical legacies. Meanwhile, the maintenance of
habitus acquired from the state-socialist hierarchical system is an invisible mechanism
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for reproducing inequality under reform.
Keywords: Chinese Economic Reform; Legitimacy of Inequality; Symbolic Capital;
State-Socialist Hierarchical System; Habitus; Reproduction of Inequality
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1 Introduction
Inequality is one of the most commonly discussed topics. For countries in transition,
changing from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, social inequality
seems to be a volcano hidden beneath the new market mechanism. China is one of the
countries. As the largest country currently in transition on one hand, China has created
a development miracle and has been seen as an engine of world and regional growth
since its reform and opening up began in the late 1970s. In the reform period (1978-
present), China's economic growth has surpassed the Four Asian Tigers1, and hundreds
of millions of its citizens have been lifted out of poverty (Whyte, 2010b). China has also
made great achievements in the development of high-speed rail ways, information and
communication technology, and aerospace, for example. On the other hand, the Gini
coecient, which is widely utilized by scholars to measure overall inequality, scored
China 38.6 in 2015, reecting how China has become a society that is very unequal in
its income distribution2.
How do Chinese citizens perceive the inequality? Both Chinese and foreign ob-
servers believe that the severe inequality generated by China's reform has inspired
anger among ordinary people (Whyte, 2010a). As a response to the problem of so-
cial inequality, the concept of the harmonious society was developed by the Hu-Wen
Administration in the mid-2000s (S. Li, Sato, & Sicular, 2013). This philosophical
ideology signies China's pursuit of the balance between rapid economic development
and a stability maintenance regime (D. L. Yang, 2017). In spite of this apparent anger,
ordinary Chinese people believe that inequality is inevitable (Xie, Thornton, Wang,
& Lai, 2012). Moreover, it has been empirically found that, in China, disadvantaged
groups, such as rural citizens, women, and lower class people are more likely to view
1East Asian Tigers, also known as Four Asian Dragons, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore
and South Korea.
2According to the World Bank website, in 2015, inequality is divided into ve levels from very
equal to very unequal based on the following scores: <29.4, 29.4-34.2, 34.2-38.6, 38.6-43.4, >43.4;
See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=CN&type=shaded&view=map&year
=2015&year high desc=true
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the unequal distribution in Chinese society as just and acceptable (Im, 2014).
This dissertation doesn't ask what causes inequality in China in general, but rather
concentrates on the social legitimacy of inequality and its causes in today's China.
This research therefore addresses a topic that has received little attention by social
scientists, which will hopefully encourage us to work more to uncover how the human
acceptance of inequality happens in a meritocratic society3. In meritocratic societies,
most of which are market-driven societies, people are rewarded in keeping with their
dierential merits, even though the concept of \merit" may have dierent meanings
in dierent contexts (Swift & Marshall, 1997). The acceptance of inequality concerns
two aspects: Firstly, it has been found that perceived longevity increases system jus-
tication (e.g., Blanchar & Eidelman, 2013). The practice system that persists with a
longstanding structural relation is called socioculture, which is responsible for human
beliefs of a social order entailed in that relation. Secondly, according to Im (2014),
Chinese citizens generally accept the unequal distribution of resources after the reform
and opening up, and see the world as a competitive jungle. In this sense, the inequality
is legitimized when people feel that the results of meritocratic competition are proper
within a sociocultural tradition. I therefore presume that the social stratication under
China's market reform is the outcome of merit but reects a long-lasting order of dom-
ination, that is, the legacies of the socialist class system. Based on this presumption, I
work to examine the possible link between the legacies of socialist hierarchies and the
inequality in today's China.
1.1 Existing Studies on Inequality in China
1.1.1 The Status-Quo of China's Inequality
China's economic reform, in addition to generating rapid economic growth, has been
deemed responsible for many negative outcomes, particularly with regard to social
inequality. Practically, describing the status-quo of China's inequality requires com-
prehensively understanding what kinds of inequality are experienced in China. The
introduction of a market economy, leading to the emergence of a meritocratic society,
moves inequality concerns from those of a redistribution situation to those of a market
3In this study, I use \meritocratic society" and \market-oriented society" interchangeably.
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situation. In particular, individual opportunities for gain and prot are more broadly
based and diverse when market force augments the opportunity structure controlled
by the redistributive power (Nee, 1996). As a result, China has simultaneously created
a new market-driven social structure that consists of prominent spatial and gender
inequalities.
Urban-Rural Inequality Scholars and policy makers generally believe that urban-
rural inequality is one of the most severe structural problems to have followed China's
economic reform. As the central institutional mechanism dening the city-countryside
and the state-society relations, household registration system (hukou system) estab-
lishes urban-rural citizenship inequality, which provides the principal basis for con-
structing urban-rural dual structure in China (T. Cheng & Selden, 1994). For a long
time, this system has favored urban residents and discriminated against rural residents
in socioeconomic resource allocation, which has given rise to rural residents essentially
becoming underclass citizens (Afridi, Li, & Ren, 2015). Due to a series of urban-biased
policies, citizens who obtain rural hukou are less able to access some socioeconomic
resources, such as education and healthcare. These restrictions further lower the living
standard of rural residents and possibly restrict upward social mobility.
The urban-biased household registration system gradually contributes to urban-
rural income inequality. The income inequality between urban and rural has been
asserted as the source of the rise in China's Gini index (e.g., Sicular, Ximing, Gustafs-
son, & Li, 2008; Gustafsson, Shi, & Sicular, 2008). Recent statistical result shows that
the urban-rural divide accounts for more than 10% of the total income inequality in
China (Xie & Zhou, 2014). In fact, in the opening decade of economic reform (1980s),
the urban-rural income gap showed a weak decline, and then started to rise with an
increase of 6% by the early 1990s, continuing steadily upward afterwards (Kanbur &
Zhang, 1999). In early 21st century, because of the expansion of the urban economy,
the urban-rural income gap increased once again (Goodman, 2014). The latest data
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China demonstrated that, in 2016, per capita
disposable income of urban households was 33616 yuan, nearly three times the per
capita disposable income of rural households in 12363 yuan.
In addition to this economic situation, there has also been an increase in urban-rural
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social inequality with regard to health and education outcomes (X. Zhang & Kanbur,
2005; Dollar, 2007). Marketization grants local governments more responsibilities to
develop the social and economic situation to indigenous populations. However, with
limited help from the central budget, cutting public spending on education and health-
care often becomes an alternative for local governments that are faced with dicult
scal situations (X. Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). Disparity in education is a signicant
indicator for dening urban-rural inequality in China, as education provides opportu-
nities for taking advantage of China's rapid economic development and for raising one's
own social status (X. Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). Table 1 presents the levels of illiteracy,
comparing urban, town, and rural populations over age 15. The statistical results tell
us that, since the economic reform, illiteracy rates of rural China have continuously
been much higher than that of urban China. Table 1 reveals a big reduction in illiter-
acy rate in both rural and urban areas since economic reform. Strikingly, one feature
is that in the past three decades, the rural-urban illiteracy gap has been widening.
Table 1: Illiteracy rate (% of people age 15 and over)
Year Rural Town Urban Rural/Urban
1982 34.8 NA 16.4 2.1
1990 26.2 11.5 12.2 2.2
2000 11.6 6.5 4.6 2.5
2010 7.3 3.9 1.9 3.8
Data source: China 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010 population census data. The illiteracy
rate for 1982 is based on people who are 12 years old and above, dierent from the
rests that are based on people who are 15 years old and above.
Urban-rural economic inequality denitely has further resulted in a large gap be-
tween regions with regard to access to basic healthcare (Dollar, 2007). Figure 1 shows
the number of medical technical personnel per 10000 persons in both urban and rural
China for a ten-year period. From 2007 to 2016, there was a growing evident disparity
in the number of medical technical personnel between rural and urban regions. One of
the consequences of inadequate healthcare is an increasing infant mortality rate. The
latest statistical results show that in 2016, the infant mortality rate in urban areas was
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Figure 1: Number of medical technical personnel (per 10000 persons) in both rural and
urban China
Source: Own compilation based on the recent ten years data from National Bureau of Statistic of
China
4.2%, less than half of that rate in rural area, which was 9%. Likewise, over the same
period, the mortality rate of children under 5 in rural areas was 12.4%, more than twice
that of urban areas (5.2%).
Regional Inequality Rapid growth is linked to regional disparity. Regarding the
economic situation, from the period of the socialist planned economy characterized by
egalitarian wages to the early 1990s, \inequality across major regions trended down-
ward, but it rose sharply in the decade of the 1990s" (Fleisher, Li, & Zhao, 2010, p. 216).
Currently, approximately 12% of China's overall income inequality is attributed to dis-
parities across provinces (Xie & Zhou, 2014). The 2016 annual data at the provincial
level released by National Bureau of Statistics of China showed that, Beijing had the
highest level of gross regional production per capita (118,198 yuan, equal to 18,566 US
dollars). This value was about 4.3 times that of the Gansu province, which had the
lowest gross regional production per capita (27,643 yuan, equal to 4342 US dollars).
As that economic inequality happens, a report presented by McKinsey consultants
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shows that 87% of middle class has concentrated in Coastal China (11 in 31 provincial
administrative units) in 2002. Although this value is predicted to reduce to 61% in
2022, the share of the middle class continues to dier by geography (Barton, Chen, &
Jin, 2013).
Regional inequality is further characterized by unequal access to basic education and
health care across provinces. China's 2010 population census reported that, the average
illiteracy rate (for respondents aged 15 and over) is 4.88% by provincial region, ranging
from 1.86% in Beijing to 32.29% in Tibet. Aside from Tibet, there are three other
provinces whose illiteracy rate is higher than 10%: Gansu (10.62%), Guizhou (11.4%),
and Qinghai (12.94%). Education development exhibits regional disparities in the same
way. The dataset used by Hannum and Meiyan (2006) shows that in the rst decade
of establishing the market economy, compared to some costal provinces experiencing
dramatic improvement in education level, the percentage of primary school graduates
entering into secondary school by some provinces improved very slightly, such as that
in the Guizhou province and the Gansu province. Additionally, in the same period,
this percentage in Tibet dropped drastically.
Poorer health conditions have also been associated with inequality between regions.
Before its economic reform, China was among the poorest countries in the world, but
it ranked near middle-income countries in terms of life expectancy, due to the socialist
system and the egalitarian ideology (Banister, 1987; Y. Cai, 2009). The market-based
system has created this health disparity, with people living in well-developed provinces,
particularly in the costal areas, gaining more in the way of social rewards from economic
growth (Y. Cai, 2009, p.146). The most recent 2010 national population census
calculated that the life expectancy of some coastal provincial level regions exceeded
80, including Beijing (80.18) and Shanghai (80.26). However, in some inland areas, life
expectancy is predominantly below 70, such as that Tibet (68.17) and Qinghai (69.96).
These distinctive variations of life expectancy within provinces are largely consistent
with the inequality of public health conditions. For example, at the provincial level in
2016, the number of medical technical personnel in health care institutions per 10,000
persons ranged from 108 (Beijing) to 45 (Tibet).
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Figure 2: China illiteracy rate by gender
Source: Own compilation based on the data from China 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010 population census.
The illiteracy rate for 1982 is based on people who are 12 years old and above, dierent from the rests
that are based on people who are 15 years old and above.
Gender Inequality Pursuing gender equality is one of the main goals of, and
achievements under, socialism. However, the initiation of China's transition has changed
the original policy agenda of the gender equality and has made hierarchical relationships
between men and women constitute one of the tenets of the Chinese social stratication
order (F. Wang, 2008; P. N. Cohen & Wang, 2009). Since education is often considered
an advantaged sphere of social life for women, gender inequality is suggested to be more
pronounced in educational systems (Jacobs, 1996). Figure 2 presents calculations of
the illiteracy rate by gender from China's most recent population census. A consider-
able reduction in illiteracy for both men and women took place after economic reform.
However, there has been a gender gap with regard to access to basic education, and
the female illiteracy rate has been maintained above that average. Moreover, China's
gender inequality in educational attainment is found to vary by area (rural vs. urban).
Women in rural areas are faced more serious education inequality, particularly after
they nish 9-year compulsory education (primary school and junior high school; Zeng,
Pang, Zhang, Medina, & Rozelle, 2014).
In a market-oriented system, gender inequality signicantly manifests in the form
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of income inequality. Statistically, in urban China, the female disadvantage in income
enlarged from 15% in early 1990s to 25% in 2000 (F. Wang, 2008; P. N. Cohen &
Wang, 2009). Market transition theory ascribes this gender inequality in income to
the establishment of the market economy. To be concrete, China's economic transfor-
mation has initiated the honoring of eciency and productivity, which tends to give
rise to discrimination against women whose individual traits are believed to not be
correlated to productivity (Shu & Bian, 2003). Scholars have also found that after
taking into account some market-related mechanisms, for instance, gender dierence
in educational attainment, sector of employment, industrial locations, and access to
social capital, the gender gap in income increases dramatically compared to when only
taking dierences in individual characteristics between men and women into considera-
tion (F. Wang, 2008; P. N. Cohen & Wang, 2009; C. Cheng, Wang, & Bian, 2015). This
reveals that, with respect to gender segregation among industries in urban China (Shu,
2005), women are concentrated in the \less-privileged economic sectors, lower-ranked
occupations, and lower-paying industries" (P. N. Cohen & Wang, 2009, p.51).
1.1.2 Social Structure Under Reform
China's market transition since 1978 has involved a fundamental reorganizations of
social order, with an abandonment of egalitarian ideology and former socioeconomic
ways of life. The description of the status-quo of inequality provides an understanding
of China's social structure under economic reform. Based on the dual classication
of hukou registration, the relationship between urban and rural China is central to
the construction of urban-rural dual structure (e.g., Bian, 2002; Goodman, 2014).
This phenomenon has been depicted as \one country, two societies" (Whyte, 2010c,
p. 1).The citizenship inequality built on the hukou system not only divides life chances
between urban and rural areas, but also marginalizes rural migrants in urban society
(e.g., K. W. Chan & Zhang, 1999; Goodman, 2014; Afridi et al., 2015). Even though
China's entire society is divided into two parts, the economic reform has resulted in
both urban and rural areas starting to look like those found in capitalist societies.
Social Structure in Rural China The reconstruction of rural society occurs after
economic liberation. The introduction of a liberal market and decollectivization has
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given rise to a sector of non-agricultural business in rural areas, which internally strati-
es the peasantry (Skinner, 1985). In a China-specic discursive context, the peasantry
has always been identied as a relatively subordinate class, including peasants who live
and work in rural China, rural migrant workers, and others who live and work in urban
areas (Goodman, 2014). In rural society, what was a relatively homogeneous peasant
stratum before economic reform is currently spilt into two classes: a rich peasant class
and a poor peasant class (So, 2003). Agricultural marketing and o-farm businesses
dierentiate the characteristics of rich peasants from peasants who keep themselves
working on farms (De Janvry, Sadoulet, & Zhu, 2005), making the boundary between
the high-income group and the low-income group increasingly distinct.
In addition to wealth indicators, some scholars have examined the monopolization
of resources in rural China with respect to social structure, and have found consistency
with Max Weber's observations of social stratication by degree of political power,
or social status. Walder (2002) pointed out that the market system has transformed
China's rural society from one based on a political structure alone to one based on a
political-economic structure. In his study, it was concluded that income inequality is
reinforced by unequal power and privileges. Based on household income, China's rural
society can be divided into the following strata: cadre entrepreneur household, cadre
household, entrepreneur household, and ordinary household.
In rural China, village cadres are advantaged group members of their rural com-
munities, which signify authority of allocating resources and prioritizing tasks, and
privilege of accessing greater rates of socioeconomic returns. Walder's interpretation
of inequality in rural China emphasizes monopolization by cadres (Walder, 2002). Mar-
ketization, as a sort of structural change, partly expands political advantages in the
reconstruction of rural society. An entrepreneur with a cadre position will be well-
compensated in the more industrialized rural areas (Parish, Zhe, & Li, 1995; Walder,
2002). As a result, socioeconomic returns for working as a village cadre inevitably
increase over time (J. Zhang, Giles, & Rozelle, 2012). Another interpretation of the
social structure in rural China justies the monopolization of resources, specically, by
cadres intertwined with privileged insiders. From this perspective, rural society can
be categorized into two groups: (privileged) insiders and (inferior) outsiders (Unger,
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2012). This classication can mainly be found in the rural areas with a well-developed,
non-agricultural business sector, particularly in some coastal villages. The increasing
number of migrants from nearby counties and faraway provinces generates an identity-
based rural society. In this case, natives who are represented by village cadres em-
phasize themselves as privileged insiders, to be distinguished from the socially and
economically inferior migrants.
Not restricted by any specic theory, Bian (2002) synthesized some published nd-
ings by native Chinese sociologists, that followed eight social classes that might be
found in rural society: \(a) rural cadres as political elites; (b) private entrepreneurs as
the new capitalist class; (c) managers of township and village enterprises; (d) house-
hold and individual business owners as the petty bourgeoisie; (e) professionals as the
new rural middle class; (f) peasant laborers (including rural migrant workers in urban
areas); (g) wage labor in local private sector as the new working class; (h) agricultural
peasants" (Bian, 2002, p.95). Owing to the mixture of theories of ownership, based
on political authority and cultural capital, this classication is believed to provide a
comprehensive sketch of China's rural class structure under reform.
Social Structure in Urban China The class structure in urban China is more
complex, due to not only the diversity of industrial sectors that has developed since
economic reform, but also because of the exible household registration policy that
encourages rural peasants to interact with the urban industrial system and the market.
One of the more prominent changes in urban society has happened to the lower class.
Roughly, in urban China, employees of commercial service, the industrial working
class, and the unemployed and semi-employed are classied into the lower stratum by
workforce (J. Hu, Li, & Wei, 2012). Hu and his colleagues used the data released
by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to further point out that, the proportion of
the lowest level of the entire society has been expanding since 2000. In terms of
urban society, this phenomenon reects the expansion of the jobless, unemployed, and
underemployed class. Practically, industrial structure upgrades, excessively speedy
urbanization, and lack of competitiveness are believed to contribute to the increasing
lowest class population (J. Hu et al., 2012).
Trends related to the emerging and the accelerated rise of middle class have made
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their appearance in China's urban society. Exclusively focusing on annual disposal
income per urban household, the share of urban middle class households is expected
to reach 76% in 2022 (Barton et al., 2013). Academically, however, the middle class
in China is usually more an occupational than an economic construct, as an advanced
profession (i.e. a white-collar job) is a guarantee of a relatively high and stable so-
cioeconomic status (Tomba, 2004; C. Li, 2010; J. Hu et al., 2012). This denition also
restricts the discursive context of China's middle class in urban areas. The accelerated
rise of the new urban middle class has been greatly attributed to the expansion of
higher education institutions and the service sector, both of which characterize such
a class group as not only capitalist, but also intellectual segment (So, 2003). Schol-
ars summarized the following very typical middle class occupations in urban China:
managers, clerks, and professional and technical personnel. In addition, considering
the possession of certain amounts of capital, some private entrepreneurs and individual
business owners are classied into the middle class (J. Hu et al., 2012).
Owing to socioeconomic advantages, middle-class people are more likely to have ac-
cess to some advanced resources and to share a common social identity (Tomba, 2004).
In this interpretation, the middle class in urban China is dened by a lifestyle, in-
cluding particular consumption behavior, that entails such luxuries as studying abroad
and so on (e.g., Liechty, 2003; Tomba, 2004; Zhan & He, 2012). Research by McK-
insey has shown that, in urban China, the consumption habits of younger generation
middle-class people are more westernized than the older generation. At the same time,
the population characterized by middle-class consumption behaviors is predicted to
drastically increase by 2022 (Barton et al., 2013).
The distribution of middle-class population reveals some structural inequalities in
China. Geographically, although there is an expansion of the middle class population
in the west and the north, the majority of the middle class population continues to
concentrate in China's coastal provinces. Judged by annual disposable income levels,
only less than 20% of the middle-class population was dispersed in selected tier 3
and tier 4 cities4 by 2002. Even though this rate is expected to grow to 40%, the
4The Chinese city tier system is a hierarchical classication of Chinese cities and frequently referred
to by non-ocial publications. Cities in dierent tiers reect distinctions in income level, population
size, business opportunity, internationalization and diversity, infrastructure, future dynamism, and so
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limited number of tier 1 and tier 2 cities5 will still have attracted more than half
of China's middle-class population (Barton et al., 2013). What's more, a gendered
division of labor exists in the urban labor market. Even if the education level of
women in urban China increases signicantly, occupationally, the belief that women
are physically weaker, less capable than men, and mainly responsible for the domestic
domain makes it harder for women to obtain white-collar jobs and to enter the middle
class (J. Liu, 2013).
Overall, social stratication in both urban and rural areas has intensied, which
denotes that the gap between social classes has increasingly widened (J. Hu et al., 2012).
In rural society, although the diversity of emerging social classes reects the propensity
of the market system, underclass agricultural peasants and peasant laborers are still in
greater quantity (see: Bian, 2002). Similarly, in urban China, socioeconomic resources
are increasingly concentrated among the elites and middle class people (Dittmer & Lv,
1996; J. Hu et al., 2012), which has even given rise to inequality of discourse (Johnston,
2004; Sun, 2013). This is to say, the voices of advantaged social classes are more likely
to be heard by the top, with the growing inuence of intellectuals and capitalists on
policy-making. These inequalities conversely reinforce the dierences of life chances
among social classes and denitely impede social mobility.
1.1.3 The Legitimacy of China's Inequality
What are Chinese citizens' attitudes toward the status-quo of inequality? This question
concerns the legitimacy of inequality in a meritocratic society. Up to the present, the
legitimacy of inequality in China has been directly or indirectly regarded as a premise in
some social sciences academic works (e.g., Xie et al., 2012; Sun, 2013; G. King, Pan, &
Roberts, 2013). Two particular questions greatly help us to understand the legitimacy
of inequality under China's reform: Do most Chinese citizens approve of the now
market-oriented and highly competitive society? More importantly, do disadvantaged
citizens accept their worse o situations?
on. In 2013 McKinsey report, the selected tier 3 cities include: Leshan, Ziyang, and Yongzhou; the
selected tier 4 cities include: Gongzhuling, Linfen, Liuan, Zhaotong, and Meishan.
5In 2013 McKinsey report, the tier 1 cities include: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen;
the selected tier 2 cities include: Wuhan, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Foshan.
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Adaptation to a market-based society is supposed to be a big challenge for citizens
in transition countries. In general, for most transition countries, gaining the accep-
tance of the people with regard to the market system is the rst step to preventing
local grievances and social protests from escalating into general challenges to the exist-
ing system. Fortunately, nostalgia for the bygone state socialist era has not prevailed
in China, even though some individuals and groups have experienced unemployment,
downward mobility, and a highly competitive social atmosphere (C. Han & Whyte,
2009; Whyte, 2010b). On the one hand, the acceptance of the market system stems
from the great number of benets brought about by economic reform. It is the im-
provement in economic performance that has inuenced the opinions of Chinese citizens
regarding the relationship between development and inequality. On the other hand,
for most ordinary people, inequality is the inevitable cost of a country's progress (Xie
et al., 2012). Although China's current leaders have responded to fears that rising
inequality might threaten political and social stability by announcing some changes
in policy, such as the abolition of rural taxes and fees to construct harmonious soci-
ety, the general consent surrounding the economic transformation technically ensures
the feasibility and stability of the market system and Chinese Communist Party rule
(C. Han & Whyte, 2009).
Inequality is equated to injustice that is against free will (Rakowski, 1991). Since
Deng Xiaoping encouraged some people to get rich rst, China has initiated its switch
in distribution principle from egalitarianism to eciency (So, 2003). Eective distri-
bution is a sort of stimulation for people to try to get rich themselves, which denotes
a growing division between advantaged groups and disadvantaged groups. Feelings of
injustice and resentment are likely to motivate Chinese citizens to doubt and disobey
authority, which may threaten social and political stability (Whyte, 2010b). How low
socioeconomic status people view current inequality, therefore, is central to under-
standing the degree to which inequality in China has been legitimized.
C. Han and Whyte (2009) have found that people of lower social status vary in their
views on distributive issues. The strongest feelings of injustice appear to be held by
rural migrant workers in urban areas and by workers in the urban private sector. Rural
people, who are objectively at or near the bottom of the social hierarchy, however, feel
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optimistic about chances for ordinary people to move ahead. Survey data demonstrated
that by 2005, 74.8% of the respondents felt that the children of peasants and workers
have equal chances in Chinese society, and about 80% believed that opportunities are
equal if people are smart enough (X. Wu, 2009). These results, at least to some extent,
demonstrate that the inequality has been legitimized by merit.
At the same time, disadvantaged groups, rural citizens, females, and people with
fewer socioeconomic resources in China have been found to have a higher desire for
unequal and dominant/subordinate relations among social groups and classes (Im,
2014). Psychologically, Im (2014) characterized these disadvantaged groups as gen-
erally holding a social dominance orientation (SDO). As a psychological disposition,
SDO interprets the legitimacy of inequality from both meritocratic view and sociocul-
tural perspective. SDO, on one hand, is based on the insight of seeing the world as a
competitive jungle (Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), on
the other hand, is used to measure an individual's preference for maintaining group-
based discrimination (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Accordingly,
sociocultural traditions are combined with meritocracy in legitimizing superior-inferior
structural relations by constructing injurious meanings (Pratto et al., 1994). The so-
ciocultural view particularly concerns the role of stereotypes in legitimizing inequality,
as stereotypes activated by sociocultural pressures can inuence the competition per-
formance of the stereotyped groups (Pratto et al., 1994; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady,
1999). In this sense, the status-quo of inequality is accepted by Chinese citizens because
the outcomes of meritocratic competition reect the sociocultural contexts. Exploring
along with this way, future studies will deepen our understanding of the legitimacy of
inequality by approaching to the interaction of a sociocultural schema with meritocracy.
1.2 Research Objectives
1.2.1 Research Questions
Most research agrees that since the reform and opening up, inequality in China has
been not only characterized by meritocracy but also legitimized. Why is a stratied
society that has undergone a recent transformation from egalitarianism to eciency
legitimized, however, has not been studied. This study tries to ll this research gap
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through combining a sociocultural perspective with meritocracy. To be concrete, in a
capitalist society, people feel that a merit-based social structure is just because their
awareness of what is natural and what is fair has been aected by sociocultural tradi-
tions. Accordingly, the social stratication under China's market reform is presumed
to be the outcome of meritocratic competition but reects a long-lasting order of dom-
ination. I therefore particularly propose the persistent state-socialist class system to
be one of the sociocultural traditions after economic reform, and examine whether
or not the social stratication in today's China is perceived similarly to the socialist
hierarchies. Two specic questions are thus raised:
Question1: Whether and to what extent is social stratication in today's China
reproduced from the class system held over from state-socialism?
Question2: If it is, what makes it happen?
1.2.2 Research Hypotheses
Increasingly oriented by the market force, inequality in China has been transformed
from a non-antagonistic class relationship to an antagonistic strata (e.g., Parkin, 1972;
Nee, 1996; T. Lin & Wu, 2010). I therefore apply Max Weber's theory of stratication
in observing the inequality that is the outcome of meritocratic competition. Weber
maps his theory of social stratication \in relation to the orders of economic and the
political" (Gane, 2005, p. 211), which have been widely applied to the study of inequal-
ity in market-oriented situations. According to Weber, an individual's class situation
is determined by his/her relation to the market, and is particularly determined by their
economic situations, social status and access to power (Weber, 1946). Weber empha-
sized that, in addition to the possession of material capital, the ability to exert inuence
on others also determines the strata into which a person becomes categorized. Weber's
three-component theory of social stratication emphasizes that inequality results from
dierences in achievement, which provides a theoretical foundation to interpret the
conguration of the inequality under China's reform.
Human attitudes toward certain social arrangements are socioculturally rooted in
their perceptual experiences. This means that an acceptable merit-based social struc-
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ture is, to some extent, in accordance with the human experience of perceiving the
world. Under the one-party leadership of the socialist politburo, some earlier hierar-
chical arrangements during the state-socialist period have been maintained since the
initiation of China's transformation. With respect to the fact of legitimate inequality,
I therefore argue that even for the rise of emerging classes, the persistent socialist hier-
archical system plays an important role in informing the social structure under China's
reform.
Hypothesis1: In today's China, the conguration of social stratication is, to
some extent, reproduced from the class system under state socialism.
In this study, an entire human practice system in a structural relation is dened as
socioculture. The sociocultural approach therefore allows us to understand inequality
by observing why a human tends to act in a certain way. In particular, socioeconomi-
cally distinguishing itself from others, an individual's class situation is also determined
by the possession of symbolic capital and habitus. As an instrument of cognition and
communication within a certain sociocultural framework, symbolic capital orients hu-
mans to follow routinized behavioral and thought patterns, which signify the access to
valued traits in a society. The sociocultural perspective thus describes social inequality
as a form of unequal distribution that is structurally rooted in human embodied dis-
positions. These embodied patterns of actions are called habitus. The habitus theory
systematically developed by Pierre Bourdieu is adopted as a theoretical mechanism
to trace how inequality is reproduced. According to Bourdieu (1977, 1990), habitus
refers to the practice that is organized in accordance with the human logic acquired
and structured from experiences. Without conscious intention, habitus organizes the
logic of human practices seeking the conditions from which the habitus emerged, which
signify access to economic capital, social status, and power in a stratied society. With
regard to a society that is transforming into the meritocratic regime, such as China,
habitus signies individual merit that is relevant to competition for the scarcity of
resources.
Hypothesis2: The inequality in today's China is contributed to by the unequal
distribution of habitus that has been sustained by the state-socialist hierarchical system,
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because the logic of practice organized by habitus indicates that the human ability to
possess and excise power reproduces the class situation from which the habitus emerged.
1.2.3 Empirical Methods
Mixed methods research that combines quantitative and qualitative are applied in an-
swering the research questions raised in this dissertation. It is appropriate to use
mixed methods to investigate the topics of interest, because these specic research
questions are identied as two questions of dierent dimensions. In general, \quantita-
tive research species numerical assignment to the phenomenon under study, whereas
qualitative research produces narrative or textual description of the phenomenon under
study" (VanderStoep & Johnson, 2008, p. 7). In particular, ndings from quantita-
tive research are phenomena described numerically, and manifest in the form of a
closed ended relationship among variables. Qualitative design, in contrast, is applied
through open-ended questions that mainly focus on a single concept underlying the
major themes of the project. These questions are raised in the forms of \what" and
\how" (Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano, & Morales, 2007; VanderStoep & Johnson,
2008).
In recent years, quantitative and qualitative research methods have ceased to be
viewed as dichotomous research paradigms, but rather as dimensionally dierent (R. B. John-
son, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007; VanderStoep & Johnson, 2008). How research
questions are arranged under certain conditions determines the form in which quanti-
tative and qualitative approaches can coexist. In consideration of the arrangement of
data types in a particular order, three major research paradigms of mixed methods can
be summarized: the quantitative dominant, the qualitative dominant, and the equal
status (R. B. Johnson et al., 2007; Creswell, 2007). With regard to the former two
methods, quantitative and qualitative data are collected in phases to answer sequen-
tially connected questions. With regard to the latter, data is collected concurrently, as
research questions are independent of each other.
In this dissertation, I use quantitative and qualitative investigations sequentially to
understand the phenomena of interest. The two research questions raised above are
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connected in phases, which means that ndings from the rst quantitative question
inform the qualitative exploration. To be concrete, understanding the quantitative
results that reveal the conguration of inequality in today's China constitutes the initial
intention of this study, and directly determines how the qualitative data is gathered
for answering the second research question.
Quantitative Method Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is applied as a
statistical technique in representing the underlying structure of inequality in today's
China. Essentially, this research question addresses a quantitative relationship between
the state-socialist class system and social stratication in the market-oriented situation.
MCA, thus, is an appropriate technique to analyze the patterns of relationship between
several categorical variables (e.g., Abdi & Valentin, 2007), and to examine whether or
not the social stratication is reproduced from the hierarchical system under state
socialism.
The raw data from the 2015 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) is employed in
the quantitative research6. Launched in 2003, the CGSS has become an authoritative
dataset that is widely used in tracking the dynamics of social structure and life quality
in China (see: Bian & Li, 2012). A series of survey items relevant to the state-socialist
hierarchical system (such as items related to one's economic situation, social status,
power, demographic items, and other supplementary items) are selected and converted
to the categorical variables for the quantitative investigation. The survey data collected
has been organized as categorical, or nominal, since the MCA is applicable to a large
set of categorical data. Due to the urban-rural dualism, the underlying structure of
urban and rural societies is observed.
Qualitative Method As the second phase of mixed methods, the qualitative re-
search approach was developed based upon the ndings from the quantitative research.
In particular, within the hypothetical view that inequality in today's China is to some
extent a reproduction of the state-socialist class system, the qualitative research is
targeted at the factors that contribute to the inequality reproduction in China.
This qualitative research was conducted in the form of in-depth, face-to-face inter-
6Published in 2018.01.01, the 2015 CGSS data is the latest public data.
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views in urban and rural societies. The participants were strictly selected as the indi-
vidual representatives of each social class. Through a series of qualitative interviews,
human habitus and how it works in determining an individual's position in a social
structure, were observed. The qualitative research consists of two things: constructing
human habitus types and bridging the habitus types to human class situations. The
documentary method (see: Bohnsack, 2014) was adopted to interpret the qualitative
data collected from the interviews.
One contribution of this qualitative research is developing a method of operational-
izing the concept of habitus, which has been ignored by Bourdieu. In line with Jodhka,
Rehbein, and Souza (2017), the everyday practice summarized from semi-structured
interview data determines \elementary categories" that characterize habitus and fur-
ther construct ideal-types. The categories of habitus traits are inductively developed
through observing the practical actions and utterances of interviewees. These traits
then are assembled into the habitus types ideally situated in the context of China's
transformation. Through the construction of habitus types, the aim is to examine how
a transforming society is stratied under the inuence of the socialist socioculture.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 present the theoretical foundation of this study. Chapter 2
comprehensively introduces the concept of legitimacy, which justies the application
of the sociocultural perspective in exploring why a stratied society resulted from
meritocratic competition is accepted by most ordinary people. Chapter 3 focuses on
inequality within a sociocultural framework. This framework generally explains the
ontological process of a social class, and why each class or group justies their position
in the hierarchical system. Thus, an entire sign-system is viewed as the structural root
of inequality. In this chapter, Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital and habitus are
introduced to explain: (1) How human practice or habitus is symbolically mediated;
(2) How inequality is reproduced by human habitus; and (3) How the reproduction of
inequality is legitimized.
Chapter 4 systematically describes the historical background of China's class system
under state socialism (1957-1978) and how this system evolved after the reform and
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opening-up. As a system of non-antagonistic strata, the state-socialist hierarchical
arrangements are presumed to shape human thinking and behavior and can therefore
be called a socialist socioculture. Even though the market system has been developing
for 40 years in China under the socialist political system, the state-socialist hierarchical
system is expected to always mediate human practice in a transforming society.
Chapter 5 and chapter 6 focus on empirical analysis. In chapter 5, multiple cor-
respondence analysis is developed to quantitatively detect whether or not, and (if the
former) to what extent, inequality in today's China corresponds to the state-socialist
class system. Findings from this quantitative research inform the data collection of the
qualitative interviews. In chapter 6, the documentary method is used to interpret the
qualitative data. Habitus types in urban and rural China are then constructed based
on a hypothetical sociocultural mechanism and demonstrated empirically. Finally, the
use of the documentary method allows us to observe how habitus types contribute to
inequality and its reproduction.
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2 Understanding Legitimate Inequalities in Meri-
tocratic Societies: A Sociocultural Perspective
Transforming from an egalitarian ideology to one focused on eciency (So, 2003), in-
equality becomes a result of meritocratic competition between individuals (Jodhka et
al., 2017). Therefore, the legitimacy of inequality under China's reform deserves more
attention. But what is legitimacy of inequality? If inequality in today's China is being
legitimated, how can we understand this legitimacy eectively? These questions are
crucial to begin at an approach to my primary argument in this study. Referring to
the legitimacy of inequality under reform implies a premise that the current system
of social stratication has been accepted by most Chinese citizens without delibera-
tion, particularly by the citizens who are of lower status. This voluntary collective
acceptance, I argue, is a perceptual process constructed by the socioculture within a
state-socialist context. From this perspective, the inheritance and reproduction of the
earlier state-socialist class system naturalizes and justies the inequality under reform,
which in turn makes people feel that the social stratication based on merit is at least
partially proper and just.
This chapter rst provides a brief introduction to the political philosophical term
legitimacy, and of how this concept is applied to inequality research. The sociocultural
approach is then introduced to help one to understand how inequality can be legitimized
in a meritocratic society. The sociocultural approach suggests that social practices that
are passed on from one period to the next reproduce and naturalize inequality by merit.
Consequently, people tend to feel that social inequalities are just and acceptable.
2.1 Legitimacy of Inequality
2.1.1 Legitimacy: Basic Ideas
The term legitimacy originates from political philosophy, and now has been extended
to several social science subjects. In modern politics, legitimacy plays a role of moral
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tool, to justify governmental power. The prevailing interpretation of legitimacy is
that government must rest on the consent of the governed \in the name of people"
(Nasstrom, 2007, p. 624). Consent theory was initially applied to explain legitimacy
by one of the founders of political philosophy, Tomas Hobbes. The relevant ideas can be
found in his best known work Leviathan. Although he is often viewed as an absolutism
defender, Hobbes also developed some liberal thoughts, evidenced through statements
such as \for all men are equally and by nature free" (Hobbes, 2002, p.162). The natural
condition of mankind, for Hobbes, is one of a war of \every one against every one"
(Hobbes, 2002, p. 80), which compels men to realize that the essences of self-interest are
peace and stability, and order is preferable to chaos (Dyzenhaus, 2001). Given that,
it is necessary to establish general rules to forbid men to engage in the destructive
actions. These rules are called \natural law" (Hobbes, 2002, p. 164). Because of the
equality and the natural freedom of all men, however, there is no natural authority
among them, the authority has to be authorized to make law and to represent men's
will and interests (Riley, 1973). Hobbes believed that the basis of the founding of a
sovereign authority is a social contract.
Another well known Englightenment-era British political philosopher was John
Locke. Locke continued to relate the concept of legitimacy to consent. In his work
Two Treatises of Government, Locke wrote that \he has no Right, to get me into
his Power . . . I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my Liberty,
would not when he had me in his Power, take away everything else" (Locke, 1988,
p.280). Locke's ideas on legitimacy argue against political absolutism, and empha-
size the enforcement of public rules (J. Cohen, 1986). But why is common consent
so crucial to legitimize government or political society? Lockean theory goes beyond
Hobbesian, by associating the assumption that human beings are in a state of nature
and equally free, with property and territory rights. Locke noted that the settlement
of property rights suggests agreement on boundaries between men and their neighbors
(Locke, 1988). The emphasis on property rights obliges men not to harm anyone else's
in life, liberty, or possessions, and thus natural law creates obligations for everyone
(Locke, 1988). Agreement on these obligations therefore constitutes the necessary or
minimum condition for a legitimate civil society (J. Cohen, 1986).
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Continuing this tradition, Jean-Jacques Rousseau further developed the essence
of legitimacy in civil society. His most quoted line, from the beginning of the rst
book of The Social Contract, 1762, is: \man is born free, and everywhere he is in
chains" (Rousseau, 2013, p. 35). In the book I of The Social Contract, 1762, Rousseau
concentrated on how to reconcile individual freedom with political authority (Bertram,
2004). He distinguished civil liberty from natural liberty, and pointed out that natural
liberty is limited by the power of the individual while the civil liberty is limited by
the general will (Rousseau, 2013). Through social contracts, men gain civil liberty but
lose unlimited rights. Civil society, thus, in both Locke's and Rousseau's eyes, is an
alternative entity that is consistent with men's desire for self-preservation of property
and other interests, and also denotes men's departure from the state of nature (Kumar,
1993; Bertram, 2004). Based on this idea, Rousseau rejected the role of nature and
force in maintaining social order, and believed that the universal will or agreement is
the only possible source of legitimacy. Politically, a legitimate administrative system
comes into being when the general will is applied or enforced (Bertram, 2004).
Beyond philosophy, Max Weber applied legitimacy to the study of political and so-
cial systems. According to Weber, \state is a relation of men dominating men"(Weber,
1946, p. 78). Weber's theory on legitimacy answers an important question, that is:
When and why do men voluntarily obey a certain leader's orders (Weber, 1946; Pakul-
ski, 1986)? Naturally, this collective voluntary obedience or acceptance is an expression
of consent. According to Weber, men's obedience, is determined by fear of the revenge
of power-holders, and hope for rewards. There are three domains to which humans
can be said to submit their obedience in a social context, provided they view each as
legitimate: the \traditional," the \charismatic," and the \legal" (Weber, 1946, p. 79).
These three inner justications refer to the sanctication of the authority, the authority
of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace, and authority's belief in the validity of
legal statute, respectively (Weber, 1946). It shows that the natural implication of le-
gitimacy is the defense of appropriation. Weber then specied the use of convention to
deepen the application of legitimacy. In social life, Weber believed, a legitimate order
is organized through a series of behaviors that are consistent with society's normative
patterns (Weber, 1978).
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2.1.2 Legitimacy and Inequality
Weber's interpretation of legitimacy has given rise to a number of perspectives in social
sciences. From classical to contemporary theories, legitimacy has received increased at-
tention by sociologists, and has provided grounds for research across many sociological
areas, such as social organization, social order, and mobilization studies (e.g., Stryker,
1994; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012). In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology,
legitimacy is described as a state of appropriateness that is granted to an entity. A
legitimate entity is one that is suited to the institutionalized values, norms and beliefs
of a social environment to which the entity belongs to. Only in this way can an entity
deserve collective support in the environment (Troyer, 2007). Here emphasis on col-
lective support in generating legitimacy is comparative to the emphasis on consent in
earlier political philosophical works.
Based on Weber's theory of legitimacy, H. A. Walker (2014) summarized two broad
streams of modern legitimacy research in the social sciences. The rst focuses on the
emergence and validation of rules that govern social forms and actions. The second
concerns individuals' evaluation of social structure and system. The former examines
the processes through which organizations operate validly at the macro-level, while the
latter concentrates on individuals' attitudes towards social structure and processes at
the micro-level (see also: Weatherford, 1992; H. A. Walker, 2014). Notwithstanding
that social theories involving legitimacy have drawn heavily on consent theory from
political philosophy, sociologists seem more interested in the legitimacy of the formation
of structural relations. Inuenced by Levi-Straus's theory that structure refers to the
universal laws and rules that organize binary oppositions in mythical thoughts (Levi-
Strauss, 1974), the contemporary structuralist direction underlines the causal force of
the relations among elements in a system (M. A. Schneider, 2007). Structuralism or
structural relations theory is generally built on sign-systems, and intends to reect
an abstract picture that expresses the reality (Pettit, 1977; M. A. Schneider, 2007).
In the domain of sociology, gender relations (male vs. female) and racial relations
(black vs. white) are very typical examples of structural relations described by abstract
semiotic theory. In this sense, the structural relation is a socially constructed metaphor
for hierarchy (Sewell Jr, 1992). And whether these organizational forms have gained
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legitimacy depends on whether or not people voluntarily accept their positions and
the values, norms, and beliefs that have been transmitted through these relations
(B. S. Turner, 2006; Troyer, 2007).
Structural relations generate dominance and inequality. Drawing an associative
link between legitimacy and inequality requires the condition that such dominance has
been collectively acknowledged as valid (H. A. Walker, 2014). In an unequal structural
relation, dierent actors are assigned to dierent social roles to create social groups
or classes. People act through semiotic social roles, and nally create an abstractly
presented social structure (B. S. Turner, 2006). As an abstract social order, legitimate
structural inequality deals not only with whether a person with a positional advantage
tend to support a stratied system, but also whether a disadvantaged one will likewise
tends to support it (Stolte, 1983). The need of legitimate structural relations is an
\inequality regime" that produces a series of relevant corresponding internalized rules
and norms, so that legitimacy is believed to play an important role in creating and
maintaining social relations (Acker, 2006). Upon this, the legitimacy of inequality is
strengthened through the process of naturalizing inequality (Acker, 2006; Jodhka et
al., 2017). Taking gender inequality as an example, gender discrimination policies in
social spaces are historically made. Currently, even if women have already been aware
of gender disparities in society, many of them still take male-female dierences for
granted as part of the way how their work and life are organized.
To sum up, legitimacy in inequality research investigates how a hierarchical ar-
rangement regime at the macro-level transforms into a collectively acceptable norm at
the micro-level. A legitimated relation of inequality and the promotion, maintenance,
and reproduction of social arrangements are mutually constructed. As a perception
of justication rather than an objective fact, legitimacy implies an awareness of what
is fair, what is natural, and what could be tolerated. It is internalized attitudes and
behaviors that make legitimacy into a mechanism that maintains and reproduces in-
equality. Naturalizing inequality is a psychological process for establishing obligations
for group members to tolerate and to conform to the rules that govern the inequality
regime (Blanchar & Eidelman, 2013; H. A. Walker, 2014). With regard to human per-
ception, in turn, inequality in a meritocratic society appears natural and acceptable
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when it is expressed in a form of being reproduced or reects a long-lasting order of
domination (Blanchar & Eidelman, 2013). Next, I will apply a socio-psychological per-
spective to the interpretation of legitimacy and legitimation respectively, to justify the
application of the sociocultural perspective to the understanding of human perception
of authorities, institutions, and social arrangements.
2.1.3 Legitimacy and Legitimation: A Socio-psychological Approach
The philosophical interpretation of legitimacy reveals that basic ideas of this concept
denote a human belief in the appropriation and justication of authorities and insti-
tutional arrangements. In the modern social sciences, an increasing number of social
psychologists have incorporated the dimension of political philosophy into their theo-
rizing about legitimacy, and have interpreted legitimacy as a psychological property of
humans in which they feel they ought to defer to certain rules and decisions (e.g., Tyler,
1997, 2006a; Costa-Lopes, Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013). In other words, legitimacy
emphasizes how people feel and think about certain rules and norms. Human appraisal
of legitimacy, therefore, is a mental action or process of accepting norms or not. Human
judgment with regard to legitimacy has its foundations in a perceptual process. Major
(1994) argues that, in social systems, legitimacy may arise within public consciousness
through one of three modes: distributive justice norms, procedural justice norms, and
attributions of responsibility. In this sense, the logic of how authorities, institutional
arrangements, or social systems are perceived as legitimate develops out from the way
human perceptions are organized, \in concert with a simple justication ideology that
guides social conduct" (Crandall & Beasley, 2001, p.78).
If legitimacy is understood as a particular psychological property in making judg-
ment, it must be also viewed as a broad social process. Human feelings of ought to defer
to rules are evoked by internalized values (Tyler, 2006a). Legitimacy, thus, becomes a
generalized perception that is socially constructed within a taken-for-granted system
of values, norms, and rules (Suchman, 1995; C. Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006),
and has to be appraised within a local situation, or a broader community such as an
organization or a society. Otherwise, it would not make sense. In particular, the way
humans perceptually make judgments on appropriateness and justify a given social
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Legitimacy
Legitimation
Socioculturally construction process Socioculturally perceptual process
Figure 3: A social organization that is maintained by legitimation and legitimacy.
reality denotes their awareness of surroundings. This awareness, or mental process,
is acquired through social and/or cultural interactions and is situated in particular
contexts (C. A. Sanderson, 2010). For instance, Im (2014), while examining Chinese
society, stressed in his article that citizens attitudes toward legitimacy of inequality
are constructed upon a psychological mechanism that is embedded in China-specic
political-cultural schemata that is shaped by historical contingencies and momentous
social events.
Legitimation, refers to the processes by which authorities, institutions, and social
arrangements are justied as meeting norms, rules, and standards (Costa-Lopes et al.,
2013). Legitimation thus can be described as a characteristic of being legitimized within
a framework through which something is believed just and proper (Tyler, 2006a). More
specically, human beliefs that institutional and social arrangements are appropriate
and just help make sense of sociopolitical systems in ways that provide support for the
rationality and justice of excising power by an authority. In this sense, legitimation is
a process of social construction and becomes one of the pillars of stability maintenance
in a social organization. Searching for a recognizably appropriate form of identity is
crucial in legitimation construction, as identity signies a collective reconciliation of
conicting needs for assimilation and dierentiation (Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006). The
fact is that humans are more willing to comply with a justiably recognized subject,
even though they have to concede what they should have been granted to a certain
extent (see also: Costa-Lopes et al., 2013).
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In terms of social inequality, legitimacy and legitimation concern dierent aspects
of the same process. Legitimacy of inequality emphasizes human belief that the class
systems or hierarchical arrangements are proper, just and acceptable. Taking social
reality as an object of judgment, legitimacy is gained through human subjective feel-
ing. Legitimation reveals a characteristic of inequality that the certain class system
or hierarchical arrangement appears to be just and proper and thus perceptually ac-
cepted by humans. Legitimacy and legitimation, therefore, are reciprocally constructed
(see: Figure 3). The research target of the present study is to nd out why Chinese
citizens voluntarily accept the status quo of inequality. This exploration of the cause
of legitimacy of inequality has to be associated with the meritocratic characteristic of
inequality becoming legitimized.
2.2 Cause of Legitimacy of Inequality: A Sociocultural Frame-
work
How do hierarchical arrangements become collectively accepted in a meritocratic so-
ciety? What makes the inequality appears to be naturalized and justied? Why
do lower status people voluntarily accept their inferiority? These questions are keys
to understanding the source of the legitimacy of inequality in today's China. Legiti-
mate inequality is about domination that describes a naturalized superiority-inferiority
structural relation. The description of the legitimacy of China's inequality in the in-
troductory chapter addresses a question of social dominance and how the structural
relation from micro level to macro level is naturalized and accepted by citizens. The
fact has been emphasized above that human perceptions of justication are sociocultur-
ally organized, which further justies the application of the sociocultural perspective
in exploring the source of the legitimacy of inequality.
2.2.1 Social Domination: From Individual to Social Group
In terms of structural relations, the nature of inequality is group-based discrimination
and oppression that promotes the superiority of one social group over others (Sidanius,
Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991; Pratto et al., 1994). In academic work, racism and
gender dominance are very typical cases for discussing group-based inequality. In the
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relevant studies, symbolic recognitions, such as \female" and \Black" become the cate-
gorical sources of social classication. For this reason, I will now introduce the psycho-
logical trait \social dominance orientation" (SDO) (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen,
2003, p. 161) to describe how human perception is organized in viewing inequality. As
a micro-level psychological and behavioral disposition, social dominance orientation
expresses an individual's more general desire for unequal social systems. For instance,
individuals who have a high SDO are found to be more nationalistic, anti-Black racist
and sexist (Pratto et al., 1994). To be concrete, despite being in lower status po-
sitions, individuals who are high in SDO still believe that hierarchy is appropriate,
and voluntarily accept their inferiority. For individuals, the acceptance of domination
denotes that something appears to be naturalized and routinized (Brighenti, 2011).
Thus, social inequality can be understood as a perceptual construction of reality.
As a psychological mechanism, the disposition of social dominance orientation re-
produces and reinforces inequality via \individuals who have a general preference for
hierarchical structures over egalitarian ones" (Schmitt et al., 2003, p.162). This psy-
chological trait has an organized set of values and beliefs that view hierarchical struc-
ture as proper and further justies the corresponding practices. In particular, human
practice is socially constructed by this perceptual process within a cultural context.
Furthermore, this mechanism corresponds to the group conict model, so that the
individual psychological level can become associated with a sociopolitical structure
(Blumer, 1958; Pratto et al., 2000). The maintenance of group-based dominance re-
lies on two conditions: institutionalized discrimination within a symbolic world, and
relevant normative social practices (see also: Pratto et al., 2000).
Theoretically, institutionalized discrimination refers to the rules, norms, and poli-
cies that contribute to maintaining disadvantaged groups (Pager & Shepherd, 2008).
This denition reveals the fact that it is a rule in discriminatory practice that leads
the group-based dominance or inequality to be structured and reproduced. The insti-
tutionalized discriminatory attitudes and behaviors at group-level emerge from a sys-
tem of symbolic interaction, and contribute to symbolic inequality between the classes
(Jodhka et al., 2017). An individual becomes humanized through interaction with
others. This interaction thus gives rise to the acquisition of human nature, thinking,
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and self-direction (Manis & Meltzer, 1978). Within a symbolic world, the interaction
is the process of the formation of routinized values, norms and rules. For instance,
physical dierences among individuals can be interpreted as gender dierences within
the gender system, or as ethnic dierences within the ethnic system. It is the sym-
bolic recognition, such as gender, ethnicity, and title, that transforms the domination
from individual-level to group-level. Another example, from the labor market, is that
women and minorities have to become better educated and experienced to compete
with men and majorities, because these two groups of people are always discriminato-
rily considered to be less competitive (see: Larwood, Gutek, & Gattiker, 1984). The
injurious meanings exerted upon symbolic recognition allow the inequalities between
classes and groups not to be temporary but rather to be durable and repeatable. Like-
wise, the superiority-inferiority structural inequality has to be institutionalized within
a symbolic world.
The normative social practice is a certain consequence once the group-based dom-
inance is institutionalized. Due to normativity, social practices are always substituted
by synonymous terms, such as \rules," \norms," and \traditions." S. Turner (1994)
employed the convenient term \habit" to specify the abstract term \social practice."
Specically, this term depicts a form of repeatable behavior that caused by distinctive
mental activity. From this perspective, I argue that the routinized and repeatable prac-
tice is consistent with Bourdieu's description of habitus. Bourdieu also incorporated
habitus into social practice, dening habitus as structuring dispositions (Bourdieu,
1990b), which characterized habitus as embodied patterns of thinking and action that
are intelligible and acceptable within a given sociocultural context (Jodhka et al., 2017).
As a sort of identiable paradigm, thus, the homogeneity of habitus or social practice
modes is quite fundamental to, say, whether some level of group-based dominance has
been accepted. As a result, the heterogeneity of habitus between social groups or
classes is the manifestation of such structural inequality.
2.2.2 Acceptance, Legitimacy, and the Sociocultural Approach
Why do people voluntarily accept the group-based domination? Built on the discus-
sion above, it is necessary to understand how habitus can be shared among a social
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group without any intentional calculation. Bourdieu (1990b) ascribed the objective
homogenizing of a group or class habitus to the conditions of existence that enable the
practice of people to be unconsciously adjusted to a certain rule. In this study, I view
this awareness of circumstance as the result of a sociocultural force. That is to say,
human voluntary acceptance of domination doesn't result from any risk and pressure
that can be anticipated, but rather from human perception of a certain environment.
The homogeneity of a group or class habitus is acquired by the way in which people
mentally and physically interact with their surroundings. This interaction process is
unconsciously constructed by humans, which explains how group-based habitus dis-
tinctions are legitimized within a framework through which distinctions are viewed
natural and proper. For instance, no one would doubt a middle class group of people
in Asia prefer luxury consumption to keep up their high lifestyle.
Rooted in a sociocultural system, the acceptance of human of inequality is under-
stood as an action without intentional deliberation, because socioculture embodies a
series of taken-for-granted values and norms. This pattern of thinking and action de-
notes perceptual processes that are linked to mediated activities (Vygotsky, 1980). The
acknowledgement of the fact that human practice and perception are always mediated
provides justication to introduce the sociocultural perspective to understand accep-
tance, since the formation of human awareness is shaped by social/cultural contact
and has to be traced to the developmental environment. Therefore, the distinguishing
feature of human mental activity and practice is \the internalization of socially rooted
and historically developed activities" (Vygotsky, 1980, p.57). In this theory, the me-
diated activity is internally oriented by a symbolic universe and externally oriented by
a tool system (Vygotsky, 1980; Wertsch, 1986). In a manner analogous to the tool use
that implies objective human activity, the sign 7 acts as an instrument for psychological
activity (Vygotsky, 1980). Given that, it is reasonable to believe that in a completed
process of human practice, or habitus, a specic activity has been psychologically me-
diated. At the micro and macro levels, these practice modes, or habitus, that refer to
internalized dispositions, values, and attitudes might explain distinctions in social and
economic performances (Charles, 2008; Jodhka et al., 2017). In this current study, an
7In this study, I use \sign" and \symbolic recognition" interchangeably.
31
entire practice system develops out from socioculture.
Since human-specic activities are contributed to through psychological mediation,
the practice system is organized through a symbolic world. Vygotsky (1980) empha-
sized that the creation of signs or signalization could be expressed by a generalized form
of the same metaphor. As a matter of fact, in a world of social construction, signs be-
come the carriers of social practice systems, of habitus modes, and of sociocultures.
As a sign, for example, \masculine" and \Black" respectively represents some distinct
traits, such as leadership or rock music. At the same time, all these signs are placed in
structural relation, like gender structure and ethnicity structure. This further reveals
that the nature of sociocultures or cultures is expressed through a symbolic dimension
(see also: Reckwitz, 2002).
Accordingly, it is the socioculturally rooted psychological process that allows group
members to accept shared habitus without intentional deliberation. Such voluntary
acceptance of habitus shared by a group or class means the acceptance of the group's
position in a structural relation. For humans, it is required to repeat mental activities
to accept these rules, norms, and hierarchical arrangements. The perceived longevity
of hierarchical systems may increase people's acceptance of inequality, which denotes
that the source of legitimacy in a structural relation must be a perceived stable system
(Blanchar & Eidelman, 2013). This conclusion was supported by comparative empirical
test about the dierence between Americans and Indians to describe the legitimacy
and justication of the caste system. In this sense, the stability and durability of
socioculture organizes human perception in a routinized way, and orients humans to
repeatedly accept their positions in a hierarchical system. Human habitus acquired
through this acceptance reproduces the social structure from which the habitus develops
out of, and in turn the inequality system comes to be viewed as natural and proper.
In a meritocratic society, human habitus signies individual merit. For this reason
I regard the class system in state-socialist society as a specic socioculture in order
to understand the legitimacy of inequality in today's China, since some state-socialist
class inequalities have persisted even after China's economic transformation. In other
words, under state socialism, a series of hierarchical arrangements have shaped human
practice, which is presumed to signify individual merit in today's China. The relevant
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habitus is expected to continue to exist along with some legacies of the socialist social
structure. Socioculture, thus, is a novel contributor to a clear understanding of why the
inequality resulted from meritocratic competition is perceived to be just and acceptable.
The following two chapters will layout how socioculture, as an entire practice system,
reproduces inequality, and what exactly persists as socialist socioculture in today's
China.
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3 Legitimizing Inequality: The Sociocultural Mak-
ing of the Reproduction of Domination
Within the social sciences, legitimacy is often viewed as a human socio-psychological
property characterized by voluntary deference to normative standards (e.g., D. T. Miller,
2001; Tyler, 2006a; Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). Because of legitimacy, people believe
that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are proper and just, and feel that
they ought to defer to rules (Tyler, 2006a). One particularly innovative approach that
integrates the behavior and mental processes with contextual factors, to explore the
source of the legitimacy of inequality is the sociocultural perspective. The legitimacy of
inequality, is not only contributed to through the coordinated eorts of the privileged
groups, but also through the support provided by under-privileged groups (Stolte, 1983;
Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Since the sociocultural perspective emphasizes the eect
of sociocultural roots on psychological development and on cultural form of behavior
(Vygotsky, 1980), legitimacy can be seen as a socioculturally psychological process that
makes inequality acceptable. In other words, as a result of meritocratic competition,
inequality is legitimized when it reects a socioculturally rooted domination, which is
perceived as proper by both advantage and disadvantaged groups.
In this chapter, the sociocultural approach is interested in two sides. One concerns
the process ontology of a social group or class, and the other explains why each group
voluntarily tends to accept their position in a structural relation. Both of these sides
make an emphasis on how humans attempt to strategically cope with their surround-
ings. Within Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, inequality is essentially understood
as the distribution of habitus and symbolic capital, indicating that the structural root
of inequality is mediated by human habitus. Habitus contributes to the legitimacy of
inequality through reproduction, which is to say that legitimate inequality is always
reproduced from a society's earlier historical structure. The apparent invisibility of
reproduction makes domination appear natural and normal. In line with Bourdieu,
habitus signies a practice system in a given symbolically expressed structure and is
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dened as, socioculture. Bourdieu's habitus theory has its applicability to the case of
the development of Chinese society. For instance, Y. Wu (2008) found that Bourdieu's
theory of the social reproduction of educational inequality is applicable to the context
of post-Maoist China. When a merit-based socioeconomic system was established af-
ter the Cultural Revolution, the eect of the embodied cultural practice (as a type
of habitus) on educational attainments and upward social mobility reemerged. Apart
from this, habitus theory is popular in Chinese language articles, which focus on the
class structure in reform-era China (e.g., R. Hu & Chen, 2008; Hong & Zhao, 2014)
This chapter is organized as follows: the rst section introduces socioculturalism
and how it is applied to the construction of social groups and forms of domination.
Built on that, the second section adopts the concept of symbolic inequality, to describe
the distinctions among social groups in a symbolic universe, and how the rules of the
organization of these groups orient and institutionalize intergroup relations and human
actions. Then, in order to further depict the internalized actions by social groups and to
explain how these embodied dispositions contribute to the reproduction of intergroup
relation or domination, Bourdieu's habitus is formally introduced in the third section.
Finally, in the last section, based on the entire system of symbolic inequality, habitus,
and practice, socioculture is dened as a practice system or a set of internalized values
and actions. By choosing this denition, I explain why domination or inequality is
natural and generally acceptable to humans.
3.1 Socioculture, Social Group, and Domination
3.1.1 Socioculture and Process Ontology
The sociocultural perspective provides an approach to understanding why people think
and behave the way they do without intentional calculation. One fundamental assump-
tion of socioculturalism, thus, is the process ontology, which holds that entities and
structures are not existent but rather socially constructed, and that only processes
are real (Sawyer, 2002). Contemporary socioculturalism gives us a more comprehen-
sive account of how things are really are, by incorporating constructivism within the
traditional sociocultural perspective to explain a learner's practice in a specic milieu
through the description of his/her mental activities (Bereiter, 1994). This development
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is particularly attributed to the classic Vygotskian model which has been to used to
help illuminate learning and cognition in non-academic settings, such as environments
that shape development, those of everyday life (Vygotsky, 1980; Bereiter, 1994). Al-
though Vygotsky places an emphasis on the cognitive function in the process of social
construction, his theory is, to some extent, incomplete (Frawley, 1997). The focus
on cognitive processes in contemporary sociocultural theory has resulted in its wide
application to research related to second language acquisition and adult learning (e.g.,
Lantolf & Pavlenko, 1995; Alfred, 2003).
With regard to the sociocultural perspective, the process ontology mainly concerns
cognitive development that focuses on \the role of the individual in constructing real-
ity" (Rogo, 1990, p.4). But what is cognition or social cognition research actually
about? In a recent study, Greifeneder and Bless (2017) attempted to address this by
asking: How do individuals process information, and convert their subjective interpre-
tation of the objective situation to the construction into social reality? Indeed, the
same inputs usually result in dierent interpretations by dierent individuals, which
means that the particular way in which an individual constructs his or her social real-
ity is contingent on that individual's feelings and general understanding of himself or
herself (Greifeneder & Bless, 2017). Furthermore, dierences in cognition between peo-
ple reects dierences in decision making and interactive histories. In earlier research,
humans were not considered as autonomous agents but rather as causal contributors
to their motivation and action. Accordingly, shared cognition is a system of \triadic
reciprocal causation" (Bandura, 1989, p.1175). In this model, a comprehensive cog-
nitive process should include personal factors, behavioral patterns and environmental
events that inuence one another bidirectionally as interacting determinants.
Focusing on the environmental factors in the model of triadic reciprocal causation,
three particular environmental structures are included: the imposed environment, the
selected environment and the constructed environment (Bandura, 1999). The imposed
environment is physical and sociocultural thrust upon people whether they like it or
not. However, the imposed environment's rewarding and punishing aspects won't come
into being until the specic environments, such as certain activities or milieus, are
selected. In selected environment, people construct institutional systems in a society
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Personal Factors
Behavioral Patterns Environmental Factors
Figure 4: Social cognition model of triadic reciprocal causation
by their generative eorts. It is inevitable for humans to be inuenced by routines
when they are embedded in certain contexts within a given society, which reveals
the nature of human cognitive development as a process of social interaction between
institutionalized environments and human activities (see: Rogo, 1990).
The presence of an imposed environment is the rst step in human information
processing, learning, and thinking. Cognition, thus, is situated. More precisely, cogni-
tion is socioculturally situated, because the use of signs breaks away the biological and
physical inuences on psychological processes (Vygotsky, 1980; Gee, 1997). Through
mediating devices, including signs and general heuristics, embedded values and beliefs
guide human mental processes and inuence the way how humans feel, think and be-
have (Valsiner, 2007). Valsiner (2007) thus argued that, as a sociocultural process,
human thinking unies individuals and society within a cultural (semiotic) process of
making sense of one's world and of oneself. Social existence, therefore, is the production
of human culture-based cognitive processes, which corresponds to the socioculturalists'
interpretation of process ontology. Human cognitive structure, by this argument is
thus socioculturally organized.
The sociocultural approach thus assumes that social existence is constructed phone-
mically, through knowledge, value, experience, etc. (Fox, 1998). This view of social
existence doesn't reject the mode of existence of social objects but rather emphasizes
the subjective interpretation of an object. Presently, humans tend to interpret real-
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ity through two cognitive sensory organs: \an epistemic sense of objective-subjective
distinction and ontological sense" (J. R. Searle, 1995, p. 8). Epistemically, both \ob-
jective" and \subjective" concern the way in which individuals make judgments. And
the ontological sense relates to the objective-subjective distinction of the modes of ex-
istence, which is crucial to the explanation of process ontology. For example, as an
objective territory, the United States of America might be considered either as a dream
place or an enemy country. That is to say, it is the forms of human knowledge and
feeling that vary the existence of the U.S. To be concrete, the U.S. territory is ontolog-
ically objective, since the mode of its existence is independent of human mental states.
In contrast, the sense of it being an enemy country or a dream place is a subjective
entity, because this mode of existence results from the feeling or perception of subjects.
Likewise, seen as a social existence, system structure is framed by the object-generated
mental schema (Sewell Jr, 1992). This mental schema includes thoughts, perceptions
and actions, which yields human practice. In gender structure, for instance, the binary
opposition of male-female social relation radically stems from the physical dierences
between men and women. For the most part, the gender structure denotes the onto-
logical interpretation of gender relation that people use their mental processes to make
sense of the information of physical dierences. In this sense, any structural relation
in a system gives rise to the construction of a cognitive processes in individuals.
Even though Searle's theory reveals the role of conscious intentionality in the con-
struction of social groups and their belief systems, it overlooks the unconscious dimen-
sion of intention in the cognitive processes of making sense of a social world. Although
Searle made a contribution to the theory of unconscious states, he failed to systemati-
cally link unconscious intentional states to group-based human actions. Compared to
conscious intentional states that reect subjective desires and beliefs that are based on
objectivity, an unconscious intentional state in the mind is analogous to a \sh deep in
the sea," or \objects stored in the dark attic of the mind" (J. R. Searle, 1991, p. 48).
J. R. Searle (1991) further regarded unconsciousness as an altered conscious intention,
which characterizes the unconscious as irreducibly subjective. In the following studies,
human unconscious states are found to be routinized, through the guidance of the con-
scious components of working memory (e.g., Baars & Franklin, 2003). In other words,
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the mental scheme granted by conscious intention is stored in human memories, which
orients humans to unconsciously behave in routine ways in the future. The sociocul-
tural approach brings this stored mental scheme or unconscious intention to light, to
emphasize the justications of social reality and human action.
3.1.2 The Construction of Social Group and Domination
The description above implies another fundamental idea of social constructivism that
only by virtue of collective acceptance, recognition, or commitment objective facts
exist (e.g., Tuomela, 2003; J. R. Searle, 2006). I will thus look upon this collective
acceptance as a criterion for evaluating whether a social existence is legitimate. From
this perspective, physical entities act out social roles and gain social status by being
collectively created. Tuomela (2003) provided an example to illustrate this mecha-
nism. A squirrel fur can \in principle" be used as money because collective members
performatively accept it as currency. Should members of this imaginary collective stop
accepting squirrel fur as money, the role and function of squirrel fur as currency will be
replaced by something else. In this instance, collective acceptance determines how an
object achieves a recognition in society. This collectivism, in the eyes of some scholars,
is further linked to how individuals cope within a sociocultural context (e.g., Chun,
Moos, & Cronkite, 2006; Kuo, 2013). Theoretically, as one of the coping strategies,
collective acceptance needs to be discussed in the context of stress-related reactions to
particular kinds of stimuli in social environments (Kuo, 2013).
Up to the present, collective coping has been commonly viewed as stress reactions
in ways consistent with several social theories (Morris et al., 1976; Pittner & Hous-
ton, 1980; Kuo, 2013). Stress, as in psychological or physiological distress, is caused
by either overarousal or underarousal within a personal-environment dynamic (Aldwin,
2007, p.24). Collective coping with stress can be illustrated in a typical case that, social
protest is the collective members' reaction towards the stressful experience of devaluing
environment (Kaplan & Liu, 2000). The original and complete understanding of col-
lective coping consists of both individual and collective sides (Wagner, Kronberger, &
Seifert, 2002). At the collective level, coping is triggered when stress culturally shapes
a wide array of responses. To sum up, collective behaviors or eorts are being concep-
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tualized as \a constellation of multifaceted stress responses shaped and enhanced by
collectivistic norms, values, and tendencies" (Kuo, 2013, p.4).
Based on the universal conclusion that external conditions generate dierent forms
of interaction between collective members and situations, socioculturalists further em-
phasize human adaptation in the process of coping (Cross, 1995; Aldwin, 2007). As an
incorporated concept, adaptation originally consisted of two dimensions, the psycholog-
ical dimension that refers to the emotional well-being of humans, and the sociocultural
dimension that relates to the ability for humans to t in to the host environment
(W. Searle & Ward, 1990; C. Ward & Kennedy, 1996, 1999). In the model of sociocul-
tural theory, the psychological adaptation is best understood in terms of a stress and
coping framework. And it is human psychological reactions towards certain contexts
that yield culture-specic learning and corresponding behaviors (Lave, 1997; C. Ward
& Kennedy, 1999). C. Ward and Kennedy (1999) have noted that, compared to psy-
chological reaction, sociocultural adjustment is rather an emphasis on behavioral com-
petence that is acquired by cultural learning. From this perspective, human behavior
has to be interpreted in the sociocultural background in which it takes place, otherwise,
it won't be meaningful (Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998).
In the sociocultural paradigm, adaptation means acceptance of the host culture.
The concept of sociocultural adaptation has in recent years been extensively adopted
in cross-cultural and immigration studies. Through some existing studies, I have found
that the measurement of sociocultural adaptation underlines human knowledge about
the institutions, norms, and values in a certain context, and to what extent they
agree with and follows these culturally appropriate practice (W. Searle & Ward, 1990;
C. Ward & Kennedy, 1999). These implications explain why people engage in routine
activities. Culturally routine behavior suggests human acceptance of norms in the
social space. Being collectively accepted can mean either acceptance of the \I-mode"
or acceptance in the \we-mode" (Tuomela, 2003). As a matter of fact, no matter which
mode collective acceptance happens, the collective existence is legitimately created.
However, in terms of group construction, collective acceptance must be in the \we-
mode," which means group members do not \privately" accept something but rather
\together" accept something (Tuomela, 2003, 2013). In Tuomela's work (2013), the
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we-mode is built on three criterial notions: the group reason, the collective conditions
and the collective commitment. These foundations make it possible for a we-mode to
authorize members to act as a unit or a group, and to become committed to the group
as well as to each other. As a result, group members have a tendency to engage in
cooperative behavior and sharing attitudes (J. R. Searle, 2006). Usually, the we-shared
attitude relates to conformity to a group's intentions. In a technical sense, intentional-
ity is believed to play a crucial role in the construction of a social group. Intentionality
depicts the feature of minds by which mental states are about something or directed at
something (J. R. Searle, 1995, 2006). Desire, belief, and hope are intentional, as these
terms embody human perceptions of justication on certain objects. To be concrete,
if a social group has a goal it must be a desire that such should be the case. Once the
intention of a social group is xed, the corresponding group-shared thinking, attitudes
and actions are routinized and nally become the norms of practice.
In order to examine how the intentionality of a certain social group comes into
being, it's necessary to provide a clear denition of social group. Tuomela (2013)
said, the collection of the members of a we-mode group is socially constructed as a
group. Tuomela's description of social groups is consistent with the prevailing idea that
social groups do not only maintain a constructed existence, but also count as \objects"
(Hacking, 1999), because people labelled \female," \refugee," \the Anglo-Saxon" are all
various collections in the world. Groups, as well as extensions, such as sets and classes,
are the divisions or classications of humans (Tajfel, 1981; Hacking, 1999). But what
are the ways of classifying humans? Many scholars agree that both internal power and
external power are feasible to divide humans into groups. In Tajfel's 1981 work, they
are called internal phenomenal criteria and external experimenters' criteria respectively.
Built on internal-external power, Tuomela (2013) then divided we-mode groups into
autonomous groups and non-autonomous groups. This autonomy occurs along with
a denite internal phenomenon. For instance, skin color, as a physical phenomenon,
provides a special condition for people of the same color to be gathered by a racial
label. Such a condition rejects people of other colors as members. The racial group,
thus, is an obvious case of autonomous group. Contrary to the autonomous group,
a non-autonomous group is rather the functioning community or organization whose
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establishment relies on the use of external power and control. One non-autonomous
group case is the labor union whose operation is processed by the externally authorized
leaders.
Conceptually, social class is an extension of the social group. In the contemporary
context, social class, social stratication and social structure are often interchangeablly
used, and related to the study of the logical order of human agencies' access to capital
and status. In this sense, class is not simply equal to group, but rather synonymous
to \group status," that is, \a collectivity that chooses to think of itself as a group and
is recognized by others as such" (McAll, 1990, p.28). Academically, when scholars
speak of social class, they are technically referring to, namely, \upper class," \working
class," \middle class" and so on (see: Bourdieu, 1987; McAll, 1990). The explanation
and the prediction of the observed distinctions among individuals are allowed by con-
structing social space (Bourdieu, 1987). Such space, in Bourdieu's eyes, is not the real
geographic space, but is rather the space empirically constructed by \the main factors
of dierentiation which account for observed distinctions in a given social universe,"
and that exists in the form of \capital" (Bourdieu, 1987, p.3-4). For instance, the
inequality that is determined by dierences of economic capital is a space. At the
same time, Bourdieu noted that people who are close together in social space tend to
recognize each other as a collective (Bourdieu, 1989).
Bourdieu's discussion of social space and class leads us to believe that social class
is a sort of autonomous group. A shared class comes into being along with the phe-
nomenon that individuals who stand close together in a space recognize and accept each
other. In other words, objectively, people with near amount of capital are inclined to
together accept their situation. Like other autonomous social groups, this we-mode
collective acceptance reveals that class members tend to engage in shared attitudes
and behavioral patterns. This togetherness directs them toward collective goals partic-
ular to their class or group, which I dene as intentionality above. In terms of specic
social classes, intention reects the source of justication of the common actions of
class members. Intentionality provides the foundation for the construction of a social
group or class. By this means, it is reasonable to believe that the intention-yielded
attitudes and behavioral patterns draw the class boundaries in the social structure.
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In this study, I hold the idea that collectively acceptance existence not only means
a group or a class member's commitment to the group's situation, but also signies
their simultaneous acceptance of domination. That being said, as a structural rela-
tion, class domination is also a we-mode collectively accepted existence. The sociocul-
tural paradigm, actually, acknowledges that human adaptation to certain domination
is implicit the acceptance of a host culture. In line with Vygotsky (1980)'s model,
sociocultural forces shape psychological dispositions through cognitive processes. This
cognition is developed through everyday learning in a given context, and further evolves
into the internalized practice. When referring to class domination, specically, cogni-
tion refers to voluntary acceptance of class status. Ontologically, it is such cognition
that justies the existence of domination.
Additionally, justied or legitimated domination signies that the thought pro-
cesses and actions of a group or a class member a mediated by situated cognition. A
disadvantaged group member tends to behave in a way that corresponds to an infe-
rior position. A typical example concerns the gender domination. For a long time,
women have preferentially choosen low-risk professions while men have tended to play
dominating roles in society, like serving in political positions. In the sociocultural
paradigm, this psychological mediation is viewed as a communication system governed
by semantic rules and codes that can be abstracted as a sign-system, since the social
class and domination are socially and culturally constructed (Hebdige, 1979; Bour-
dieu, 1979; Vygotsky, 1980). In this sense, sociocultural process or cultural process
is constructed upon the communication-functioned sign-system and means that \the
most taken-for-granted phenomena can function as signs" (Hebdige, 1979, p. 13). In
this sense, human actions are symbolically mediated (Rehbein & Souza, 2015; Jodhka
et al., 2017). As a practice system, moreover, the sociocultural environment exists in
the form of a symbolic world, which characterizes legitimated domination as symbolic
domination.
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3.2 Symbolic Domination and Practice
3.2.1 Symbolic Capital and Inequality
The symbolic mediation of practice makes group or class distinctions appear to be
naturalized. A group or class's belief, which I call intentionality, can be seen as a
symbolic guarantee. This guarantee, in academic works, is dened as symbolic power
that constitutes world-making, or the construction of social reality (Bourdieu, 1979,
1989). In the sociocultural paradigm, power in a symbolic world constructs and justies
social order or domination, which leads to the search for distinctions through the
tracking of symbolic logic (Bourdieu, 1986). Symbolic power, therefore, enables a
certain group or class members to engage in discriminatory practice modes, such as
racism. Under this circumstance, symbolic capital is an eective instrument for the
maintenance of domination.
And what exactly is symbolic capital? With regard to the cognitive function, sym-
bolic capital is a credit that grants people who hold sucient recognition within a
collective to be in a position to impose recognition (Bourdieu, 1989, 1990b) . Simply
speaking, a symbol is a form of recognition. Symbolic capital brings about relevant
prots, through its function as an instrument of cognition and communication. Sym-
bolic capital is exhibited in various forms of recognition, such as titles, prestige, or gen-
der/ethnicity identity, to construct the distinctions in a symbolic world. For instance, if
a person holds a Ph.D. degree, then almost no one would doubt that his/her knowledge
in the subject for which the degree was obtained, compared to outsiders. And a woman
is likely to be doubted in ability when she runs for public oce. These illustrations
suggest that symbolic capital can be converted into other capitals. X. Zhang (2004)
used the case of China's land reform, to illustrate how class status as symbolic capital
transformed into political capital during that period. For Bourdieu, symbolic capital
is thought to be one of the mechanisms that \make capital go to capital" (Bourdieu,
1990b, p.120).
Symbolic capital thus institutionalizes social domination. Due to the cognitive
function, labeling recognition may remind one of social psychology and symbolic inter-
actionism, theoretical schools that examine phenomena that underlines the intellectual-
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cognitive experiences that generate the constitution of social group identity (Lamont
& Fournier, 1992). A certain cognitive process or experience is shaped along with the
objective world, thereby turning into a subjective structure. In Bourdieu's eyes, this
transformation moves from symbolic objects to symbolic forms (Bourdieu, 1979). That
is to say, the entire symbolic universe is built on objective phenomena, which makes all
symbolic recognitions equipped with internal objectivity. If a constructed social iden-
tity is associated with symbolic recognition, then its formation can be simplied as a
process that turns objective divisions into recognized symbolic classications, and then
into internalized cognitive experiences, and nally into institutionalized distinctions.
In this process, the most crucial is that human objective divisions have to establish
the rules of collective adaptation toward environmental stress. Otherwise, these divi-
sions won't be institutionalized. As shown in Figure 5, only through collective coping
norms can an objective division be recognized. Take an example of racism. It was
the slave trade during the age of discovery that led to the race-based divisions which
shaped human cognitive interpretations and led to the institutionalized domination
of this classication system in modern society. When the characteristics of objective
divisions are embodied in symbolic recognitions, such as \Ph.D." signifying knowl-
edgable and \male" signifying power, the sociocultural foundation of domination has
been established.
Unequal access to symbolic capital has given rise to a phenomenon that is called
\symbolic inequality" (Jodhka et al., 2017, p. 11). As an expression of the logical
order of a social structure, symbolic inequality rather suggests that domination is
institutionalized and the distinctions have become built in a apparently way. Func-
tionally, symbolic capital is used to legitimize social domination mainly through two
steps. The rst concerns the establishment of a coherent belief system, that is, the
underlying prejudices or stereotypes toward lower class groups of people, indexed by
recognitions. As mentioned above, belief systems are about characteristics and are
established through objective divisions inherent in particular collective coping rules.
Practically, the \black" and \female," are typically believed to lack professional com-
petitiveness in labor market. As another example, in political elections, as a heuristic
symbol, party identication has a signicant eect on voters stereotypes regarding a
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Figure 5: Process of the formation of institutionalized social distinctions and domination
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candidate's issue predispositions (Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). For instance, a
\Republican presidential candidate" in the United States is usually seen to be more
conservative in some social issues, such as abortion and immigration. In the domain
of the social sciences, the term \symbolic violence" is referred to describe such non-
physical discriminatory implications via dierent recognitions between social groups
(Henry & Sears, 2002; Jodhka et al., 2017). Secondly, it is quite necessary for symbolic
characteristics to pass on from one generation to the next. Essentially, the inheri-
tance of symbolic characteristics not only maintains the privileges of superior groups'
privileges, but also leads to inferior group members becoming involved in sustained
deprivation of capital, which allows domination to be taken for granted. In this sense,
as a manifestation of legitimation, institutionalization particularly reects that domi-
nation or inequality in society has been naturalized invisibly, and can be reproduced
(see also: Jodhka et al., 2017).
3.2.2 Symbolic Power and the Making of Practice
Getting back to the earlier discussion, it is the practice that directs and institutional-
izes the merits and dispositions of individual agents. I will now employ a conceptual
framework of practice, developed by Bourdieu, to describe embodied dispositions and
explore the way how they become naturalized (Sweetman, 2009). This framework has
systematically associated symbolic capital to the logic of practice, and has helped ex-
plained how society operates through the cognitive function of recognitions. Bourdieu's
theory on practice has recently been reduced to the following model that I adopt in
this study, that is, practice as a routinized or institutionalized type of behavior that
constitutes various forms: body and mental activities, background knowledges of being
understood, things and their use, and so on (Reckwitz, 2002). For Bourdieu, humans
behave like \virtuoso" with commends of their \art of living," because they tend to
do things the right way (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 8). The appropriate selection of conduct
for a given situation, or the \sense," as I discuss above, is the rule-yielding strategic
coping by agents. The art of living, then, was theoretically developed by Bourdieu in
his explanation of the norms that explicitly govern practice.
In one of his more well known books, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977),
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Bourdieu used \the `rules' of honor to the `sense' of honor" to trace how a practice mode
is established. Conferring an honor on a man requires judgments about whether the
man is thought to be able to play the game of honor appropriately and well (Bourdieu,
1977). In this sense, the rule of honor implies a principle that is equivalent to a practical
scheme that enables trained agents to make correct judgments about honor, further
characterizing the honor as a mutual recognition. The repeated operation of a rule
which I call knowledge learning and consumption, in this case generates a disposition
called the \sense of honor" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 15). As a disposition, sense of honor
or sense of the game, becomes inculcated in one's earlier years of life and suggests
a scheme of thoughts enabling each agent to engender practices naturally consistent
with the logic of a ritual world (Bourdieu, 1977). Bourdieu explained that a rule in
this social game is a simple regularity that is derived not only from a law or quasi-
law, but also from a custom, formula, and even proverb, thus forming normative facts
(Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986). In addition to that, the sense term refers to a feel for
the game, emphasizing human subjective choice of the best possible match to what a
game requires (Bourdieu, 1977; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986).
Usually, human experiences are not acquired through the rules or norms, but rather
by means of feelings and selections. However, these rules and norms do provide knowl-
edge to humans about what is correct, and characterize human actions as intuitive
products of knowing such rules of the game, called \strategies" by Bourdieuian schol-
ars (e.g., Harker, Mahar, & Wilkes, 1990; Gherardi, 2000). A practice mode is shaped
through experiencing the \sense" that is situated appropriate strategy. For a social
group or class, it is the shared sense of honor that determines whether an action is
acceptable or sanctionable (A. King, 2000). But what do the term \sense" and \strat-
egy" mean when they are interchangeably applied to the theory of practice? Bourdieu
pointed out that acquisition of a practical sense in a social game begins in an individ-
ual's childhood, through participation in social activities (Bourdieu, 1977; Lamaison
& Bourdieu, 1986). Dierent from the rule of the game that appears to be based on
quasi-juridical principle8, on one hand, the sense of the game embodied in the agent
8The quasi-juridical is one of the connotations of rules, referring to a clearly objectied and con-
sciously held precept (see: Lizardo, 2010).
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Repeated operations of rules
Orients and routinizes actions
Figure 6: Making of a practice
that orients and adjusts actions according to the relevant rules (Lamaison & Bourdieu,
1986). On the other hand, strategy is viewed as an agent's coping actions that are
based on a sense of the social game (Chia & Holt, 2006; Vaara & Whittington, 2012).
The formation of the sense of the social game virtually routinizes human actions and,
as a result, human behaviors can be executed with minimal conscious control in a
given context (W. Schneider & Shirin, 1977; Shirin & Schneider, 1977; Ajzen, 2002).
For example, going to the hospital, for most people, is an appropriate coping strategy
when sick, and then becomes a situated routine that doesn't require much focused
deliberation. Hence, as shown in Figure 6, no matter the identity of the individual or
group agent, the routinization of strategic coping is the core mechanism for accessing
a practice mode (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011).
The human practice has a logic (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990b). In the following studies,
the nature of this logic is interpreted as the practical sense, and it should be noted
that this practical logic contradicts the Levi-Straussian model of logical logic, that
reduces action to structure (Lau, 2004). The Bourdieuian approach views practice
directly as a product of practical sense, which assumes social sensitivities as guides to
human actions (Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). By associating appro-
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priateness with the sense of the game, Bourdieu believed that the logic in practice to
some extent denotes the human tendency to take the things of logic for the logic of
things (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In this sense, practice is commonly recognized
as a strategic interest-pursuing act. Despite this, Bourdieu and his followers do not
see logical practice as rational activity but rather strategy, because the term \ratio-
nality" explains the actions of agents by the direct ecacy of cause, but ignores the
eect of agents' individual and collective histories on production and reproduction of
actions through the internalization of preferences (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Evens,
1999). Given the nature of strategic intuition, the logical practice usually appears to be
naturalized and without intentional deliberation. As Bourdieuian scholars have said,
strategy, within the logic of practice, conveys the purpose of legitimation of social order
(see: Harker et al., 1990).
When the logic of practice is placed in a framework of social group domination, it is
necessary to add the concept \symbolic capital" and \symbolic power" to understand
how an agent's strategy is imposed and maintained in the group, since society is a
social space where people exist in relation to one another based on the distribution of
status honor. As the starting point of the legitimation of domination, the objective
divisions, in a socially constructed world, have been transformed into representations
granted by a symbolic universe (Bourdieu, 1979; Wacquant, 1992). In this system,
the representation acts as a communication instrument to guide the way in which
humans interact with each other. For most people, it is signicant to use a medium
of communication to negotiate with others in the rst phase. The recognition, which
carries symbolic capital, is viewed as guarantor, to promote the interaction and to
guarantee the deal of domination once it has been made (Bourdieu, 1979).
The claim here is that symbolic capital generates an invisible \symbolic power".
Contrary to the visible power in everywhere, Bourdieu introduced the notion of sym-
bolic power in his work Language and Symbolic Power, as the invisible power which
\can be excised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they
are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it" (Bourdieu, 1991, p.164). Es-
sentially, due to the unequal distribution of symbolic capital, the exercise of such power
also contains the discriminatory meaning and inevitably generates symbolic violence.
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It is actions with discriminatory implications that establish the sense of the hierar-
chical order and the social world (see also: Bourdieu, 1979). Bourdieu emphasized
that symbolic power can be exercised only if it is recognized. That is to say, sym-
bolic recognition is automatically granted \a power of constituting the given through
utterances, of making people see and believe, of conrming or transforming the vision
of the world" (Bourdieu, 1991, p.170). Accordingly, symbolic power has become the
taken-for-granted force of legitimate pronouncement, to further classify, authorize and
represent the world (Loader, 1997).
The specic pattern of actions embodied in symbolic recognition becomes a prac-
tice mode. By making the constructed world taken-for granted symbolic capital and its
power suggest a sociocultural root to make a practice mode meaningful. That is to say,
even if strategic coping occurs without deliberation, the action of an individual agent
or a group agent is meaningful because its embodied logic is symbolically mediated. In
this sense, sociocultural environment, as a practice system, can be particularly concep-
tualized as a symbolic domination system. The dispositions linked to macro symbolic
domination not only determine the logic in micro-level practice, but also reect in such
certain practice tendencies, which bound symbolic power, interaction, and the emergent
mediated order (Hallett, 2003). When the practice modes of social groups are known as
symbolic characteristics, a social order or hierarchy is symbolically negotiated. I bor-
row the concept stereotype from social psychology, dened as an abstract impression of
a certain category of person, acquired from the earlier experiences (R. Gordon, 1949;
Tajfel, 1982; Sherman, 1996), to describe such group-based symbolic characteristics.
Just like the implicit cognition contained in stereotypes that automatically activate
actions (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996), in accordance with Bourdieu's discussion
(1979) of the cognitive function of symbolic power, symbolic characteristics contribute
to intergroup attitudes and behavior in the form of specic action tendencies (Tajfel,
1982; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In terms of social domination, action tendencies
include the discriminatory or injurious meaning of superior groups (i.e., male, elite
class people, natives), as well as the acceptance of inferior groups (i.e., female, lower
class people, immigrants) to being discriminated against. From the perspective of le-
gitimation, thus, symbolically mediated intergroup interactions allow domination to be
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viewed as proper and acceptable.
3.3 Habitus and Reproduction
3.3.1 Capital, Field, and Habitus
In order to deeply investigate how human practice is mediated to become acceptable
and naturalized from a sociocultural perspective, it is crucial to introduce a concept
of habitus. The idea of habitus is one of Bourdieu's most inuential academic legacies,
because it not only saves Bourdieu's theory from becoming a position of rationalist for-
malism with disembodied agents engaging in strategies to the accumulation of various
capital, but it also allows Bourdieu to analyze the social agent as a embodied actor
whose dispositions are aected by the real physical and institutional conguration of
the eld (Lizardo, 2004). Thus, the interpretation of Bourdieu's work on habitus must
be associated with two other highly relevant concepts: capital and eld. In Bourdieu's
eyes, the social genesis is twofold, one is the scheme of thoughts, beliefs and behaviors
which are collectively called \habitus" and the other is the social structure, which is
called the \eld" or, ordinarily, \social class" (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14). In this sense, the
distribution of the forms of capital denotes how a eld is set and constituted. Habi-
tus, then, is the result of internalized understanding of a certain eld by agents, or
even of the entire social world (see also: Bourdieu, 1989). In the following section, I
will provide comprehensive theoretical introductions of these concepts respectively. In
addition, a thorough knowledge of habitus is necessary to understand how a practice
mode is organized in a cognitive way, and how it develops into a particular socioculture.
The introduction of the notion of capital is of vital importance in understanding the
social world. In Bourdieu's theories, capital is a crucial conceptual apparatus to bridge
eld and habitus (Mahar, Harker, & Wilkes, 1990). His concept of capital identies
three main dimensions: economic, social and cultural capital. The ownership and
possession of these three resources are legitimized through the mediation of symbolic
capital (Siisiainen, 2003). All these objectied or embodied forms dene capital, briey,
as a potential capacity to produce prots and to reproduce itself in an identical form.
That is to say, capital contains \a tendency to persist in its being" (Bourdieu, 1986,
p. 15). In this sense, capital is available in the form of force that implies the struggle
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for the imposition (Mahar et al., 1990; Siisiainen, 2003). For Bourdieu, capital is the
basis of domination (Mahar et al., 1990).
More importantly, capital is convertible, which makes the capital-based domination
legitimate. In addition to being a social force, capital also acts as a social nexus within
an exchange system, to associate all tangible and visible resources with the worth of
being sought. Such convertibility is consistent with Lin's interpretation of capital as
representative of an investment with expected returns in a marketplace (N. Lin, 1999).
A typical example is that educational qualications as cultural capital are expected to
be turned into economic earnings. The most powerful conversion, however, happens
to symbolic capital, for it is often the only legitimate way to accumulate various forms
of capital (Mahar et al., 1990; Smart, 1993). In a structural relation, the eect of all
tangible and visible capital of imposition maintains through the conversion to symbolic
capital. Only through the conversion into invisible capital that is available in the form
of honorable or prestigious recognition, can an advantageous person or class naturally
be accepted as legitimate authority (Mahar et al., 1990).
All forms of capital make sense in a given eld. Generally, the English word eld
refers to the space of autonomous social microcosms, such as religious eld, intellectual
eld, artistic eld. In Bourdieu's eyes, the eld is closely associated with social space.
Religion, economy, and art are analogous to social spaces or elds. A large eld can
be divided into a series of subelds, for instance, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism are all
subelds of religion. Bourdieu's concept of eld contains three important analogies:
the eld where a football game plays, a eld in science ction, and a eld of force in
physics (Thomson, 2008). The football eld is a site where the positions of players are
represented in visual form, and the game of football has its specic rules that players
must learn. Bourdieu believed that the social eld looks like a football that consists of
positions occupied by agents or players, and what happens in the game is boundarized,
or organized (Thomson, 2008). Not only that, but the fact that this competitive game
happens on a football eld means that players or agents have to make strategies to
maintain and to improve their positions, which further reveal the conguration of a
eld depending on how various forms of capital are distributed (Bourdieu, 1989, 1991).
Science ction force-elds refers to Bourdieu's description of a eld or a space as a
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cosmos that obeys its own laws (Bourdieu, 2005). Through these laws, the rules of
eld behavior are justied and routinized, and nally become the logic of practice
within a eld (see also: Thomson, 2008).
Last but not least, the eld of force in physics is quite crucial for understanding
Bourdieu's eld. The force exerted by one object on anther suggests that a eld
could be thought to be a composition of opposing forces (Thomson, 2008). These
forces, stressed by Bourdieu, operate similar to the accumulation of cultural capital and
economic capital. Given that, the eld is characterized to be magnetic, with agents'
positions determined by the structural relationship between these forces (Thomson,
2008). Extensively, in academic terms, a eld could been dened as \a network, or a
conguration, of objective relations between positions" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992,
p. 97). From this perspective, as long as a setting locates agents and their positions,
it can be seen as a eld; from a religious eld to a football eld, from a physical eld
to a eld of social structure.
Capital, eld, and habitus are directly connected. The value of capital is related
to the characteristics of an agent's habitus (Bourdieu, 1984; Mahar et al., 1990). Seen
as one of the most inuential academic legacies by Pierre Bourdieu, habitus, has been
retrieved and reworked rather than invented by this French sociologist. As a matter
of fact, this term can be originally traced back to Aristotle's account of \hexis". In
Aristotle's eyes, hexis is regarded as a set of habitual dispositions that are instilled in
early education and experiences, and which orient human feelings, desires, activities
and self representations (Burkitt, 2002; Wacquant, 2016). This everyday habit suggests
unthinking and durable routine of behavior. The latin word \habitus" was proposed
by Marcel Mauss to replace hexis and other synonyms, such as \habit," \habitude,"
and \acquired ability" because habitus denotes that human habits vary not only with
individuals and their institutions, but also between societies, properties, educations,
and forms of prestige (Mauss, 1973; Burkitt, 2002). In this sense, habitus has an
implication that integrates human habitual dispositions into a framework of sociological
studies, and connects actions to the situated appropriateness.
Compared to the \rules" or the \norms" that regulate human actions in the game,
Bourdieu reintroduced and further developed the concept of habitus as a sense of the
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game (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1977). The technical term habitus is
thus borrowed by Bourdieu to describe such people's strategies or choices that are not
the product of obedience to a rule, but of a feel for a game (Bourdieu, 1990a). In line
with this, Bourdieu and his followers then questioned how social structure and individ-
ual agency can be reconciled, by addressing habitus as a concept of structuralism. As
a production of the structures constitutive of a particular context, habitus comprises
a structured and structuring structure (Bourdieu, 1977; Maton, 2008). Here, \struc-
turing" can be viewed as the tendency without conscious reference to the norms, and
be \structured" by earlier environments wherein experience and knowledge have been
attained (Bourdieu, 1990b; Sewell Jr, 1992; Maton, 2008).
Theoretically, it is necessary to bring structured and structuring parts together to
follow the implication of habitus. It is quite signicant to rst emphasize that, habitus
is characterized as a durable and stable disposition, and that such durability or stabil-
ity signies a human's way of being, or a habitual state. The generated dispositions,
including beliefs, perceptions, feelings and behavioral patterns, reveal the underlying
structuring principles of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977; Maton, 2008). In this study, there-
fore, I call these structuring principles the logic of the sense of a game to orient the
future practice. If habitus has been acknowledged as human dispositions or tenden-
cies without any intentional calculation, then the habitus is structured by a structure
(Bourdieu, 1990b). For some time now, the word \structured" has been used as an
technical term in cognitive psychology. For instance, in social psychology, imagina-
tion is structured in the sense that imagination is directed by past stored knowledge
(T. B. Ward, 1994). Given that, I prefer to see \structured" as a word used to describe
how human minds process the rules of society, in which the most crucial processing is
internalization, and only by internalization can the rules in society be transformed into
a sense. The assembly of structured and structuring parts suggests that the logic con-
tained in habitus is the unconscious reasoning cultivated through the internalization of
the norms or rules in structural relation. Such interpretations enable us to understand
how Bourdieu described habitus in his sociological studies:
\The habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appropriation nec-
essary in order for those products of collective history, the objective structures
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(e.g. of language, economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or
less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, in the organisms (which one
can, if one wishes, call individuals) lastingly subjected to the same conditionings,
and hence placed in the same material conditions of existence" (Bourdieu, 1977,
p.85).
Habitus, when applied to relevant studies, is seen as the embodied dispositions or
tendencies to behave in ways that human agents have learned (Rehbein, 2015; Jodhka
et al., 2017). It is the capital that determines tendencies. At the same time, human
habitus has to match the logic of how a eld is organized, that is, the \unwritten
rules of the game underlying practices within that eld" (Maton, 2008, p.57). It is
Bourdieu's notion of habitus that captures the genesis of a practice mode. Additionally,
as the internalized logic of action, practice appears to be meaningful only when it is
associated with a given setting. In short, practice can be viewed as the habitus in a
given condition. For example, as a practice mode, women's social participation only
makes sense in secular industrialized societies. Such relationship between capital, eld,
habitus and practice can be summarized in accordance with a formula as follow:
[(Habitus)(Capital)]+Field=Practice (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101)
Although Bourdieu's ideas on habitus have been followed and employed by an in-
creasing number of social scientists, it is inevitable even for him to receive some crit-
icism. Up to now, the critique of Bourdieu's habitus mainly concerns two aspects:
habitus and social change, and the reductiveness of the habitus (A. King, 2000; Lau,
2004). About the former, the critics have pointed out that, since habitus describes
a system of durable internalized dispositions that are appropriate to the structural
relations in a eld, a society should reproduce itself. Therefore, logically, it seems im-
possible for social changes and revolutions (e.g., Brubaker, 1985; Evens, 1999; A. King,
2000). To solve this problem, Bourdieu employed a notion of hysteresis eect to in-
tegrate social change into the theory of habitus. When the environment that humans
encounter is dierent from the one to which they have already been adjusted, there
will be a lag time for humans to acquire new habitus to catch up with the emerging
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objective conditions (Bourdieu, 1990b; A. King, 2000; Maton, 2008). It is worth not-
ing that, the hysteresis of habitus is quite important for us to analyze and understand
domination or inequalities in transformation societies.
The latter concerns how habitus reproduces social relations. In most works, habitus
is seen by Bourdieu to provide a convincing account of social reproduction, because
it plays a mechanical role of imposing prior social structure on individuals' tenden-
cies (A. King, 2000). In other words, this reductiveness characterizes humans to be
the self-deluded followers of social rules or regularities (A. King, 2000; Schrift, 2014).
Accordingly, such reductiveness has been rejected by Bourdieu in his critique of the
structuralist account of gift exchanges, and leaves him to be criticized as an objec-
tivist (e.g., Evens, 1999; A. King, 2000; Mouzelis, 2000; Lau, 2004). It's undeniable
that, nevertheless, Bourdieu's real intention is to introduce a subject-object dualism to
overcome the problems of structuralist objectivism, which makes an emphasis on em-
bodied habitus as a naturalized way of trying to manipulate and control the structural
relations. As is well known, habitus has been seen as the most successful explanation
of social reproduction, while the challenge of making habitus a non-reductive concept
remains (Lau, 2004; Archer, 2004). In order to avoid being a reductionistic explanatory
tool, it is necessary to construct habitus as a concept that explains both change and
reproduction (see also: Lau, 2004). Referring to Jodhka et al. (2017)'s study on the
operationalization of habitus, therefore, I try to investigate how human agencies react
to milieu and how habitus works out in my empirical analysis.
3.3.2 Habitus and the Reproduction of Symbolic Boundaries
In Bourdieu's eyes, reproduction is either biological reproduction that denotes the
heredity of physical traits, or social reproduction that concerns the maintenance of
social order or relationships. The biological and the social reproduction of human
agencies are objectively concerted, assigned by a series of principles that govern human
tendencies and constitute a particular mode of reproduction (Bourdieu, 1977). In
terms of the reproduction of social order in a meritocratic society, the maintenance
of domination doesn't concern the visible capital but rather concerns invisible value,
which means that inequality is reproduced through the invisible symbolic domination
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(Haeri, 1997; Rehbein & Souza, 2015; Jodhka et al., 2017). Bourdieu took marriage
as an example to describe how social order or hierarchy is reproduced by symbolic
capital. He believed that marriage is an eective tool to strengthen practical kinship or
relationships, because the family plays a decisive role in the maintenance of social order
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1996). As the central unit in a society, family takes responsibility to
accumulate and to transmit the capital in dierent forms, and it safeguards its unity
for accumulation and transmission. In this case, marriage is a reproduction strategy to
protect the privilege and value of the family name. The social order that is maintained
and inherited by marriage, essentially, is the reproduction of symbolic boundaries.
Since it has been acknowledged that logical order in social structure is expressed by
symbolic inequality, as well as the symbolic making of social reproduction, how does
habitus make symbolic reproduction possible? To answer this is of vital signicance to
the exploration of why habitus is about reproduction. The continuance of the value of
symbolic capital is the consequence of the transmission of habitus between generations,
which makes habitus a reproducible social world. In agreement with Bourdieu, many
scholars believe that habitus contains a kind of genetic information that allows suc-
cessive generations to inherit dispositions from the earlier generations (Swartz, 1997;
Crossley, 2003). The inheritance and transmission of habitus from one generation to
the next reveal the likelihood that the psychosocial categories are genetically hard-
wired in human bodies as well (Silva, 2016). Bourdieu's emphasis on the individual
subjectivity-societal objectivity dualism in habitus therefore suggests that the physical
body is simultaneously socialized (Swartz, 1997).
From a behavioral perspective, habitus is shaped by a distinct social-psychological
experience that is deeply related to a given cultural condition (e.g., Lizardo, 2004;
Bonilla-Silva, Goar, & Embrick, 2006). More specically, it is the human observation
and participation in social closure that make it possible for humans to acquire habitus.
Habitus, as a result, \helps normalize and legitimize social closure" (Bonilla-Silva et
al., 2006, p. 233). By social closure Max Weber meant the process by which social col-
lectivities seek to monopolize various resources for achieving or maintaining privileged
positions in a society (S. K. Sanderson, 2007). Weber's notion of closure in sociology
virtually entails that social closure is the basis for class formation and class structure
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(Parkin, 1974). Practically, attempts at closure occur along many lines, including gen-
der, ethnicity, class, language, etc. By observing these, it is found that social closure
suggests the picking over of an identiable social or physical attribute as the justiable
basis of exclusion (Parkin, 1974). The identiable attribute, is what we call \symbolic
recognition".
The construction of symbolic boundaries simultaneously favors privileged groups
but impedes devalued groups (Bonilla-Silva et al., 2006). Social closure, to some ex-
tent, leads habitus to be restricted within a symbolic boundary, which leads human
habitus to vary with symbolic recognitions (Bourdieu, 1989). In this sense, the main-
tenance or even reinforcement of symbolic boundaries is conditioned by the inheritance
of habitus. Up to the present, the underlying relationship between habitus and sym-
bolic capital has been more often revealed through psychological perspectives. Overall
speaking, the symbolic capital possessed by humans always reminds human agencies
of the recognition of their hierarchical positions (Steinmetz, 2006). It is the cogni-
tive function of self identication contained in symbolic capital that generates power
to orient humans to behave in given ways without intentional calculation (Bourdieu,
1979). This has been systematically pointed out by Pierre Bourdieu in his theory of
practice. The core of Bourdieu's idea of human practice is the emphasis on the uncon-
scious intentional state in a specic context. Although a distinct tendency is linked to
a symbolic recognition, nevertheless, such tendency, that is called \habitus", is not a
direct product of symbolic recognition but rather a product of history that produces
practice modes (see also: Harker & May, 1993). Thus, symbolic recognition can be
more precisely understood as a storage device to ensure the active presence of past
experiences and knowledges. Practically, these past experiences provide a guarantee
of the correctness of practices and their constancy over time (Harker & May, 1993),
the symbolic capital or recognition, virtually, plays the role of a reminder to humans
to maintain tendencies. For instance, as a recognition, \male" always reminds the
masculine to play a leading role in gender relations, which is deeply inuenced by the
earlier historical gender dominance.
Habitus must be regarded not only in terms of acquisition and generativity, but
also in terms of reproduction of power and position-taking (Noble & Watkins, 2003).
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According to Bourdieu, the reproductive nature of habitus proposes a model of me-
diation and process that suggests human agencies engage in an educational system
that includes teachers, parents, friends, etc. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). It is ed-
ucational institutions, such as schools, wherein naturalizing human habitus becomes
a most eective lter in the reproductive processes of a hierarchical society, because
schools enable habitus to be transformed into cultural capital (Harker, 1990; Bourdieu
& Passeron, 1990). In Bourdieu's theory, social classications are transformed and
projected by academic classication. More specically, in educational institutions, the
habitus that represents the culture of a class or a group acts as a guarantee of academic
grades and educational qualications for the students, so that social value comes to be
identied as personal value (Bourdieu, 1984; Harker, 1990). Accordingly and briey,
in highly dierentiated societies, habitus traits become more akin to class and status-
group subculture, and more closely associated with individual merit (see also: Swartz,
1997; Jodhka et al., 2017). The reproduction of social hierarchy, hence, is the result of
the inheritance or maintenance of a group-based social traits.
Similarly, if social domination is understood in terms of symbolic inequality, habi-
tus traits appear to be analogous to symbolic characteristics. In addition, it is the
cognitive function of symbolic recognition that further explains why Bourdieu's the-
ory on education and habitus makes sense. As symbolic recognition has its cognitive
function to orient and remind humans to follow \the sense of a game" to retain the
class-relevant habitus traits, a certain habitus is passed on from one generation to the
next, and symbolically distinguishes itself from other groups or classes. The symbolic
function of group labels transforms social dierences into personal values by uncon-
scious self-control. On that note, Jodhka et al. (2017) have been pointed out that,
some groups with less symbolic value, such as people of color, women, and lower class
people have never been able to acquire the equal merit with others, because they have
inherited less valuable social traits. For this reason, habitus, and its maintenance,
promote the homogeneity and the solidarity for the symbolic in-group, which indeed
reinforces symbolic boundaries and even more reproduces domination (see: Figure 7).
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Figure 7: How habitus reproduces symbolic boundaries
3.4 How Socioculture Legitimizes Domination
3.4.1 Socioculture: An Internalized Practice System
Sociocultural studies emphasize human mental activities, and their learning processes
from a given milieu (e.g., Vygotsky, 1980; Bereiter, 1994). In most academic works in
the social sciences, social milieu is viewed as a non-academic setting, describing how
humans learn from their everyday lives and make appropriate decisions. In general,
milieu can be a closed place, such as a school, family, working place, etc., or a political
institution, or class milieu (Reiss, 1951; W. B. Miller, 1958; Garrahan, 1977). In terms
of social domination, milieu concerns two dimensions, one concerning the whole social
hierarchy at the macro level, and the other concerning the particular class/group milieu
at the meso level. Both two levels of milieus contribute to human cognitive development
about social domination at the micro level.
On one hand, class milieu orients human thinking and behavioral patterns. Class
community is a social closure that is characterized by a set of value systems, which
dene a class as a distinct cultural system. In a closure, one is accepted as a class
member only through acting in conformity with the traditional and long-established
value system dened by the class. W. B. Miller (1958) gave an example of the lower
class in the U.S., to illustrate why and how the lower class milieu exerts a direct
inuence on deviant behaviors. He stressed that \trouble," \excitement," \toughness"
are the very typical features of lower class culture, which characterized lower class
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culture as a generating milieu of crime, because in-group members have to adhere to
the underlying behavioral standards within that community. More broadly, human
psychological motivations relate to group norms virtually reveals the nature of cultural
force that provokes the feelings of belonging and presence (W. B. Miller, 1958; Rogers
& Lea, 2005).
On the other hand, by the whole social structure, milieu represents how various
class milieus are linked together and hierarchically organized to form a larger context
(Gerth & Mills, 1953; Stinchcombe, 1986). When milieu is structured, it develops
discriminatory control of one group over the other (Reiss, 1951; Sidanius & Pratto,
2001). In a structured milieu, individuals are assigned to social roles along with the
spatial boundaries, which signies the collective role as a status position in a struc-
tural system. Roles, by denition, are interpersonal. That is, \what we think ourselves
are decisively inuenced by what others think of us" (Gerth & Mills, 1953, p. 11).
Essentially, the denition of role further reveals human attitudes towards intergroup
domination, and such attitudes have been proposed as psychological mechanisms to
explain why it is possible for inequality to be maintained (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001;
Schmitt et al., 2003). This psychological mechanism, is the social dominance orien-
tation (SDO) that I discuss in the introduction chapter. Usually, a high SDO level
indicates the preference for hierarchy, not only for privileged groups, but also for the
disadvantaged groups. At the same time, Sidanius and Pratto (2001) stressed, the sta-
bility of intergroup hierarchical relations implies that group-relevant norms and values
have been compatible with higher SDO level. Specically, a structured milieu empha-
sizes hierarchical preference as an important dimension of the cultural system of a class.
For instance, in a male dominated society, the behavioral norms that men have control
over the resources and women voluntarily play marginalized roles, reects the value
systems of these two gender groups respectively. All distinct lifestyles of classes are de-
ned objectively and sometimes subjectively in and through their mutual relationships
(Bourdieu, 1984). In this sense, in terms of social structure, it is the long-established
concordance among class dierences that institutionalizes a structural relation. Here,
I call this institutionalized structural relation \sociocultural background".
As it is well known, the sociocultural perspective provides an explanation of how
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human cognitions and behaviors are aected by cultural background. Thus, as an in-
stitutionalized structural relation, such as sociocultural background, shapes the way
in which humans behave through two conditions: the class condition and the social
condition. This happens to correspond to Bourdieu's formula to account for practice.
According to Bourdieu's theory, the former condition refers to a human's status position
that implies the volume of capital he or she possesses, and the latter is the hierarchical
structure (e.g. Bourdieu, 1989, 1989). Understanding by the logic of symbolic dom-
ination, sociocultural background, then, becomes the synthesis of symbolic relations
at both meso and macro levels. Firstly, a class condition has to be expressed by the
possession of symbolic capital. Then, through the distribution of symbolic capital, an
entire symbolic world is organized to dene the logic of class dierences. Human sta-
tus positions have been symbolically retranslated as symbolic lifestyle, which identies
class habitus as a result of the homogeneity of symbolic conditions (Bourdieu, 1990b;
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2013).
Habitus is an unconscious expression of a distinct class culture. The habitus of dif-
ferent classes is organized in a structural system, to perform a meaningful abstraction
that is called \practice" by Bourdieu. Habitus, is the source of the logic of practice,
but rather than practice itself. Thus, habitus cannot be seen as a practice system
but rather a practice mode. Generated by habitus, practice mode follows a practical
logic, and only through this can we contrast Bourdieu's practice theory with the Levi-
Straussian model of logical logic that reduces human actions to structure (Lau, 2004).
Furthermore, practical logic associates practice with a phenominoncal-premise, which
adds subjectivity to Levi-Strauss' description of human actions. Such subjectivity en-
ables human agencies to act with a sense of the game to adapt towards the social eld
where they live. Like what Lau (2004) summarized in his article, Bourdieu's prac-
tice is an interest-pursing strategy without conscious deliberation, and this strategy,
essentially, is in pursuit of illusio in specic elds-games.
A practice system is composed of a series of class habitus that has to be appropriate
to a given institutionalized social structure, otherwise, it won't be socially meaningful.
Such practice systems, in this dissertation, are what I call \socioculture". In short,
as an abstract concept, socioculture can be understood as a set of appropriate values
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and actions in a specic structure. Similarly, in the work of Jodhka et al. (2017),
socioculture is regarded as a synthesis of an entire structure, culture and practice,
which also reminds us that it is unwise to discuss socioculture and its functions without
structural context. Likewise, a structural relation that is constructed through the
distribution of symbolic capital denotes a socioculture, as it represents an internalized
practice system. Particularly, due to the symbolic violence among classes, each class
habitus maintains domination through everyday practice, which provides socioculture
symbolically discriminatory meanings. In addition to the gender dominance in a male
dominating society, racism is another socioculture in a racially segregated society.
3.4.2 From Reproduction to Legitimation
Then, how socioculture legitimizes inequality? Legitimation signies a characteristic
that domination is viewed as right and proper, by both privileged groups and disad-
vantaged groups. As a belief of being legitimized, legitimacy of inequality is achieved
through a human psychological property of social hierarchy, the belief in domination.
When legitimacy is possessed, it leads people to obey social rules and arrangements
voluntarily (Tyler, 2006a). Without the belief in domination, it is impossible to seek
the legitimacy of inequality. As a technical term that has been widely applied to the do-
main of public administration, legitimacy emphasizes a feeling of obligation to defer to
and accept the policies and rules made by authorities (e.g., Tyler, 2006a; Hurd, 1999;
Tyler, 2004). It is this psychologically voluntary deference that ensures authorities
can easily exert inuence and control over most others. That is to say, this feeling of
\should" shapes a perception of legitimacy, which explains why inequality is legitimate.
Experts in legitimacy have generalized such feeling of ought to obey, for the most
people, as internalized norms or internalized obligation (Tyler, 1997, 2006a). By this
means, authorities are naturally allowed to exert an inuence on most people by the
use of their superior power. In the book Why people obey the law, Tyler set a case of
people's obedience with the law, to further describe such internalized obligation. He
pointed out that, in terms of the compliance with the law, the internalized obligation
is a human sense of what is morally right and wrong (Tyler, 2006b). This sense, is
acquired through the repeatable operation of moral norms. With regard to inequality,
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likewise, its legitimacy is expected to be built on the human sense of duty that takes
social hierarchy for granted. The sense, which is derived from a human desire to
behave in a way that is in accord with the rules of how a social structure is organized,
is habitus.
If legitimacy of inequality is understood to have relevance of a human psychological
or behavioral property, then, a legitimate domination concerns human agencies that
feel obliged to comply with the hierarchical arrangement rather than change or even
overturn it. Bourdieu's habitus happens to correspond to this sense of obligation,
because in a structural relation, each group or class has a sense of tendency to play
its role. Thus, socioculture, as a practice system in a structural relation, is performed
through the sense of obligations set up for each class or group. For instance, in gender
structure, compared to men, women tend to feel more obligated to focus on domestic
life.
As a set of internalized traits of a class, the inheritance and the transmission of
habitus from one generation to the next reproduces distinctions between classes. This
reproduction not only continues but also reinforces inequality, because the interior dis-
tinctions have matched with exterior distinctions (Tilly, 1998). This is quite important
for connecting reproduction to legitimation. In Tilly's theory, the interior distinctions
reect the internally visible structure, and match an interior boundary with an exterior
categorical pair importing earlier established understandings and relations, so that the
cost of maintaining the boundary will be lowered (Tilly, 1998). In some extent, Tilly's
thoughts of durable inequality are analogous to Bourdieu's reproduction, even though
these two sociologists dene interior boundary dierently. In the book Reproduction in
Education, Society and Culture, Bourdieu and Passeron regarded the habitus of stu-
dents as valued by both teachers and the institutional procedures in the educational
eld as the core reason why children from culturally wealthy backgrounds inherit their
wealth (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Crossley, 2008). In this respect, indeed, match-
ing habitus distinctions with class boundaries makes inequality and its reproduction
appear to be justiable.
With regard to domination, reproduction signies legitimation, which mainly con-
cerns two aspects. On one hand, the reproduction is horizontal, which denotes that
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the exterior inequality is visible but justied through the habitus distinctions among
groups. Bonilla-Silva (2006) provided an obvious case of \white habitus" to illustrate
this reproduction. He indicated that whites rst acquire the \white habitus," including
taste, feelings and values from a social closure segregated from other races. Thereupon,
the habitus distinctions that match with racial dierences make the issue of racism or
racial domination invisible. And this process of legitimation is described by Bonilla-
Silva as \racism without racists" (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, p. 4). On the other hand, the
reproduction is vertical, which means inequality is naturalized through the inheritance
of habitus from one generation to the next.
The transformation from reproduction to legitimation requires the construction of
a psychological property, of which the most crucial is habitus, or precisely, the distribu-
tion of habitus. Habitus contributes to the human sense of hierarchical arrangements
of social roles and obligations, which occurs through the psychological process of nat-
uralization. As a result, human voluntary acceptance of social roles inuences how
individuals perform in competitions. In a meritocratic society, accordingly, human
habitus signies individual merit that is responsible for a person's achievement and
class situation. Socioculture legitimizes inequality through the conversion of habitus
into individual merit. It reveals a fact that humans feel natural and justiable in
accepting the outcome of merit when it is reproduced from the order of domination
within a sociocultural context.
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4 The Hypothetical Practice System: Socialist So-
cioculture in China
As a practice system in a given structure, socioculture represents the conguration of
class order. In terms of the case of China, inequality under state socialism (1957-1978)9
reveals a hypothetical practice tendency reecting socialist characteristics. Interpreted
as a practice mode within the symbolic universe, earlier socialist domination is ex-
pected to naturally mediate human practice in the same way after transformation, and
becomes the structural root of the status quo of China's social stratication. This chap-
ter, instead of focusing on the rampant modernization that shaped the sociocultural
system under Mao, focuses on hierarchical structure, how that structure has been ma-
nipulated over time via political intervention, and how it has been expected to inuence
human dispositions after the economic reform. For a sociocultural understanding of
China's inequality after transformation, this chapter specically deals with its socialist
hierarchical system by examining its historical and institutional context. It argues that
the legacies of the socialist hierarchical structure after China's transformation persist
as a sort of socioculture that denotes specic practice norms. Known as habitus traits,
practice norms are presumed to unequally distributed along with the legacies of social-
ist hierarchies. The continuance of these practice norms with socialist characteristics is
thus regarded as the mechanism of reproducing social inequality within the emerging
capitalist class order in China.
9China under state socialism specically refers to the period from the establishment of Soviet model
of socialism to the initiation of economic reform (1957-1978). The historical term \Mao era" refers to
the history of People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1976, and largely coincides with China's state
socialist period (see: Goodman, 2014; Walder, 2015).
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4.1 Inequality in a State Socialist Society
4.1.1 State Socialism: A Political Ideology
The roots of the ideological term \socialism" can be traced back to the Latin sociare,
which means to share or to combine. This Latin word was later replaced by societas
to describe a legalistic idea that refers to a consensual contract between freemen in
medieval law (A. Vincent, 2010). In the modern era, the word socialisti rst made its
appearance in the Italian language in Ferdinando Facchinei's book Note e osservazioni
sul libro intitolato \De Delitti e Delle Pene" to describe the followers of Rousseau who
believed in freedom and equality (de Sauvigny, 1970). Soon after, the similar-looking
word socialismo was adopted by another Italian political philosopher Appiano Buon-
afede in his book Della Restaurazione Di Ogni Filosoa Nei Secoli XVI, XVII, XVIII,
to label a system based on the notion of sociability (de Sauvigny, 1970). The modern
notion of socialism as a political ideology however with systematic ideas, emerged in
the early 19th-century European continent (Newman, 2005). During this period, the
word socialisme appeared in a series of articles in French appealing to a return to
socialism from individualism, to get together for social equality 10.
Etymologically, \socialism is related to social in exactly the same way that indi-
vidualism is related to individual" (Parry et al., 1911, p. 359), which arranges a just
social order of society through fellowship and companionship (Hoppe, 1989; A. Vincent,
2010). The term \utopian" has been used by a number of early socialists, the most fa-
mous of which include Henri Saint-Simon, Etienne Cabet, and Charles Fourier. Overall,
French utopian socialism highlights a belief that it is possible to establish a harmo-
nious, associative, and coorperative society of communal living and working (Taylor,
1982; Newman, 2005). The expectation of happiness or harmony comes from a period
in which a severe dislocation of social groups in Western countries was caused by the
development of capitalist industrialism (Taylor, 1982). More particular, a new working
class developed out from the labour division \between dierent occupations, between
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and, within manufacturing, between arti-
10The early 19th-century published French articles that mentions socialisme mainly include Indi-
vidualisme et Socialisme, Catholicisme et Protestantisme, Le Globe, etc. (see: de Sauvigny, 1970).
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sans and handicraft workers" (Taylor, 1982, p. 3). During this period of socio-economic
development attained in the western countries, the traditional social values rooted in an
essentially pre-industrial society lost much of their relevance, because of the emergence
of the working class, whose status is either ambiguous or threatened by the results of
mechanized production. The values of utopian socialism had been believed to be a
reasonable response to such social problem (Taylor, 1982).
A harmonious society, in the eyes of early French utopian socialists, had to be
based on perfect equality in all aspects of human life (Newman, 2005). For example,
Fourier and Saint-Simon's radically denounced the oppression of women, which had a
far-reaching eect on the rst wave of feminism and on the establishment of equal legal
and political rights for women (Goldstein, 1982; Newman, 2005). However, Fourier
was convinced that the fundamental cause of human misery was not human beings
themselves, but rather the current society. At the same time, he assumed that the
social and economic inequality could be overcome if everybody had a basic minimum
compatible with private property (Newman, 2005). This idea is a derivation of the an-
archic principle of free competition, which reects how earlier French utopian socialists
had abandoned the struggle legacies of the French Revolution (Buber, 1996).
Earlier French utopian socialism presents a utopian society in both aspects of means
and goal. Although they were as utopian as their French predecessors with regard to
their critique of capitalism and the market system, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
proposed an opposing opinion about how a perfect society is created, emphasizing
progressive and revolutionary transformation (e.g., Arnold, 1989; Weiner, 1999). In
middle-late nineteenth century, the concept of \scientic socialism" was systemati-
cally put forward, as opposed to \utopian socialism." In his renowned book Socialism:
Utopian and Scientic (originally published in 1880), Engels pointed out that, the
rational conditions for organizing a perfect society by no means existed at the stage
of industrialization, and radically denied the propositional logic of utopian socialist
thoughts. What's more, in Engels's book, the solution to social problems lays hidden
in undeveloped economic conditions. In other words, \the economic structure of society
always furnishes the real basis" (Engels, 1999, p. 77).
Earlier than Engels, in the book Poverty of Philosophy (originally published in
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1847), Marx stressed the eects of modes of production in economic conditions on the
characters of social, political and intellectual processes of human life, and proposed
the crucial concept of \relations of production" in his political economy theory. The
relations of production refer to the sum total of any social relations that humans have
to be involved in for their livelihood (Marx, 2008). Theoretically, in Marx's sense, social
relations are bound up with productive forces, which leads humans to produce social
values, ideas, and principles in accordance with their social relations (Marx, 2008).
Accordingly, harmonious social relations have to be established through corresponding
productive power. For Marx and Engels, the perfectly equal society pictured by their
French predecessors cannot be created through a human sense of rationality and justice,
but rather through revolutions. In this following book published in A Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx further emphasized that the relations of
production always correspond to a given developmental stage of productive forces and
the denite relations of production which men inevitably enter into are independent of
the will of men. It is the relations of production that provide the real foundation for
the economic structure of a society. According to Marx, \it is not the consciousness of
men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that
determines their consciousness" (Marx, 1904, p.11-12).
When socialism is understood in the extended way of a practical system of political
economy, Marx's theory of surplus value matters. Through his theory, Marx discussed
and condemned the relations of production under capitalism, and this condemnation
became the basis of the social relations of socialism. Marx found that in capitalist
societies, capitalists accumulated surplus values by exploiting labor, for example by
demanding laborers to work longer hour than agreed to without corresponding payment
(Schumpeter, 2010). The exploitation of workers suggests the nature of the relations
of production in capitalist society: due to a scarcity of the means of production that
is used to produce goods, those who own the means of production seek prots by
demanding workers to produce more commodities (Hoppe, 1989; Newman, 2005). In
Marx's anti-capitalist thinking, harmonious relations of production or social relations
can be built only when workers take over the means of production, distribution, and
exchange via a revolutionary struggle (e.g., Bottomore, Harris, Kiernan, & Miliband,
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1991).
The redistribution of the means of production is regarded as the basis of a new
socioeconomic system that is opposed to capitalism. Socialism, interpreted as a prod-
uct of bourgeois mentality by this time, was thus replaced by the term \communism"
in the famous Marx and Engels work The Communist Manifesto (Schumpeter, 2010).
Compared to \communism," in the same period, the use of \socialism" in readings
always showed moderate for readers' understanding (Bond, 2011). Additionally, listed
objects of socialist policies facilitated the emergence of a series of communist organi-
zations in many European countries. From the late nineteenth century to the early
twentieth century, many countries (from Germany to France, from Sweden to Russia)
had found their own specic denitions of socialism.
In fact, even though communist groups and parties increased during this time, so-
cialists in most Europeans countries were not completely tinged with Marxism, except
for Russia whose rebuilt system was purely Marxist-institutionalized (Hoppe, 1989;
Schumpeter, 2010; Homann, 2011). Schumpeter (2010) justied these dierences in
his book. Tsarist Russia was dierent from other European capitalist societies, being a
traditional agrarian country with very a limited industrial proletariat, and commercial
and industrial bourgeoise. However, these groups are supposed to be the main forces in
revolution for controlling the scarce means of production. Thus Russia was faced with
an awkward situation after the success of the Bolshevik-led revolution, related to how
to apply the value of socialism to developing a form of economic planning. Practically,
the Bolshevik party had to conduct central planning to redistribute the means of pro-
duction as a way to establish socialism in Russia, even if that way was to utilize state
power to aggressively, which had never been advocated for by the followers of orthodox
Marxism (Screpanti & Zamagni, 2005). This state-oriented redistribution associated
with Russian socialism is called \state socialism" (Lane, 2013, p. 27), and became a
dominant socialist practice mode in the twentieth century with the establishment of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter referred to as the Soviet Union, or
the USSR) (e.g., Hoppe, 1989; Van der Pijl, 1993; Lane, 2013). It is worth noting
that, in addition to the state owning and planning system, the term \state socialism"
was earlier used to refer to a comprehensive list of Marxist doctrine-based social wel-
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fare polices proposed by Otto Bismarck in Germany in mid-late nineteenth century
(e.g., Rothfels, 1938). The adoption of state socialism to designate a socialist model
of central planning and a one-party system began with the establishment of the Soviet
Union.
State socialism, is grounded on, but not equal to Marx's socialist thoughts of the
redistribution of the means of production. As an ideology, its adoption and promi-
nence began with the transformation of the Bolshevik party into an organization of
advocating state control in mid-1920s (Van der Pijl, 1993). The values of the Bol-
sheviks, which included state ownership, a central-planned economy and the leading
role of the Communist Party, are now the principles that dene what we call state
socialism (Gregory, 2004). As a technical term, state socialism sometimes is used in-
terchangeably with Stalinism or Stalinist political logics, in reference to the central
planning system implemented in his time (e.g., Nee & Lian, 1994; Poulantzas, 2000).
However, this ideology is not only associated with the USSR, but represents any system
of indirect central party rule and exible centralized power, as with Hungarian model
(Csanadi, 1997).
Usually and acceptably, state socialism practice has been depicted as a set of in-
stitutionalized policies in which the allocation of resources should be controlled over
by the state (e.g., Hoppe, 1989; Nee & Lian, 1994; Poulantzas, 2000). In other words,
under state socialism, it is the bureaucratic organizations rather than the market that
play a decisive role in determining how the means of production are distributed. The
state bureaucracy is almost completely bound up with the hegemonic role of the Party,
because the institutional design of state socialism is aimed at making the state heavily
dependent upon the Party to ensure the execution of socialist ideology. As a result, a
communist society is legitimized by a party-state system, because party and state are
closely intertwined, and act through a singular identity. Decisions made by the state
apparatus have to be reviewed by organizations controlled by the Party (Csanadi, 1997;
Bunce, 1999). Taking an obvious example of China during the Mao era (1949-1976), all
the key policy decisions were made outside the administrative government but entirely
monopolized by the Chinese Communist Party (S. Guo, 2001). In the period spanning
the establishment of the USSR to its fall in the early 1990s, the state socialism model
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was successively employed by a number of countries, including central and eastern Eu-
ropean countries, People's Republic of China, Republic of Cuba, Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, and so forth.
Concerning socialist economies, the central-planned economy operation employs
\redistribution" to replace the general \market" principle (I. Szelenyi, 1978). Never-
theless, the state's political space has been neglected in Marxism, but rather arised
in earlier German social democracy ideology as an eective and independent entity of
justice and achievements of socialism (Berlau, 1970; Poulantzas, 2000). The neglect
to examine the role of the state, according to Poulantzas, does creates a poor reec-
tion of Marx's ideas of socialism and the ownership of the means of production. He
wrote that, \as long as Marxism neglected the state, it was guilty of economism; and
when it speaks of the state, it can only have fallen into statism" (Poulantzas, 2000,
p. 35). Poulantzas's summery, to some extent, reveals the dilemma of the operation of
state socialism. On one hand, such centralization initially appeared to work in many
countries of Eastern Bloc, during two decades after the end of World War II. From
the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, numerous state socialist countries, such as Bulgaria,
the German Democratic Republic (the GDR) and Hungary, quickly narrowed the gap
with or even exceeded Austria, Spain, and France in the areas of life expectancy, in-
dex general industrial production, university enrollment and more (see: I. Szelenyi &
Szelenyi, 1994). On the other hand, the model of state socialism denes power as iden-
tiable with or reducible to the state, which inevitably leads to the state intervening
excessively within domestic structures rather than to respect the autonomy of society
and the economy (Poulantzas, 2000; Kaminski, 2014). A typical example would be the
the Soviet famine of 1932-1933 that was resulted from the excessive collectivization of
agricultural sector. It is this characteristic that has been blamed as the main reason
for the failure of the practice of state socialism. Up to the current date, the capitalist
market has been introduced and adopted by increasing former state socialist countries
as a way to transform to a mixed form of socioeconomic system. Strictly speaking, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains the last system of true state socialism.
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4.1.2 Class System in State Socialist Society
For socialism to truly be achieved, inequality ought to be eliminated. If this is supposed
to be the case, can a state socialist society be viewed as having inequality or a class
system? If it can, how is inequality shaped within a state socialist system? Answers
to these two questions are fundamental to understand the structure of state socialist
society and its relevant practice system.
Under state socialism, the concept of class has been basically transformed from its
original description in the capitalist context. In turning attention to class system in a
state socialist society, one should not forget how class is conceptualized for traditional
capitalist societies. The entry of The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology provides a
quick but clear description of the concept of class in stating that it refers to \a strati-
cation system that divides a society into a hierarchy of social positions" (Vitt, 2007,
p. 533). This widely-accepted denition directs class to a broad meaning of hierar-
chical system or inequality. Essentially, class is a concept of capitalist society, as it
concerns how resources are distributed in socioeconomic activities. In The Communist
Manifesto, Marx and his associate Engels revealed the nature of class relationships in
capitalist society as rife with antagonism or conict (Marx & Engels, 2007). This antag-
onism is aroused due to the unequal ownership of the means of production. In Marxist
theory, capitalist society is divided into two main conicting classes: the bourgeoisies
who own the means of production, and the proletariat who sell their labor power to
the owners of productive property (Vitt, 2007). The Marxist model of productive re-
lationships radically indicates that class emerges from dierential access to the means
of production (e.g., Marx, 1904; Clark & Lipset, 1991). This class relationship is thus
characterized to be an antagonistic relationship (Parkin, 1972). With regard to the op-
portunity structures in capitalist societies, this antagonistic relationship between social
classes is perceived as a result of meritocratic competition (see also: Morley & Lugg,
2009).
Max Weber later modied Marxian class theory, focusing on the foundation of class
in the control over goods and skills, especially emphasizing on status-dierences and
organized collective actions (Bendix, 1974; Vitt, 2007). A class position or situation
according to Weber is determined by the market relation (Weber, 1946). In this sense,
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the Weberian model of class appears to be more precise to picture advanced capitalist
society (Vitt, 2007). To be concrete, Weberian model of class position includes three
dimensions: class, status and party (or power), in which the most fundamental is class,
which is assumed to be an economic condition (Weber, 1946; Liberatos, Link, & Kelsey,
1988). Contrary to Marxian class theory, status and political power are added to the
analysis of stratication, even though both factors are always conditioned by economic
order in a capitalist society. In Weber's theory, social status and power are shown to
be of additional importance, because in addition to the possession of social resources,
the ability to exercise power also aect one's chances in life. Accordingly, occupation
is claimed to be a convincing criterion of relative class position, since an occupation
comprehensively reects a series of socioeconomic values in a market system (e.g., Hatt,
1950).
Theoretically, both Marxist and Weberian views of class reject the existence of
class in state socialist society. Firstly, based on the orthodox Marxist view, the private
ownership of the means of production no longer exists in a socialist society. Secondly,
without the mechanism of market force, class as a term appears to be not suitable
for describing a state socialist society. In other words, socialist society is declared
to be classless (Parkin, 1972). However, even if without market power and private
economy, with the establishment of the redistributive principle, an emerging model of
stratication in state socialist society was developed through the exercise of state power
(Walder, 1992). Walder (1992) cited the original text in Power and Privilege: A Theory
of Social Stratication, to claim the inequality under state socialism as a process in
which \the distribution of rewards in a society is a function of the distribution of power"
(Lenski, 1966, p. 63). Lenski's work revealed a phenomenon that a redistribution is
designed to ensure the administrative power's control over the social structure (see
also: I. Szelenyi, 1978; Walder, 1992). Just as in capitalist societies, inequality systems
in state socialist societies are reected in almost every aspects, including housing,
education, career promotion and so forth (e.g., S. Szelenyi, 1987; Bodnar & Borocz,
1998). The distinction is that the basic structure of inequality under state socialism is
not a result of autonomous market relations, but rather of redistributive mechanisms
(I. Szelenyi, 1978; Nee, 1989). Walder wrote, \power is seen as a class phenomenon"
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(Walder, 1992, p.524).
Under the principle of socialist systems, egalitarianism tries to erase the dierences
of talent and ability among persons that can be the basis for legitimate inequality
(So, 2003; Scheer, 2003). Given that, redistribution is justied and developed as an
eective tool to organize social structure in a socialist society. As an instrument of
macro-control, redistribution is not exclusive to socialist society but rather common
as socioeconomic mechanism in capitalist society, since the concept of redistribution is
morally attached to a vision of social justice (Honneth, 2001). For instance, in a free
market, taxation, monetary policies and welfare are the universal means employed by
administrations to reduce the autonomy of distributive inequality or of poverty (e.g.,
Scott, 2014). Unlike those modern market economies, the redistribution implemented
by state socialist countries directly collects and distributes goods through centralized
planning (Nee, 1989). It has been noticed that, such models of redistributive economies
feature the ideology of state socialism, and involve vertical relationships between re-
distributors (bureaucratic administrations) and producers. Usually, unlike with the
horizontally mutual relationship between consumers and producers, the decisions and
behavior of producers have to be consistent with the decisions of bureaucratic admin-
istrations. In state socialist countries, this vertical relationship is built through state
and collective ownership.
The signicance of redistributive power is not exclusive to centralized states. In
decentralized states, central redistributive policies are usually adopted to prevent po-
litical instability, economic ineciency and social inequality (e.g., Wellisch & Wildasin,
1996; Treisman, 1999). However, compared to the mechanisms in state socialism that
integrate the economy through institutions of central planning, these redistributive po-
lices primarily concern scal and monetary policies, and the allocation of public goods,
to stabilize macroeconomics (Treisman, 1999). That is to say, for a market society,
the formation mechanism of the social structure cannot be aected by redistributive
power, since the fundamental relations of production won't be changed by such re-
distributive policies. This dierence further reminds us to distinguish the inequality
system under state socialism from general capitalist societies. Non-antagonistic strata
is a precise term that emphasizes on the nature of the class system in socialist societies
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(Parkin, 1972; J. Zhang, 2004). Due to central planning, dierent social groups share
a similar status with respect to the means of production, even though material and
social dierences do exist among these groups. Summarized by Parkin, \the `vertical'
distribution of rewards does not produce a `horizontal' clustering of positions which is
a characteristic feature of class structure" (Parkin, 1972, p.138).
The central role of state power as stratifying mechanism characterizes the social
structure in state socialist societies as an organized hierarchical order, rather than a
form of autonomous stratication (e.g., Parkin, 1972; Walder, 1992; Zhou, Tuma, &
Moen, 1996). Monopolized by central redistributors, social benets are not associ-
ated with market position but rather with the power position. Fundamentally, the
endorsement of state power justies the positional power of a social group or class,
which organizes hierarchical structure in state socialist societies. In particular, on one
hand, the social structure is basically introduced by redistributive power, with a di-
minished place for market force and increased eectiveness of bureaucratized social
relations (I. Szelenyi, 1978; Kraus, 1981). On the other hand, the relations between
social organizations and state power are hierarchically ordered in terms of property
rights, which corresponds to Marxist test of the ownership of the means of production
and causes inequalities among organizations with regard to access to privileges and
benets (N. Lin & Bian, 1991; Zhou et al., 1996).
4.2 Inequality under State Socialism (1957-1978): The Case
of China
Before the initiation of the reform and opening up in the late 1970s, social structure in
state socialist China was organized through a redistributive hierarchy. In state social-
ist regimes, redistributive hierarchies essentially reveal the allocation of political status
(Walder, Li, & Treiman, 2000). Although the distributive principle of egalitarianism
weakens the horizontally mutual interaction between customers and producers, control
over resources leads bureaucratic power to completely decide how these resources and
life chances are hierarchically arranged in accordance with political status. The fol-
lowing subsections detail the hierarchical order of the state socialist society in China.
These hierarchies not only explain the ideologically political loyalty to the given sys-
77
tem, but also suggest China's movement toward modernization. Known as a socialist
sociocultural system, this series of hierarchical arrangements express the naturalized
conguration of social structure during the period of state socialism.
4.2.1 Class as Caste
Class designations everywhere highlight dierence and inequality in state socialist
China. The application of class designations that name the strata in Chinese soci-
ety have been consistent with China's revolutionarily political correctness, since class
struggle continued after the establishment of socialism to keep the whole party sys-
tem from being inltrated by capitalist ideology (e.g., Kraus, 1977; Goodman, 2014;
Walder, 2015). The period in China, from the establishment of state socialism to the
initiation of transformation, thus, has been found to some extent to be a continua-
tion of the social structures as it existed before the liberation. The term \class" in a
socialist context refers to a hierarchical construction that comes from the CCP's Marx-
Leninist ideology rather than more general strata or stratum. Instead of being used
in generalizing \middle class" or \laboring class" in market-oriented society, class is
employed to describe workers, peasants, bourgeois and capitalists in a socialist social
context. Such an understanding of class was abolished after China's economic reform,
and the more general interpretation has been universally adopted to describe China's
social structure since 2002 (Goodman, 2014).
Understood in terms of the CCP's ideological basis of both the social relations of
production and political consciousness, class status virtually denotes an identity that
reveals an individual's political position. During the state socialism of Mao, class
was emphasized as inherited social honor, but without static patterns (Kraus, 1981).
In particular, class was seen as a dynamic conception grounded on Mao's inconstant
understanding of class consciousness. For instance, the intellectual group was o-
cially identied as an enemy class after they criticized the Party. In this sense, the
class-as-caste model in state socialist China does make an emphasis on the biological
inheritability of identity, but also relinquishes the consistency of the corresponding po-
litical status of a class identity. Similar to almost all other state socialist countries,
through a structural arrangement of binary opposition, China's social structure was
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transformed into an organic organization of political objectives and was further trans-
lated into a concrete political programme during the Mao era (Wood, 1998). Briey
speaking, class designation in Chinese society is in a process of politicization. Class
struggle obviously explains how a politicized class structure serves the purity and the
stability of a political system. It has also been stressed that, when the state power
is able to exert its willingness to intervene in society, society inevitably \comes to be
organized and run along bureaucratic lines" (M. M.-h. Yang, 1988, p.413-414).
Strictly, the socialist class system seen entirely in terms of political conscious-
ness and socio-economic conditions, existed in China from 1957 to 1976 (Goodman,
2014). The persistence of class divisions and class struggle throughout the socialist era
was Mao's justication for the establishment and the preservation of socialist system
(G. Young, 1986; Healy, 2008). During that time, class status came to be partly or-
dered in terms of Mao's changing interpretation of the political correctness of a class
group (Goodman, 2014), which led class relationships to be historically specic. Given
that, it is proper to analyze China's socialist class system in a historically sequential
order. Overall, speaking to what scholars universally conveyed, it is CCP's ideological
formulation embodied in the relationship between an adult's position in the production
process and political consciousness that shapes China's class order under state social-
ism (Kraus, 1981; Goodman, 2014). Such class structure denotes political hierarchy
through attaching privileged class labels and discriminating class labels toward various
groups.
From 1958 to 1961, after the socialist reconstruction of society, China entered into
the Great Leap Forward (the GLP). This period is called \Mao's crusade" by histo-
rians, since Mao mobilized every Chinese citizen to transform the whole country, and
was blindly condent that economic development and social transformation could be
rapidly achieved through boosting production (A. L. Chan, 2001, p. 15). Increasingly
unrealistic goals and slogans were proposed, such as \catching up with and overtaking
the UK in 15 years." During this time, agricultural and industrial sectors developed
in parallel under Mao. The agricultural collectivization and leap encouraged farmers
to engage in agricultural production and was successful in the very initial stage of the
GLF. Nevertheless, the ignorance of nature and socioeconomic law brought about a se-
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ries of mistakes in production plans and misallocation of resources, which led to a 15%
decline in grain output in 1959. The problems that came with this decline were further
compounded by the 14.7 % increased state compulsory grain procurement quota in
that year (J. Y. Lin, 1990). This vicious circle caused successive agricultural crises
and nally led to the erce famine that swept large parts of rural China from 1959
to 1961 (J. Y. Lin, 1990; Kung & Lin, 2003; Thaxton, 2008). On industrialization,
the prominent movement concerned Mao's tremendous emphasis on steel production.
Historical data shows that, like the situation of grain output, there was a temporary
surge in steel and iron output from 1958 to 1959. However, the steel and iron output
drastically decreased from 62.6 to 31 (10,000 tons) between 1960 and 1961 (W. Li &
Yang, 2005). Meanwhile, preoccupied with iron and steel manufacturing, commune
authorities had to, to some extent, neglect the agricultural production. Thus the eco-
nomic costs of the GLF were huge. For example, a large amount of steel produced was
of poor quality and was considered wasted (Kung & Lin, 2003). Viewed from a histor-
ical perspective, dominated by extreme Leftism, the Great Leap Forward brought the
newly established China to a political and socioeconomic disaster (see: Joseph, 1986;
W. Li & Yang, 2005; Kung & Chen, 2011).
The ideological foundation behind this radical movement was the Marxist doctrine
that class contradictions are the motive force of socioeconomic development. \Red and
experts" that emphasized the signicance of political consciousness (red) and techni-
cians (experts) had become the politico-ideological foundation of the GLF since 1957
(Baum, 1964). Based on this, and in concert with the goals of the GLF, two \exploiting
classes" and two \laboring classes"11 were identied by Mao to construct a new class
structure (Goodman, 2014). The laboring classes were workers and peasants, while
the rst exploiting class included \imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, the
remnants of the Nationalist Party" and \the 300,000 Rightists and their agents," and
the second included bourgeoisies. It is worth noting that, due to the nationwide land
revolution movement, landlords and rich peasants social classes in China had been put
to end (P. C. Huang, 1995), which gave rise to a stable rural class system including
11The laboring class here doesn't refer to the working class in market society, but rather to be used
to describe a class opposite to the \exploiting class."
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hired agricultural worker, poor peasant and middle peasant.
Table 2: Class system during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961)
Exploiting Classes Laboring Classes
Imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism,
remnants of the Nationalist Party,
the 300,000 Rightists and their agents
Workers
Bourgeoisies Peasants
Hired agricultural workers
Poor peasants
Middle peasants
Source: (Kraus, 1981)
After the abandonment of the GLF, China's class structure was initiated to trans-
form the remnants of the old elite classes from the former society to the emerging
classes arising within the socialist society (G. Young, 1986; Goodman, 2014). Simul-
taneously, the concept of the \new elements of bourgeoisie" mainly referring to the
Rightists and their supporters was proposed by Mao, as the ideological foundation
of this group was believed to signify a warning of the danger of socialist revolution.
However, Mao's remark of this new class group was not in accordance with the own-
ership implication of the orthodox conception of socialist revolution. Young continued
to stress that, virtually, Mao's new interpretation of class struggle equated socialism
to \a society transition between capitalism and communism" (G. Young, 1986, p. 47),
rather than to a distinct economic base. Mao insisted that, the CCP and the socialist
system must take a stand for the interests of the proletariat. Those of bourgeoisie or
non-proletariat class designation, thus, were discriminated against for their ideology
that didn't represent the proletariat (Healy, 2008). Mao stated in the early of 1960s
that the class struggle gave rise to the socialist transition specically and ideologi-
cally occurred between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and was by no means over
(Healy, 2008).
In order to prevent the newly established system from being restored to capital-
ism, the radical class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie developed
into the Cultural Revolution in the superstructure. During the Cultural Revolution
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(1966-1976), class struggle had completely become an ideological apparatus to ensure
pure proletarian culture and institutions of Chinese society were retained (e.g., Kraus,
1981; G. Young, 1986). The Cultural Revolution was aimed at political alignment,
which transformed the ideological foundation of Chinese society by mobilizing the
masses (Feng, 2011). One of the primary motives of a thorough ideology struggle for
Mao was to ensure that China would never change within the political and ideologi-
cal superstructure (e.g., Walder, 2015). Due to the emphasis on ideologically political
correctness, the status and the privileges of the \red class" were strongly promoted
(Gao, 1987; Andreas, 2009). Correspondingly, those of the non-red or non-proletariat
class were discriminated against. Although Mao stressed that family background was
neither to be ignored nor to be the dominant consideration in evaluating an individ-
ual, it regained new prominence during the Cultural Revolution, which convincingly
characterized China's class categorization as a caste system (Kraus, 1981; H. Zheng &
Hong, 1996). Based on family background and socioeconomic conditions, individuals
were categorized into a class system consisting of the \Red," the \Black," and the
\In-between" in the Cultural Revolution (see: Table 3). People who belonged to red
categories enjoyed privileges of education, material distribution and promotion over
the other two classes. For instance, it was not allowed for the students who were born
into the black and in-between classes to join the Red Guard (Gao, 1987).
Viewed as an extreme class struggle situation, the Cultural Revolution caused a
large amount of loss and isolation, both real and symbolic, suered by countless victims,
and was ocially dened as the \ten years of chaos" (X. Lu, 2004, p. 152). With the
end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP made a decision to remove the negatively
discriminating class label from the families of the former exploiting classes on January
29th, 1979 (Goodman, 2014). Although class structure in the form of a caste system
no longer ocially exists in Chinese society, the privileged class labels have remained
in other symbolic forms.
4.2.2 The Privileges of Communist Party Membership
As a one party ruling country under state socialism, party administrators are given a
monopolizing authority over redistribution. The Communist Party, can thus viewed as
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Table 3: Class system during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
The Red Class The In-Between Class The Black Class
Worker,
Poor and lower-middle peasant,
Revolutionary solider,
Revolutionary cadre,
Revolutionary martyr
Middle and Upper-middle peasant,
Pretty proprietor,
Intellectual
Landlord,
Rich peasant,
Counter-revolutionary,
Bad element,
Rightist,
Traitor,
Spy
the core pillar of the political order. In addition to the above mentioned red classes,
Party membership absolutely reected an individual's political correctness, and his/her
political loyalty to the socialist system. In this sense, for the central administration,
a series of corresponding privileges came as rewards for the loyalty of Party members
(Walder, 1995). All socialist states using the Soviet-Union model in the 20th century
took Party membership in political and social hierarchy as primary. Redistributors
who come to be symbolized as privileged party elites are the the primary beneciaries
of the state socialist system, which works through Nomenklatura (e.g., Walder, 1995;
Kryshtanovskaya & White, 1996; Kung & Chen, 2011). This Communist Party leader-
ship management system originated with the USSR. \Nomenklatura" technically refers
to \a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the du-
ties of each oce" (Harasymiw, 1969, p.494). The \Nomenklatura" suggests an elite
class or a ruling class that is highly positioned within a communist political hierarchy
(see also: Volensky, 1984; Kryshtanovskaya & White, 1996). Under state socialism,
China's nomenklatura covers the highest authorities whose political power is highly
concentrated. This include the full and alternative members of the Central Committee
of China's Communist Party who control the senior ocial positions in the Party, the
military, the government and the public organizations (Kung & Chen, 2011). Given
the Party's monopoly position, in the context of a centrally planned economy, these
political elites listed in Nomenklatura act as redistributors in making ruling decisions.
In addition to the ruling status of party elites, additional privileges of Party mem-
bers under contemporary state socialism have long been recognized. As rewards for
political loyalty and reliability, Communist Party members universally enjoy priorities
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and benets in schooling, housing, food, and consumer goods quotas (I. Szelenyi, 1976,
1983; Gerber, 2000). S. Szelenyi (1987) examined socialist Hungary and demonstrated
how Communist Party12 membership was signicantly associated with social inequal-
ity, which was particularly reected in one's likelihood of career promotion. Through
investigating the archive data, she found that the Party members were mainly overrep-
resented in more advanced managerial, professional, and skilled manual occupations,
and were more likely to be found in supervisory and decision-making positions of or-
ganizations.
The same situation occurs in China. Communist Party members are a select class
of contributors that establish and maintain the communist political and social order
(Walder, 1995; Bian, Shu, & Logan, 2001). In this sense, Party member recruitment is
virtually a form of political screening. Throughout the whole Maoist era, Communist
Party member recruitment explicitly favored the \red" class people who were politically
reliable, such as peasants and workers (B. Li & Walder, 2001; Bian et al., 2001).
However, the specic criterion of Party member recruitment has evolved over time,
to reect the CCP's dynamic understanding of modernization and social convergence.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, in addition to those politically loyal classes, a growing
urban youth population became a primary source of new Party membership supply,
because urban powerless mess, especially young students were mobilized by Mao to
rebel and grab power from elite bureaucrats (Bian et al., 2001). Moreover, it was
also found that advanced urban worker, red experts and pioneers in technology were
welcomed to join the Communist Party during this period (H. Y. Lee, 1991; Andreas,
2009). Yet, the role of education in Party member recruitment should not be overstated
because, without political loyalty, education alone couldn't facilitate one's chances of
being a Communist Party member (Bian et al., 2001). Entering into the decade of
the Cultural Revolution and very shortly thereafter, \political screening in party and
elite recruitment was intensied" (Bian et al., 2001, p. 811). For example, individuals
who were categorized into the \black class" were strictly prevented from joining the
Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, since intellectuals
12In Hungary, the Communist Party was established as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
(Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart, or MSZMP (see: S. Szelenyi, 1987).
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were seen as a suspicious social class, educational credentials in many ways became an
obstacle to the attainment of Party membership (Parish, 1984; Bian et al., 2001).
Apart from the returns in the allocation of housing, health care, job, and scarce
customer goods, until the post-Mao reforms, earning Party membership was being
nearly the sole means of career mobility in urban China (Dickson & Rublee, 2000).
Statistically, being a Party member suciently increased one's chances of becoming an
elite cadre in urban China, not only in the Mao era, but also in the early reform period
(B. Li & Walder, 2001). Furthermore, during the Maoist period, time of joining the
Party also aected the career consequence: an individual who attained Party member-
ship in the very beginning of his or her career, were carried out to be 6.5 times more
likely to become a cadre than a non-Party member (B. Li & Walder, 2001).
4.2.3 Household Registration System
The contemporary household registration system (in Chinese: hukou system) has been
universally recognized as another caste system in socialist China which divides and
organizes people based on locational and family-membership dierentiation (e.g., F.-
L. Wang, 2005; Tang & Yang, 2008). Initiated as a component of the establishment of
the socialist system and central panning economy, China's contemporary hukou sys-
tem is designed to restore stability and to implement the central government's plan for
prioritized industrialization by dening the city-countryside relationship and shaping
state-society relations (T. Cheng & Selden, 1994; J. Young, 2013). Throughout the
period of People's Republic of China, specically from the establishment of the so-
cialist system to the present, the hukou system still enjoys \considerable institutional
legitimacy and administrative eectiveness" (F.-L. Wang, 2005, p. 32).
Criticized for its generations of discrimination and inequality, yet, the PRC house-
hold registration system originally dates back to ancient China. A population census
and household registration had been came into being during the Xia Dynasty (21st-
16th century B.C.) and developed during the subsequent Shang Dynasty (16th-11th
century B.C.). Scholars found that a primitive form of hukou-like system was created
in the Western Zhou Dynasty (11th-8th century B.C.). Known as xiangsui system, this
early hukou-like system divided residential and rural areas into hierarchically dierent
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zones, and managed populations based on clan structures, annually recording house-
hold registration for taxation (F.-L. Wang, 2005; J. Young, 2013). Another pre-modern
form of hukou system is called collectively baojia system that was ocially initiated
in the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC) and was in place throughout China's feudal period.
Baojia was a system imposed by Load Shang Yang to organize families into units re-
sponsible for their activities to the state, and to expand the taxation base and control
society (J. Young, 2013). Essentially, baojia is the use of the art of war, which denotes
the application of a military management system for social control (Dutton, 1988).
Strictly speaking, baojia had not been institutionalized as an eective organizational
form of household management until the Song Dynasty (960-1279). The system during
the Song Dynasty used lower level social unites to construct the hierarchical relations
of power and obligations, which ocially integrated family household (in Chinese: hu)
into social organizations (Dutton, 1988). Ten family households were categorized into
one unit jia, and one unit, bao, was composed of ten jia. This hierarchically organiza-
tional model had also been to some extent adopted by government of the Republic of
China, and was later abolished along with the establishment of the PRC.
The subsequent Chinese dynasties basically adopted this household-based registra-
tion system, but still made some adjustments to the changing situations. For instance,
the hukou system in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) registered people not only based
on their living locations, but also on their professions (F.-L. Wang, 2005). In the last
Chinese dynasty, the Qing (1632-1912), due to increasing social upheavals, civil wars
and foreign invasions, the hukou system was fully utilized by the centralized power
to maintain social stability and to limit people's migration, which characterized the
system as an ecient tool to control the population, or to protect good people and
restrict bad people (F.-L. Wang, 2004; J. Young, 2013).
The PRC household registration system, hukou system, evolved gradually with
the success of the communist revolution and the establishment of the state socialist
system in mainland China. Although the function was partly inherited from ancient
China, the PRC hukou system is utilized for its own mission to control the domestic
migration and manages temporary residents and targeted peoples (F.-L. Wang, 2005).
Additionally, in the beginning, the newly-established PRC government employed the
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hukou system to consolidate the socialist system and public interests, because China
was faced with an agrarian economy scarce in capital and it therefore had to adopt
the Soviet-Union model in order to formulate an adequate industrialization-oriented
development strategy. This made the control of population migration appear to be both
necessary and reasonable (K. W. Chan & Zhang, 1999). This system, in its restrictions
of domestic population movement, has been found to be, to some extent, analogous
to the Soviet propiska (internal passport) that concerned the permission of residence
and migration within the USSR (e.g., Dutton, 1992; Torpey, 1997; Kuang & Li, 2012).
PRC hukou system particularly emphasizes the priority of the urban-industrial sector.
Consequently, an urban-rural dual social and economic conguration is shaped and
maintained (T. Cheng & Selden, 1994; K. W. Chan & Zhang, 1999). China's hukou
system creates a spatial hierarchy of urban areas and prioritizes the city over the
countryside. Not only that, during most time of Maoist period, population movement
up and down were both spatially controlled, which denoted that the migration of both
urban and rural residents from their birth place was limited (T. Cheng & Selden, 1994).
During the Maoist era, the socialist hukou system was featured by the Regulation on
Household (Hukou) Registration of the People's Republic of China issued in 1958 and a
series of relevant regulations, proclamations and inuential ocial speeches before the
occurrence of 1958 regulation. This early socialist system of hukou management not
only made an evident urban-rural division, but also controlled migration and settlement
between city and countryside, and strictly associated an individual's hukou status to
his/her rights and privileges (J. Young, 2013). Meanwhile, the 1958 regulation only
allowed citizens' conditional domestic migration. For example, a citizen's migration
from countryside to city had to be justied by the conditions of either being admitted
by a school or an urban work unit, or being permitted by the local Ministry of Public
Security 13. In this case, throughout the collective Mao era, China's rural population
was almost restricted to a subaltern position on land and had no chances to leave
(T. Cheng & Selden, 1994). According to the PRC hukou system, legally, every citizen
has to be registered with a hukou certicate, even today. This certicate includes
two related parts: one is residential location based on an individual's one presumed
13See: Regulation on Household (Hukou) Registration of the People's Republic of China, Article 10.
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regular residence and, one is household registration status (or hukou status), which
refers to agricultural or non-agricultural hukou status (see: K. W. Chan & Zhang,
1999). The latter is closely tied up to a citizen's socioeconomic eligibility, and builds
the conguration of China's contemporary urban-rural dualism. This study specically
focuses on the latter hukou status and its inuences on human practice and inequality.
Before the reform, the hukou status determined an individual's socioeconomic benets,
which basically ruled out the countryside from the state-supplied system, particularly
in the 1960s and 1970s. Compared to the holders of agricultural hukou status who
were expected to be largely self-sucient and very limitedly beneted from the state
supplements, during this period, citizens who were designed of non-agricultural hukou
status would be entitled to commodity grain, state-provided housing, schooling, and
other social welfare benets, and more likely to get upward mobility (see: T. Cheng
& Selden, 1994; J. Zhang, 2004; F.-L. Wang, 2005; K. W. Chan & Buckingham, 2008;
J. Young, 2013). Table 4 shows a series of socioeconomic divisions upon hukou status
prior to economic reform.
4.2.4 Occupational Structure
In modern industrialized countries, occupational prestige is viewed as a measure of so-
cioeconomic achievement, which could be said to dated back to a study called Jobs and
Occupations: A Popular Evaluation, carried out by Cecil North and Pual Hatt in 1947
(e.g., N. Lin & Xie, 1988; Nakao & Treas, 1994). After its publication, increasing inves-
tigations were increasingly made to update the evolving occupational characteristics
and classications that accordingly inuenced the occupational socioeconomic status
and prestige hierarchies (e.g., Hodge, Siegel, & Rossi, 1964; Treiman, 1977; Stevens
& Hoisington, 1987). Prestige rank among occupational groupings is now thought to
share similarities across capitalist societies. Due to the spread of the Western mode of
industrial organization in the 20th century, many scholars universally believe that, a
Western pattern of division of labor has been adopted by a number of countries, which
basically accounts for the fundamental similarity of occupational hierarchy throughout
the world (Treiman, 1977; N. Lin & Xie, 1988).
From the establishment of the state socialist system to the initiation of economic
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Table 4: Divisions upon hukou status (1958-1978)
Institutionalized Rights
and Privileges
Non-Agricultural Hukou Agricultural Hukou
Food and Customer
Goods Quota
State-supplied and ratio card
system.
Self-sucient food except dur-
ing disasters.
Education State-run education, relatively
high quality.
Rural people use their own re-
source to invest education, rela-
tively low quality.
Housing State allocated or subsidized
housing.
Self-constructed houses.
Employment Arranged by urban labor bu-
reaus with some choices for ur-
ban youth.
Employment in rural communes
or agricultural production work
in the area of their registration.
Some might be hired by state
employers to work in hard or
heavy jobs.
Social Welfare Free or subsidized medical care,
retirement benets and labour
insurance.
The \cooperative medical sys-
tem" built upon rural communes
took responsibility of medical
and aged care.
Source: T. Cheng and Selden (1994), F.-L. Wang (2005), and J. Young (2013).
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reforms, China's occupational structure was largely built on the Soviet Model of so-
cial and economic organizations, which are relatively distinct from the Western pattern
(N. Lin & Xie, 1988). Nevertheless, it has been found that it is the level of industrializa-
tion, rather than the political system per say that informs how occupational hierarchies
are addressed. For instance, scholars completed an investigation in the 1950s, to make
a statistical comparisons of occupational prestige at the national-level (Inkeles & Rossi,
1956). In this study, the USSR was added as a case together with other ve industri-
alized countries: the United States, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand and Germany.
The occupational ratings in these six modern industrialized countries revealed an un-
expectedly high level of conformity, despite the variance between sociocultural settings
and political systems.
China's socialist occupational rank was specically advanced by the CCP as a
system of social stratication to categorize people, particularly during the 1966-1976
Cultural Revolution (Kraus, 1981; Bian, 1996). Theoretically, the universal notion of
occupational hierarchy is not compatible with either the early Maoist image of socialist
equality or the later Maoist class struggle theory, which makes it hard to systematically
carry out relevant studies about this issue (Bian, 1996). It is known through a few
scholarly studies that, lacking industrial patterns of division of labor, the stratication
of occupational rankings in state socialist China concerns two dimensions: horizontal
groupings called \sectors" (Kraus, 1981, p. 31) and the work unit hierarchy in urban
areas (Zhou et al., 1996).
Sector-based Occupational Rank When the term sector is understood in a so-
cialist context, the occupations are horizontally classied in line with the modes of
production, which to some extent characterizes the sector-based occupational struc-
ture as a duplicate of class designation. Specically, sectors in China are grouped
into: industry, agriculture, commerce, education, military, administration, and the
Party. The horizontal distinctions of occupational hierarchy were organized based on
the functional role played by each occupation (Kraus, 1981). As advocated for the
CCP, the status of certain occupational groups was accordingly redened. In the rst
decade of the establishment of the PRC (1949-1959), the eorts in industrializing the
country suciently increased the occupational status of the urban working class, cadres
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and professionals (N. Lin & Xie, 1988). In the late 1950s, millions of intellectuals were
discriminated against by the Anti-Rightists campaign, which negatively inuenced the
social-political status of those educated occupational groups, such as professionals,
teachers, technicians, etc. (N. Lin & Xie, 1988; Bian, 1996). As the greatest upheaval
since the establishment of the PRC, the Cultural Revolution drastically pulled down
the status of educated occupational groups. Correspondingly, the social positions of
peasants, urban workers and soldiers were signicantly promoted (N. Lin & Xie, 1988).
As an extension of class designation, the sector-based occupational ranking system was
abolished, along with the end of class struggle campaign and the initiation of reform.
Cadre-Worker Dichotomy Horizontally, the work units or organizations are listed
in descending hierarchical order in urban China as follows: the government agencies,
the public organizations and the enterprises. This division further yielded the cadre-
worker job categories into the ocial coding system (Bian, 2002). Historically, in a
socialist revolutionary context, the term \cadre" refers to a sort of person who is be-
lieved to be politically correct and who takes responsibility for special political tasks.
After the CCP became the ruling party, the concept of cadre included two distinct
categories: \the political elite and the functionaries stang the huge party-state appa-
ratus" (H. Y. Lee, 1991, p. 4). The former is easily understood as those that possess
high-level ocial positions or political power in the bureaucratic system (H. Y. Lee,
1991; Brdsgaard, 2002). The latter included other levels of the bureaucracy, such as
managers and professionals (Davis, 2000; Bian, 2002). In addition to being provided
the favor of material compensation packages, cadres are institutionalized to be more
likely and exibly to get promoted in their career lives than urban ordinary urban
workers (Bian, 2002).
Worker Stratication Based on State-Collective Dualism Vertically, in ac-
cordance with the vertical property rights relation to the state, the urban enter-
prises further hierarchically descend from the state-owned enterprise to the collective
enterprise(Zhou et al., 1996; A. Chan, 1997). Zhou and his colleagues explained that
\the relations of organizations to the state are hierarchically ordered in terms of prop-
erty rights, which causes these organizations to dier in political power, economic
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benets and prestiges" (Zhou et al., 1996, p. 761). It features China's urban economic
structure as state-collective dualism that workers enjoyed the highest status in state-
owned enterprise than collective sectors (Walder, 1986; N. Lin & Bian, 1991; Bian,
2002). The communist enterprise, especially the state-owned one, is not dened as an
economic enterprise, but rather as a social institution (Walder, 1986). In particular,
the nancial performance of these enterprises is directly determined by negotiations
with central planning agencies. In the mean time, a state-owned enterprise not only
administers for the state its labor insurance and social security provisions, but also
supplies a wide range of public goods and services. What's more, state ownership
characterizes enterprises to serve as ecient political agents to blur the boundary be-
tween control over one's work life and control over one's private life. Such functions of
sociopolitical control are entirely missing in the western world and Japan. Due to the
sense of community shaped and reinforced by the workplace, an individual's position in
urban society is signicantly identied by his/her workplace (Rohlen, 1979; A. Chan,
1997).
Beyond the model of workplace family, another Maoist feature of China's work unit
system is \permanent employment" (Chinese term: iron rice bowl). Since the prots of
state-owned enterprises are directly bound up to the state, such employment in China
boosts one's social status. Workers in state-owned enterprises who accounted for 78%
of the urban labor force were provided lifelong employment by the initiation of the
reform and enjoyed better insurance and social welfare benets than urban collective
workers (Walder, 1986; Bian, 2002). Temporary workers are conditionally allowed
to be employed in state-owned enterprises. For these workers, most of whom are
registered as agricultural hukou status and have had agricultural working experience
for at least part of the year. Compared to those permanent-employed urban workers,
temporaries are less beneted and placed in a relatively lower position in Chinese
society. A very important distinction is that permanent workers are fully guaranteed
pension and health care benets, whereas most temporary workers are not (Kraus,
1981). Empirically, it has been conrmed that even if provided less insurance, social
welfare and grain price subsidies than permanent workers in state sectors, permanent
workers in collective sectors are still favored much better in those aspects than the
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temporary workers in any sectors (Walder, 1986).
4.3 Socialist Legacies under China's Reform (1978-Present):
A Socioculture
Widely perceived as successful, China's reform inevitably changed the state-society
relations and the social structure. China's reform has basically become seen as an
institutional shift from redistribution to market-oriented mechanisms (e.g., Nee, 1992,
1996). Consequently, a society that had become subordinate to the political order
has been gradually transforming to a hierarchical arrangement more characteristic of
capitalist societies, which has further altered how the public perceives inequality (Nee &
Matthews, 1996; Wright, 2010). Recently, both Chinese citizens and research institutes
have gotten used to adopting the criteria of the western class system to depict China's
social structure. For instance, the concept of \middle class identity" that is used to
describe cultured lifestyle resting upon strong economic foundations has increasingly
attented in subjective identication (Wright, 2010; Miao, 2017). Likewise, the middle
class concept is currently widely utilized by the renowned management consulting
rm McKinsey & Company to estimate the future of China's social stratication (see:
Barton et al., 2013).
Due to the persistence of redistributive power in its market system, however, China's
social structure is essentially a hybrid of a socialist class system and capitalist social
stratication. In general, the market allocation system denitely reduces the privileges
of the redistributive bureaucracy, and increases the bargaining power of producers,
including peasants (Nee, 1991; Walder, 1996). In this sense, China's capitalist trans-
formation is a partial reform, as redistributors continue to exercise substantial control
over resources and market outlets, which weakens market autonomy (Kornai, Lukacs,
et al., 1986; Nee, 1991). Concerning the specic case of China's transformation, as
an innovative institutional form, redistribution, market, and reciprocity are in place
of the market-dominant mode, which to some extent integrates the socialist class sys-
tem into an emerging capitalist society (Nee, 1996). On one hand, a decline of the
monopoly of bureaucracy can be expected through the market force. On the other
hand, the favor of the redistributive bureaucracy is quite signicant for rent seekers,
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such as entrepreneurs, to access market resources and opportunities (see: Nee, 1991;
Rona-Tas, 1994). This is to say that, institutionally, advantages and privileges under
redistributive power would be necessarily converted to socioeconomic resources and
corresponding positional advantages in market-oriented social stratication.
The hierarchies arranged by redistributive power, discussed in this section, are called
socialist legacies. Persisting for over 20 years, this socialist social structure has evolved
into a practice system that I call socialist socioculture. Socialist symbolic capital is
thus the recognition of benets from redistributive power, such as non-agricultural
hukou, Party membership, et cetera. From a sociocultural perspective, albeit under
a market-oriented system, the persistence of redistributive power makes it inevitable
for human practice to be always mediated by the persisting socialist practice mode.
In other word, through embodied behavioral pattern or habitus, socialist symbolic
capital will be converted to other forms of capital that denote competitiveness in a
meritocratic society. Thus, even with the emergence of market force and middle class,
China's reform era social stratication is still hypothesized to related to the earlier
social structures under state socialism. Moreover, it is this sort of reproduction that
fundamentally naturalizes and legitimizes China's inequality in the reform era.
4.3.1 Transformation in China: An Overview
China's transformation, launched in the late 1970s, has turned the economy into a
market reforming era, and has also altered the state-society relations (e.g., Perry,
1994; W.-W. Zhang, 2000; Wright, 2010). Economically, this transformation applies
market force mainly into four main aspects: rural reform, urban reform, macroeconomic
reform, and opening up (W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Due to the persistence of the socialist
political system, albeit market has been introduced to China, the statist legacy has
to some extent blurred the boundary between planned and market economy in the
very beginning of economic reform (Solinger, 1993). Before the ocial establishment
of the \socialist market economy" in 1992, scholars had assumed that the purpose of
China's economic reform was to build a mixed economic regime characterized by both
expending market dependence and continuance of redistributive power (e.g., Nee, 1991,
1992).
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Concerning the legitimation of transformation, a series of political theories have
been proposed for its ideological justication since China embarked upon the reform
and opening. These ideological theories technically associate market elements to the
CCP's monopoly of political power, and afterwards, were ocially dened as \Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics" by the incumbent General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China Zhao Ziyang in the 13th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China in 1987. This innovative approach is an attempt
to strike a balance between a market-oriented economy and an authoritarian state to
maintain the continued economic growth and one-party ruling stability in China (Zhao,
2010). In the very beginning, thus, China's reform was designed as a process of \ad-
ministrative decentralization," and particularly concerned a crucial shift in how the
role and the practice of government should be designed and acted upon respectively
(e.g., Nee, 1992; Sigley, 2006; H. Cai & Treisman, 2006). Inspired by the ecacy
of the market economy, such decentralization transfers the power to the enterprises
and local governments, and is essentially a growth-oriented \soft reform" that doesn't
thoroughly violate the old system (Nee, 1992; W.-W. Zhang, 2000). In the meantime,
transformation in China makes \hard reform" that may cut deep into the old system
gradually acceptable (W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Ranging from labor markets, housing, so-
cial welfare, and the establishment of specic economic zones and today's free-trade
zones, large-scale hard reforms occur in China that appears to be structurally con-
tradictory to the nature of socialism (e.g., Meng & Kidd, 1997; W.-W. Zhang, 2000;
J. Lee & Zhu, 2006).
A series of hard reforms have led to increasing horizontal inequalities, social po-
larization and spatial segregation, which characterizes China's transformation as a
structurally revolutionary both societally and economically. One may say that China
has undergone a transguration turning \Maoist socialism" into \Capitalism with Chi-
nese characteristics" (Sigley, 2006, p. 488). On one hand, the relations of production
has drastically changed, followed by the proliferation of non-state actors and smash of
the iron rice bowl (Leung, 1988; Hsueh, 2016). On the other hand, with respect to
the capitalist characteristics, China has its own characteristic in the role of the state,
which signies a grabbing hand rather than a helping hand (Y. Huang, 2008).
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Soft Reforms In China's transformation agenda, soft reforms come rst, hard re-
forms second (W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Oriented by economic growth, soft reforms have in-
troduced market competition to replace egalitarianism (W.-W. Zhang, 2000; So, 2003).
Decentralization plays a key role in the introduction of market force to China's econ-
omy, and it has been indeed found to improve allocative eciency and macroeconomic
performance (Feltenstein & Iwata, 2005). In particular, decentralization in China's
reform primarily concerns two dimensions: administrative decentralization and the s-
cal decentralization (see also: W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Concerning the political aspect of
decentralization, the autonomy of most social actors has denitely been extended. In
addition to conventional socialist technologies of government, some neo-liberal strate-
gies that govern through the desire of individuals, whether as citizens or specically as
property owners, rent seekers and consumers are integrated in China's \socialist arts
of government" (Sigley, 2006, p. 491).
In terms of rural reform, administrative decentralization or decolletivisam is di-
rectly reected in the innovation of the \household responsibility system" and \town
and village enterprises" (TVEs). As a growth-oriented institutional reform, the house-
hold responsibility system allows peasants to sell agricultural products beyond the
government-regulated quota in the free market (J. Y. Lin, 1987). Under this system,
\the individual peasant, rather than the production team, became the basic unit for
decision making in Chinese agriculture" (McMillan, Whalley, & Zhu, 1989, p.784),
which facilitates the role of market in guiding agricultural production (J. Y. Lin, 1987,
1992). With the nationwide establishment of the household responsibility system in
rural China, commune-based collective agriculture was ocially abolished at the end
of 1984. Due to the growth of market force in rural areas, agricultural workers were
encouraged to specialize in various sideline productions to develop town and village
enterprises (W.-W. Zhang, 2000). TVEs originally referred to rms of communal char-
acteristics that were located in village and townships, and were thought to be another
remarkable institutional innovation of rural reform (Weitzman & Xu, 1994). In the
early stage of rural reform, most TVEs were collectively owned, which denoted that
the property rights of TVEs were regulated to be executed collectively through the
representatives of rural community and the corresponding collective benets were in-
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tegrated into the benets of local governments (Weitzman & Xu, 1994; Pei, 1996).
Following this, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Township Enterprises is-
sued in October 1996 allowed individual peasants to claim private ownership of TVEs
14. On collective-owned enterprises, however, the control rights are independent from
ownership, and partly delegated to managers via contracts (Weitzman & Xu, 1994).
For instance, the TVEs can be either run by local governments or run independently.
It is the vague organizational structure and operational structure that make TVEs
an imperfect product of free contracting market economy (Chang & Wang, 1994; Pei,
1996).
Earlier administrative decentralization in urban China was designed as an exper-
iment in the Sichuan province in October 1978, to revolute the power of decision-
making to enterprises. The initial result of this experiment, which occurred before the
reform & opening up, was considered positive and provided a justication for apply-
ing this initially Sichuan-specic decentralization model to nationwide urban reform
(W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Administratively, reform rstly decentralized the urban power
of decision-making to the enterprise level, in order to improve incentives and perfor-
mances. Consequently, by 1985, most state-owned enterprises were not only allowed to
self-adjust their output quantity, technologies, and their production timing, but were
also allowed to retain a large fraction of their prots (R. H. Gordon & Li, 1991). In
addition to this, as a result of administrative decentralization, domestic migration, oc-
cupational mobility and economic diversity were facilitated. On one hand, since the
1980s, a relatively exible household registration system has allowed population migra-
tion across the country and conditional change of hukou registration (e.g., T. Cheng
& Selden, 1994; K. W. Chan & Buckingham, 2008). The latest Beijing Population
Census shows that, by 2010, people who didn't hold Beijing hukou but lived in Beijing
accounted for 35.9 % of Beijing's residency 15. On the other hand, the legal status of
private-owned rms was conrmed in 1988, by adding a new article to the State Consti-
tution (Dickson, 2007), which then motivated an increasing number of people to enter
into entrepreneurship and facilitated occupational mobility. A result is that, in both
14See: Law of the People's Republic of China on Township Enterprises, Article 10.
15See: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics website:
http://tjj.beijing.gov.cn/zt/pcjdzl/rkpc/sjcx/pcgb/201603/P020160322618360863830.pdf.
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urban and rural areas, a number of former communist cadres have been encouraged to
enter into entrepreneurship (Nee, 1991; X. Wu, 2006).
Besides the reduction of government interference, as a part of soft reform, decen-
tralization also denotes scal federalism. Before 1979, a system called \eating from one
pot" was utilized to describe China's scal policy, referring to how the generalized tax
collection and prot remittances were \controlled by the central government and then
redistributed as needed to the provinces" (Feltenstein & Iwata, 2005, p.483). Under the
system of scal decentralization, the disposition of shares of revenues and expenditure
responsibilities are devolved from central to local governments (W.-W. Zhang, 2000;
Tsui & Wang, 2004; Feltenstein & Iwata, 2005). Due to the expanded scal autonomy
by provincial-level region, which began in 1979, local governments and enterprises are
strongly motivated to promote their interests (W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Currently the
1994 tax-sharing reform is believed by a number of academics to have created the most
far-reaching institutional restructuring of the central-local scal relations, relative to
other reforms of decentralization (see: Shen, Jin, & Zou, 2012). Under this system,
better developed regions are able to retain more revenue (X. Zhang, 2006; Shen et
al., 2012). Although tax-sharing reform has promoted economic growth, such a reform
policy will inevitably result in local governments increasing rent-seeking behaviors that
create regional disparities and which are dependent on scal revenue generated as a
result of growing land and real estate prices (e.g., X. Zhang, 2006; Hsing, 2006; L. Han
& Kung, 2015). Furthermore, as expenditure is transferred to local governments, scal
vulnerability of local governments is augmented (M. Y. S. Zhang & Barnett, 2014).
Concerning the severity of scal risk of local governments, the 25-year tax-sharing
policy was ocially abolished in March 2018.
Hard Reforms Compared to soft reforms that are growth-oriented, hard reforms at-
tempt to cut deeper into the old system and tend to be more institutionally transition-
oriented (W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Hard reforms are introduced, because market mech-
anisms of soft reforms have been increasingly exhausted without any institutional
changes. It is worth noting that, this transition-oriented reform in China doesn't
really target institutional reform, but rather serves as a tactic to facilitate soft reforms
or market force. Given this, those hard reforms institutionally decrease the role of
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egalitarianism in distribution.
Hard reforms inevitably encounter greater resistance than soft reforms, as they
do challenge the socialist distribution system. To ensure political stability and social
acceptance, hard reforms are initially experimented with at a smaller scale and then
later extended to large-scale practice. Even though markets have been liberalized to
allow producers' self-determination since the 1980s, the transition is still dened as
a partial economic reform of a socialist planned economy. Earlier growth-oriented
soft reforms provided cushion for socialist rms, especially state-owned enterprises, to
take party in a more ecient economy. Moreover, the growth of income and savings
generated by soft reforms has been utilized to subsidize state-owned enterprises (W.-
W. Zhang, 2000). Yet, it is the full responsibility for gains and losses imposed on
enterprises that signies the market-oriented mechanism.
China's systematic reform, thus, had to appear to be one of dichotomous choice,
that was, either the administrative logic of state-determined prices and state-mandated
coordination of exchange, or market logic of supply-demand-responsive prices and free
contracting (Solinger, 1993). As a structural change of the old system, transition to-
wards market economy poses a challenge of justifying the concept of \capital" under
the socialist political system. Focused on the delineation of ownership in the public
economy, a resultant system of \socialist market economy" was ocially established in
1992. Such a market economy is an innovation characterized by \the predominance of
public ownership combined with free competition among enterprise and market alloca-
tion of capital" (Brdsgaard & Rutten, 2017, p.95).
Social security reform, particularly pension reform, can be viewed as one of hard
reforms in China, as the economic reform has dismantled the institutional basis for the
social security system under state socialism. Inuenced by the Soviet model, Chinese
pension system had been established based on the state budget and enterprise funds
since 1951. As a part of social security, pension was conned to urban workers served
in the state owned work units and nanced by enterprises during the ten-year domestic
upheaval (1966-1976) (Zhu, 2002; B. Zheng, Yu, & Gao, 2010). However, the pension
coverage was not brought to rural China16. In order to meet the demands of economic
16In rural area, the Five Guarantees was established as a social assistance program to guarantee
food, housing, clothing, medical care, and burial expenses to childless and disabled men through
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liberalization, since 1990s, China has initiated a new urban pension system, which is
income-centered and nanced by the contributions of employers and employees (T. Liu
& Sun, 2016; Q. Lu, 2018). In recent years, the problem of population aging has been
abbreviated and created an implicit pension debt crisis, as China's local governments
use the social security benets to pay the current retirees (C. Li & Lin, 2019). Given
this, China is intending to initiate a reform on the current pension system, which has
become a debatable issue17 in China. In contrast to this, the endeavor of establishing
a rural pension system had been in a morass for a long time (Shi, 2006). A very large
number of rural residents were not covered by the rural old-age insurance until the \New
Rural Social Pension System" was proposed in 2009 under the Hu-Wen administration.
In 2014, the New Rural Social Pension system was established and merged into a basic
pension insurance plan for all citizens (T. Liu & Sun, 2016; Q. Lu, 2018). In other
words, rural residents are entirely covered by the national social pension plan under
Xi-Li Administration.
Theoretically, despite being viewed as a drastic institutional change, the mainstay
of public ownership and market mechanisms provide the justication for a coexistence
of redistributive power and market competition in China's economy. As a result, a
series of reforming systems have emerged, ranging from the labour market, the housing
market, the capital market, and so on (see: W.-W. Zhang, 2000). Compared to soft
reform, hard reform plays a more crucial role in altering the socialist stratication or-
der based on redistribution, as shift to market competitions has denitely opened up
alternative approaches to upward mobility through emergent entrepreneurship, labor
and capital market, which has enhanced opportunities for social mobility that were
previously controlled by decisions of the redistributive bureaucracy (Nee, 1996). The
expansion of market opportunities brought about by such institutional transformation
directly gives rise to the emergence of new middle class in urban China (Barton et al.,
collective support, as rural laborers produced and distributed goods communally under a collective-
owned system of land and means of production (Shen & Williamson, 2010; B. Zheng et al., 2010).
This social assistance program is still working in rural China.
17In order to deal with the burden of urban pension, Chinese policy makers have been considering
gradually raising the retirement age and/or payment base (e.g., Pozen, 2013; Q. Zhang, Guo, & Li,
2015). However, the proposal sparks public debate, which concerns the increase of the pressure of
employment and public nance.
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2013; E. Y.-H. Tsang, 2014; Goodman, 2014). Besides this, market force generates a
change in distribution of rewards that doesn't necessarily favor those who hold redis-
tributive power but rather those who control the market by merits (Nee, 1996). In
this dissertation, I argue that, in China, redistributive power, which implies competi-
tiveness in market activities, has combined with a new kind of distributive mechanism
characterized by meritocracy.
4.3.2 Persisting Socialist Status Hierarchy: A Hypothetical Socioculture
As a transition economy under the one-party leadership of socialist politburo, China re-
tained some hierarchical systems during the state socialist period. As socialist legacies,
these structural relations have evolved into practice patterns, even after China's trans-
formation, and could be described as a specic socialist socioculture that denotes the
continuance of earlier behavior patterns. Entering into the era of transformation, three
earlier structural dimensions of socialist characteristics continue to organize the Chi-
nese into symbolically distinct status groups based on: (1) A split in political aliation:
CCP membership vs. non-CCP membership; (2) A divide in household registration
(hukou) status: agricultural hukou vs. non-agricultural hukou; (3) A divide in em-
ployment structure based on the ownership of organizational assets: inside the system
vs. outside the system. It is presumed that the distribution of human habitus after
economic reform is still anchored in those hierarchical systems of socialist character.
Communist Party Membership: A Form of Capital Institutionally, the sys-
tem that supported Communist Party members enjoying the evident material bene-
ts during Maoist phase denitely changed after China embarked onto reform. Due
to availability through the liberalized market, the dependence on the Party for the
distribution of housing, jobs, and other customer goods was drastically reduced. In
addition to this, having a college degree now appears to be more ecient than being
a Communist Party member for career mobility in some industrial sectors (Dickson &
Rublee, 2000; Sato & Eto, 2008). However, Party membership is still necessary for
those who anticipate applying for positions in the party/administrative bureaucracy or
state-owned enterprises (Dickson, 2014).
Although market force does create new forms of human capital, Communist Party
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membership denitely serves the function of obtaining political connections (Bian &
Logan, 1996; Dickson, 2014). In a market economy with Chinese characteristics, Com-
munist Party membership doesn't mean the advantages in resources allocation any
more, but nevertheless plays an important role in accumulating the political and social
capital that promote competitiveness in market activities. Briey speaking, Commu-
nist Party membership acts as a symbolic capital that legitimizes the greater rewards of
engaging in market activities for Party members. For example, the Party membership
of private entrepreneurs is found to signicantly facilitate private-sector performances
(e.g., Nee, 1991; H. Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008). Dierent from Bian and Logan's
(1996) prediction that the advantage of Communist Party membership in market ac-
tivity might be a temporary phenomenon in early reform, even in recent years, the
returns to Party members are identied to be relatively positive in capital and labor
markets (see also: McLaughlin, 2017).
However, Communist Party membership doesn't simply signify benets, but also
carries extralegal detention by Commissions for Discipline Inspection, shuanggui. Since
introduced in 1994 by regulations on Party Discipline, shuanggui has developed out
of a form of detention known as \connement" practiced in imperial China and the
Maoist period, and become an established practice in order to investigate Party mem-
bers suspected of misconducts (Sapio, 2008). Without judicial involvement, shuanggui
denotes that the outcome of an investigation is always arbitrarily decided (Sapio, 2008;
X. Guo, 2014). The shuanggui policy is thus presumed to aect the way how a Party
member participate in market activities. According to the Supervision Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China enforced in March 2018, shuanggui is abolished and replaced
by a new system called liuzhi, extralegal detention not only for Party members but for
all state ocials.
A Rural-Urban Divide in Registration Status After 40-year of reform in China,
the household registration system (hukou system) passed its 60th birthday in 2018. In
the past decades, a wave of suggestions and debates were proposed about whether the
hukou system should be abolished (K. W. Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Due to the new
migratory requirements of the liberalized market, since the 1980s, a more exible hukou
system has been adopted: First, free domestic migration and settlement are permitted;
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Second, it is possible for temporary residence permit holders to become permanent in
settlement (T. Cheng & Selden, 1994; J. Young, 2013); Third, hukou status conversion
(change from agricultural hukou status to non-agricultural hukou status) is allowed by
merit-based selection or policy-based incorporation (C. Chen & Fan, 2016; X. Wu &
Zheng, 2018).
Up to the date, there is no evident signal of abolishing the household registration
system because the governance of the population is quite crucial in maintaining social
stability (J. Young, 2013). Essentially, there is no doubt that the hukou system up-
holds China's rural-urban dual society system, and further causes inequality in social
status between permanent urban and rural residents in cities (Kuang & Li, 2012). Is-
sued in July 2014, Opinions of the State Council on Further Promotion of Reform of
the Household Registration System is aimed at gradually calling o the distinctions be-
tween the agricultural hukou status and non-agricultural hukou status and establishing
a uniform rural and urban household registration system18. Under the reform, which
is combined with the National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020) and local gov-
ernment policies of hukou conversion, 100 million rural migrants in cities and towns
are expected to be provided uniform local hukou (C. Chen & Fan, 2016).
However, whether the establishment of a uniform rural and urban hukou system
will eliminate the high-level discrimination against rural-to-urban migrants in cities is
uncertain. Due to the long-term inequality in resource allocation, hukou status signi-
es a system of social identication that favors urban (non-agricultural) residents and
discriminates against rural (agricultural) residents. It has been found that with the
symbolic expression of human categories, individuals identifying with institutionally
created hierarchies experience to cognitive, behavioral and socio-economic inequal-
ity in a liberalized market. Through a designed experiment in Beijing, the current
urban-rural divide based on hukou status has been shown to help justify prejudice and
stereotypes leveled at rural residents (Kuang & Li, 2012). Through out the country,
non-agricultural hukou holders have been more likely to be formally employed than
agricultural hukou holders in the labor market (S. Zhang & Cao, 2017). Psychologi-
18Opinions of the State Council on Further Promotion of Reform of the Household Registration
System, Article 9.
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cally, the hukou system provides an unconscious mode of social domination that occurs
within everyday life. Urban-rural inequality is thus symbolically conrmed in a hier-
archical framework. The results of a relevant experimental study suggest that the
salience of hukou status signicantly reduces incentivized cognitive task of rural youth,
which leads to a decrease of earnings (Afridi et al., 2015). Analogous to India's caste
system, China's hukou system has been proved to inuence individuals at the cognitive
and behavioral level (Ho & Pandey, 2006; Afridi et al., 2015). From this perspective,
this long-established policy of social exclusion has evolved into a practice system and
has intensied inequality through the intrinsic motivations and behavior of individuals
(see also: Kuang & Li, 2012; Afridi et al., 2015).
A Dichotomy in Employment Structure The traditional socialist occupational
structure exists in a new form that is informed by the 1998 institutional reform. This
reform program concerns both the socialist cadre-worker dichotomy and the vertical
relationship of property rights to the state: Firstly, market transformations have fur-
ther divided the employment system based on the ownership sector of organizational
assets into two subsystems: the inside the state system (employed by public sector
work units) and the outside the state system (employed by non-public work units).
Secondly, a series of reforming policies have transformed the cadre-worker dichotomy
into a new dichotomy between the personnel in state-budgeted posts and the rest.
This new division system is called the bianzhi system in Chinese (Brdsgaard, 2002,
2006). Personnel within the bianzhi system include millions of state-salaried employees
(Brdsgaard, 2002). As a matter of fact, not all sta serving in the public sector are
salaried by the state budget. Personnel salaried by the state budget signify an elite
insider group inside the state system.
The following three groups divide up the state-salaried system: personnel in bud-
geted posts of the party and government administrative organ, the public service or-
ganizations (i.e., public university, public hospital), and the state-owned enterprises.
Collective and private sectors are out of the state system (see also: Brdsgaard, 2006).
Practically, it is required under scal decentralization to establish standardization in
policy implementation by the soft centralization of regulatory state-party functionaries
at the provincial level. As the main mechanism of this soft centralization,the bianzhi
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system denotes that the allocated budgets are grounded in authorized number of per-
sonnel within the state system (Mertha, 2005). Contrary to the conventional bureau-
cracies whose personnel numbers are based on budget, the authorized allocation of
personnel inside the state system goes the other way around and is akin to that of
the USSR (Mertha, 2005). Therefore, the bianzhi system still signies an occupational
structure of socialist characteristics that transfers cadre status in the old state structure
to the status of being salaried inside the state system (see also: Brdsgaard, 2012).
In China, personnel within the state-salaried system, particularly in budgeted posts
of the party and government administrative agencies, represent an \elite cadre group"
that attempts to catch prior opportunities in a growing marketplace (Bian, 2002). Par-
ticularly in the earlier reform, this elite group took full advantages of social and political
capital to create network capitalism (Boisot & Child, 1996; Bian, 2002). Attributed to
the redistribution system, elites within the state system have evident positional advan-
tages within the capitalist network, because they can \use their access to state resource
to strike it rich on the market, and use their authority over licenses, tax breaks, and
property to exploit entrepreneurs" (Smart & Hsu, 2007, p. 175). Concerning the for-
mer, on the one hand, it is the positional eect of socialist redistribution system that
leads some \insiders" to get highly paid and rewarded (e.g., T. Lin & Wu, 2009; X. Wu,
2013; Zang & Chen, 2015). This is the case especially with regard to work unit hierar-
chy based on ownership of organizational assets which have been found to shape urban
class formation through unequal distribution of income and welfare benets (Solinger,
1995; X. Wu, 2013). On the other hand, an increasing number of elite insiders and their
relatives are becoming involved in business activities, using the advantages of admin-
istrative control and privileges to access greater rates of income returns for themselves
and create new market opportunities of public assets (E. W. Tsang, 1998; Walder,
2003; X. Wu, 2006; Bian, Wang, Zhang, & Cheng, 2012).
Concerning the latter, since the endorsement of insiders in government agencies is
quite signicant in China's market competition, entrepreneurs have to seek the favor
of local cadres to gain access to resources and marketing outlets (Nee, 1991). This is
described as the \patron-client" relationship between state system insiders and non-
state entrepreneurs (Wank, 1996, p. 820). In China, business agencies, mainly private
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and foreign rms, always act as \rent-seekers" in market activities, which motivates
companies to have to establish good connections and strive to have positive interac-
tions with ocials (Nee, 1991; E. W. Tsang, 1998; Taormina & Gao, 2010). The
pervasiveness of the patron-client system inuences state system insiders to become
increasingly involved in private-public transactional corrupt behaviors (Smart & Hsu,
2007; Ko & Weng, 2012). As a kind of political cultural under reform, using positional
capital to exchange for favors has even become a everyday practice among some elite
state insiders (Keliher & Wu, 2016). However, this is now beginning to change as a
result of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign.
106
5 A Quantitative Illustration: The Underlying Struc-
ture of Social Stratication in Today's China
In this chapter I employ a quantitative technique that allows us to see the cloud of
individuals categorized into a social stratum in today's China. It is divided into three
sections presenting a comprehensive empirical research of inequality in China. The
rst section justies the urban-rural dual structure in the research design, and presents
an introduction of the data analysis technique called multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA), and describes how this technique will be applied in the empirical study. The
last section presents the results of the analysis, and further interprets the results.
Overall, the hypotheses are largely veried. In spite of the growth of emerging classes in
China, the persisting socialist hierarchical system continues to aect social stratication
in today's China. Moreover, the socialist legacies manifest more evident signs in rural
social structure than in urban society.
5.1 The Context of Research Design
5.1.1 Symbolic Inequality of Socialist Character
As we have already seen in earlier chapters, persisting socialist hierarchies are not the
stratication structured by market force, but rather the institutional orders ranked
through redistribution mechanism. These institutionalized legacies are believed to
shape the practice modes of humans, which justify the conguration of social structure
of socialist character, through raising class consciousness. The maintenance of socialist
structure virtually signies the indispensability of a certain political system, even for
the initiation of transformation. In this sense, the arranged hierarchical systems of
socialist character can be called symbolic inequalities that legitimize the persistence of
some institutional orders in a signicant transformation.
Brought together by Max Weber, the objectivity of material dierences and the
subjectivity of representations together form the root of social group (i.e. class) divi-
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sions. Meanwhile, whatever the form it takes, any capital exerts symbolic power as
soon as it is recognized (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2013). Symbolic capital, furthermore,
can be understood as the structural root of any other capital. In this sense, I agree with
the description provided by Jodhka et al. (2017) that a given social class will symboli-
cally distinguish itself from other classes. In short, symbolic dimensions of inequality
largely denote the distinctions of the ownership of other forms of capital. An example
in the literature is that through the display of taste, the role of \female" provides an
acceptable guarantee of economic capital, because women are considered to make taste
(e.g., C. Vincent & Ball, 2007).
If legacies of socialist hierarchies, in this study, are interpreted through the sym-
bolic dimension of inequality, it is also reasonable to expect that the symbolically
mediated practice tendency is the key to understanding how China's social strati-
cation is structured after transformation. Analogous to gender dominance or racism,
those recognitions of socialist characteristic are considered to include actions that have
discriminatory implications in market-oriented social domination. Understood by the
logic of practice, the exhibition of a symbolic recognition transforms abstract capital
into more concrete capital of objective material and social representation, because the
competitiveness of a social group or class is universally granted by symbolic credit
(see also: Bourdieu, 1990b). This mechanism has been employed to explore the role
of persisting socialist hierarchical systems in stratifying a transforming society. As
summarized in chapter 4, Table 5 presents the persisting socialist hierarchies and their
symbolic meanings of inequality.
5.1.2 Urban-Rural Dualistic Structure
In this section, a quantitative method will be adopted to analyze the underlying struc-
ture of inequality in today's China. The focus of this analysis will be on the social strat-
ication in urban and rural China respectively, as the urban-rural cleavage is thought
to be the most important aspect of social structure and characterizes contemporary
China as \one country, two societies" (Whyte, 2010c, p. 1). Even though the spatial
hierarchy of prioritizing the city over the countryside was created and promoted during
the Maoist period, the urban-rural divide has become increasingly evident following
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Table 5: Symbolic inequality of socialist character after China's reform and opening up
Symbolic Dimension of Inequality Institutionalized or Internalized Division(s)
Agricultural hukou status
vs.
Non-agricultural hukou status
Discrimination to rural-to-urban migrants:
Unequal access to labor market,
to social welfare, and to education, etc.
Communist Party membership
vs.
Non-Communist Party membership
Advantages for CCP membership in getting
promoted in the party/administrative system;
and in facilitating performance in capital or
labor market.
Inside the state system
vs.
Outside the state system
Being employed within the state system,
particularly being salaried by the state budget,
denotes more privileges to be highly paid and more
opportunities to access to market priorities.
Source: Self-elaborated, based on Bian (2002), Smart and Hsu (2007), Zeuthen and
Griths (2011), Kuang and Li (2012), Y. Guo (2016), McLaughlin (2017), etc. See
also the description in chapter 4.
the transformation. In terms of economic inequality particularly, the urban-rural dis-
parity reached its most tenuous point in 1984 owning to the rural reform that began in
1978. Following this reform, such inequality has continued to grow, with the exception
of the period between 1995 and 1997 during which the price of agricultural products
was raised by the government (M. Lu & Chen, 2006). The data published by National
Bureau of Statistics of China demonstrates that in 2017, per capita disposal income in
the city was 36396 Chinese Yuan (equal to 4650 Euro), almost 3 times the amount of
capita disposal income rural households (12432 Chinese Yuan, equal to 1588 Euro).19
This large income gap between urban and rural China is a product of the reforming
policies that have always been biased toward urban area and residents. Although a
series of policies, such as the increase in procurement prices for agricultural products
and the relaxation of restrictions on rural-urban migration, have been employed to
reduce the urban-rural division and do have some positive eects, urban residents have
continued to receive a number of socioeconomic privileges that are unavailable to rural
residents (D. T. Yang, 1999). Essentially, these urban-biased policies have been further
19See: National Bureau of Statistics of China website:
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01.
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justied through the continuance of the household registration system (hukou system)
(see: K. W. Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Kuang & Li, 2012). For instance, there is still
institutionalized discrimination with regard to access to resources and opportunities,
such as social welfare and employment in labor market (Zeuthen & Griths, 2011;
F. Cai, 2011)20. It is the established boundary between city and countryside that
creates a developmental system of duality between town and country (see also: Zeuthen
& Griths, 2011).
Furthermore, although Chinese society is structured by a growing free market force,
urban-rural bifurcation has become pronounced, shaping social stratication. It is
worth mentioning that, encouraged by a more exible hukou policy and rapid urban-
ization, since the mid-1980s, rural-to-urban migration has increased. Almost at pace
with reforming policies, such phenomenon of rural-to-urban migration contributes to
structural changes in both rural and urban societies. Opportunities for labor migration
are signicant for rural residents in escaping poverty (Du, Park, & Wang, 2005). At
the same time, rural-to-urban migration threatens established provider-receiver rela-
tions between government ocials and urban residents in urban areas (Tang & Yang,
2008). As a result, urban society is informed as a stratied system with capitalist
characteristics. Migrant workers have already become an indispensable part of the la-
bor force, because accumulating construction project and the ourishing private-sector
economy are dependent on these workforces. Data from the 2016 China Labor Statis-
tical Yearbook shows that, with regard to urban employment working hours, 41.9% of
agricultural hukou holders work more than 48 hours per week, much more than the
24.9% for non-agricultural hukou holders21. In Beijing, rural migrant workers usually
engage in construction projects, or other jobs related to textile, mining, and coal indus-
tries in the city (Guang, 2001). Additionally, under the hukou system, migrants are not
allowed to hold permanent urban residency rights and other associated social benets
(Kuang & Li, 2012). In this sense, discrimination against rural-to-urban migrants not
20Since 2005, a series of ocial papers have been issued, to promote urban-rural integration. Mean-
while, Chengdu and Chongqing in southwestern China were designated experimental districts for
urban-rural integration in 2007. See: Ye (2010); Zeuthen and Griths (2011).
21See: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China website:
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/tongjinianjian/201803/t20180302 289122.html.
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only marginalizes that group in urban society, but also characterizes Chinese urban
social structure as an urban caste system (Tang & Yang, 2008; Kuang & Li, 2012).
5.2 Empirical Research Method
5.2.1 Multiple Correspondence Analysis: An Analysis Technique
In this study, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) will be used to detect whether,
and to what extent, inequality in today's China is reproduced from the hierarchical sys-
tem under state socialism. In this investigation, MCA is an appropriate methodological
technique, as the variables can be categorically analyzed. Practically, as a data analysis
technique, MCA is universally applied for nominal categorical variables, such as gender
(Abdi & Valentin, 2007). In the social sciences, MCA became a preferred method in
the late 1970s, and it is perhaps best known for its application by Pierre Bourdieu. In
the book Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Bourdieu used MCA
to explore how each class fraction was characterized by a certain conguration. As a
statistical technique, MCA is commonly used by Bourdieu's followers, particularly in
approaching characteristic dierences between social classes (e.g., Kahma & Toikka,
2012; Jodhka et al., 2017).
MCA is also known as \homogeneity analysis," as it attempts to represent the
structural relationships between variables in a space of reduced dimension (Blasius &
Thiessen, 2001; Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). Mathematically, in MCA, a rectangle array
of data (matrix) is displayed by \rows" that represent individuals and \columns" that
present the categorical variables (Abdi & Valentin, 2007; Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010).
In this dimensional space, visualized proximity denotes the similarity of categories and
individuals. In practice, MCA is applicable to a set of more than two categorical
variables and therefore, it is viewed as an extension of simple correspondence analysis
(CA: Greenacre, 2006; Nenadic & Greenacre, 2007). The fundamental idea behind
simple CA techniques is that the principle of distributional equivalence is more likely
to be displayed through frequency data (e.g., Greenacre & Lewi, 2009). Greenacre
summarized two implications about the use of MCA: The rst is that it leads to the
investigation of canonical correlations between sets of variables; the second is that it
concerns the geometric observation that is linked to \data visualization and which has
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many similarities to Pearson-style principal component analysis" (Greenacre, 2006,
p.42). Given that, it is necessary for variables to be coded categorical in MCA. If
survey data at the individual-level is used in an empirical study, the possible answers
as well as the demographic variables (gender, age, education, marital status etc.) have
to be coded as nominal categories. Take a very simple example of respondent-level
data of 2017 disposable income inequality nationwide in China. The following include
the considered answers:
A. Much lower than 24,408 22 RMB yuan
B. Very slightly lower than 24,408 RMB yuan
C. Very slightly higher than 24,408 RMB yuan
D. Much higher than 24,408 RMB yuan
These are thus three possible response categories:
1. Lower income (corresponding to answer A)
2. Middle income (corresponding to answer B and C)
3. Higher income (corresponding to answer D)
In a matrix based on survey data, each row describes an individual respondent
and the columns represent the categories of responses over all items. Consequently, an
estimation is made through the display of the positions of individual subjects and of
response categories in a map (Greenacre, 2006; Blasius & Thiessen, 2006). Following
the universally accepted principle of \letting the data speak for itself,"23 MCA is indeed
an appropriate method to investigate the relevance of class position in social strati-
cation, since such correspondence analysis is often employed to \explore the structure
of data rather than to test for signicance" (Blasius & Thiessen, 2006, p. 233).
22Published by National Bureau of Statistics of China website, the
2017 median disposable income nationwide is 24,408 RMB yuan; See:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201801/t20180118 1574931.html.
23\Letting the data speak for itself" is a basic principle to minimize bias in both quantitative and
qualitative investigation, and accepted by most scholars. See: D. Walker and Myrick (2006), Blasius
and Thiessen (2006), Strayer (2012), etc.
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5.2.2 Variables and Data
Inequality Variables Max Weber's theoretical contribution to the social stratica-
tion in a market environment is utilized in this study to operationalize inequality in
today's China, for the reform and opening up establishes a system of rewards based
on merits. In Weber's terminology, class situation is used more frequently than class
itself, as class only describes the economic or non-social dimension of capital, while
class situation is the base for communal action that emerges from a group of people
have component of their life chances in common (Weber, 1946). For Weber, life chances
speak to class position as dened in terms of market advantages in general. Aside from
the possession of goods and opportunities for income, Weber emphasized, life chance
also concerns the conditions of commodities and labor market. That is to say that
life chance is structurally situated by the disposal of or control over goods and skills.
Essentially, this control further implies an individual's possession of material prop-
erty, social status and power, and determines a person's class situation (Weber, 1946;
Bendix, 1974). From a Weberian perspective, hence, persons assigned to a certain class
group occupy the same class situation (Weber, 1946; Barbalet, 1980).
Viewed as one of Weber's major contributions to the study of social stratication,
this description doesn't contradict but rather broaden Marx's understanding of class in
market situations (Parkin, 1972). In particular, Weber's interpretation of an individ-
ual's class situation is coherent to the relations of production to which Marx refers as
determinants of classes because once a person enters into a relation of production, he
or she has to be economically, politically, and socially meaningful in the construction
of a certain hierarchical relation (see also: Anthias, 2001).
Another signicant principle of Weber's theory of social stratication, is his de-
lineation between the economic achievement (class) and social status (e.g., Barbalet,
1980; Gane, 2005). As a complex and abstract term, status is necessarily to be un-
derstood in the context of status group, which refers not only to the honor or esteem
value of communities, but also to the estate. In Weber's well-known work Economy
and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, status is closely associated with a
legitimate type of domination that specically exists in a form of exercised authority
or inuence (Weber, 1978; Gane, 2005). In a market situation, the prestige rewards for
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an occupational role are associated with its period-specic social function and contri-
bution, which leads to the claim that occupation is a convincing index for revealing the
status dimension of social stratication (e.g., Hatt, 1950; Hollingshead et al., 2011).
Additionally, stated by Weber, in principle, the power that may be generated by a
party or a political club also determines a person's struggle for life chance. The party,
in Weber's opinion, is an organization founded upon social relationships, and is always
directed toward a planned goal striven for in a planned way (Weber, 1978; Gane, 2005),
which leads to the characterization of power as a person's ability to engage in social
activities and to attain goals. Practically, in line with Weber's discussion, such power is
exercised through organizations, particularly the modern organizations of bureaucracy
and of civil service (Weber, 1946). Concerning the essence of power, as an eective
instrument for facilitating socioeconomic achievements, Weber conceived of the idea
of social networks as an eective instruments that are analogous to \social capital"
(Trigilia, 2001).
For Weber and his followers, the three components of stratication above empha-
size a person's competitiveness. Literally, this competitiveness or advantage denotes
eciency and outlines the common ground of the market system, and of an emerging
society with capitalist characteristics (Cochoy, 1998). Thus, even for the maintenance
of a socialist political system, it is reasonable to dene transforming Chinese society as a
market-oriented situation. In this empirical study, Weber's model of three-components
of stratication will be used to refer to how an individual is positioned in a market-
oriented structural relation. China's inequality is then inevitably congured by the
interplay between wealth, social status, and power. Table 2 demonstrates how these
three variables of inequality will be operated.
Categorical Data This part of the empirical investigation utilizes data from 2015
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS). The raw data is available to all researchers.
Launched in 2003 by Renmin University and the Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology, the CGSS is a successive survey of China's urban and rural societies,
mainly at the individual and household levels, in order to collect panel data for tracking
the dynamics of social stratication and life quality in China (see: Bian & Li, 2012).
CGSS data is self-reported, nationally representative, and has been commonly used as
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Table 6: Inequality variables and operation
Variables Operation
Wealth
Income and other fortune
(e.g., real estate property, private vehicle, stock, savings, etc.).
Status Occupational status
Power
Work organizations;
Position within the organization (decision power);
Social network.
Source: Self-elaborated, primarily based on Weber (1946), Weber (1978), Liberatos
et al. (1988), etc.
empirical evidence in social science research on China (Xu, Perkins, & Chow, 2010;
Z. Zhang & Treiman, 2013; Xie & Zhou, 2014; Luo, 2014). In the CGSS, targeted
respondents for interviewing are civilian adults over the age of 18. The 2015 CGSS
creates 10968 samples that cover 28 provincial-level administrative areas24. Hence, it is
statistically appropriate for observing the social structure by this dataset. In order to
apply the MCA, all sets of the quantitative data from the 2015 CGSS are transformed
to the sets of categorical data.
Socialist Hierarchies Variable Data The socialist hierarchy variables dis-
cussed here include CCP aliation, hukou status and a dichotomy in employment
structure, because these classications concern the symbolic dimension of socialist hi-
erarchy. Each variable can be measured and categorized via survey responses as follows:
(1) Party Aliation: From the responses of political aliation survey I construct
the following categories:
(a) No Communist Party member (NPA; includes the masses and the communist
youth league member)
(b) Democratic parties member (DPM)
(c) Communist Party member (CPM)
24Except for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macau SAR and Taiwan,
31 provincial-level administrative regions in mainland China operates socialist political sys-
tem; About the description of 2015 CGSS, see Chinese National Survey Data Archive website:
http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=site/article&id=164 (in Chinese).
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(2) Hukou Status: From the Responses of hukou status investigation I con-
structed categories below:
(a) Agricultural hukou status (AHS)
(b) Non-agricultural hukou status (NHS; since birth, including some blue-seal hukou25
holders and local hukou26 holders who formerly held non-agricultural hukou)
(c) Rural-to-urban hukou (RHS; hukou conversion allowed by merit-based selection
or policy-based incorporation, including some blue-seal hukou holders, and local hukou
holders whose former hukou status is agricultural hukou)
(3) A Dichotomy of Being Employed: The dichotomy of employment structure
is a town-specic concept that describes a divided employment system based on the
ownership sector of organizational assets, which determines the work unit type. The
responses of relevant survey items have been constructed into the following categories:
(a) Inside the state system (IS; respondents who are employed in state-sector
units27)
(b) Outside the state system (OS; respondents who are employed in non state-sector
units28)
25Blue seal hukou is a transitional urban hukou created in early 1990s, mainly for wealthy, educated
and skilled candidates. It is possible for blue-seal holders to become permanent local urban hukou
holders after ve-year qualied residency. This policy of valid urban hukou is created to facilitate
population mobility and economic vitality (see: F.-L. Wang, 2004; Luo, 2012). According to Opinions
of the State Council on Further Promotion of Reform of the Household Registration System issued by
the State Council, the blue seal hukou was eectively terminated in July 2014.
26Raised in July 2014 Opinions of the State Council on Further Promotion of Reform of the House-
hold Registration System issued by the State Council, the system of household registration in urban
and rural areas shall be unied, and the system of residence permit shall be applied on a full scale.
Afterwards, provincial-level administrative regions successively began to gradually unify agricultural
and non-agricultural hukou as uniform local hukou.
27This empirical study provides a measurement of \being employed inside/outside the state system".
In the 2015 CGSS, inside the state system (IS) only describes public organizations (WU3) and state-
owned or holding enterprises (IS in WU2), because respondents who work for party and government
systems are not required to answer to the ownership sector. Given that, the work unit type \party
and government agencies" (WU1) are supplemented in this measurement.
28The ownership type can be collective-owned or holding, private ownership or holding, Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan-funded or holding, foreign investment or holding and other possible types.
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Inequality Variable Data According to Weber's three-component theory of
social stratication, economic capital, social status, and power are the most important
variables to measure one's class situation in a market-oriented society. These inequality
variables are indexed as follows:
(1) Economic Capital: In the 2015 CGSS, survey items that attempt to explore
the economic situation of respondents are all at the household-level. The responses of
three signicant investigations are categorically constructed to measure a household's
possession of material resources in China's contemporary society:
(a) Property ownership (PO): the total number of houses with partial or full prop-
erty ownership, coded as PO0-PO99 (totaling 0 to 99).
(b) Private vehicle ownership (PV): full ownership of a private vehicle, PV1 if yes,
PV0 if no.
(c) Economic condition (EC): the economic status of the local area, coded as EC1-
EC5, or far below average to far above average, respectively.
(2) Social Status: Social inuence of a respondent's occupation is utilized as the
index of an individual's social status. Subjective ratings by the respondents about
how they perceive the social honer and inuence of their occupation are used to in-
dicate social status. The responses towards the relevant survey item are categorically
constructed as follows:
(a) Social prestige (SP): the extent to which a respondent agrees that his/her job
helps many people, coded as SP1-SP5, from \strongly agree" to \strongly disagree."
(b) Social inuence (SI): the extent to which a respondent agrees that his/her job
benets society, coded as SI1-SI5, from \strongly agree" to \strongly disagree."
(3) Power: From the responses for the type of work units, decision power, and
social network, I construct corresponding categories to measure a respondent's power
in urban China:
(a) Work unit type (WU): a respondent is asked whether he/she works within the
party or a government agency (WU1); an enterprise (WU2); a public organization
(WU3); a social organization or a residents'/villagers' committee (WU4); the army
(WU6); or is self-employed (WU5).
(b) Decision power (DP): the extent to which a respondent makes independent
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decisions in his/her work, coded as DP1-DP4, from \highly independent" to \high
dependently."
(c) Social network (SN): the frequency that a respondent is asked to provide help
to others, because of his/her work, coded as SN1-SN5, from \very often" to \never."
(4) Additional power indicators of rural society: Due to the dualistic employ-
ment status between city and countryside, it is necessary to add other survey items
to measure power in rural China. Besides non-agricultural work unit type, another
indicator for the measurement of workplace is the division between agricultural work
and non-agricultural work. Additionally, local kin and networks exert sociocultural
forces to accomplish local coordination that facilitates reform processes in rural China
(N. Lin, 1995). This is to say that locality simultaneously denotes an individual's so-
cial capital and position in rural society. Thus, I construct following categories from
responses of relevant survey items:
(a) Employment status (ES): the employment status a respondent is current in,
including non-agricultural work (ES1); agricultural work, had been in non-agricultural
work (ES2); agricultural work, hadn't been in non-agricultural work (ES3); jobless,
had only been in agricultural work (ES4); jobless, had been in non-agricultural work
(ES5); never been in any work (ES6).
(b) Locality (LO): the extent to which a respondent is acquainted with his/her
neighbors, coded as LO1-LO5, from \not very acquainted" to \very acquainted."
Demographic Variable Data In order to comprehensively investigate the struc-
tural relation between symbolic classications and inequality, I then construct cate-
gories for some key demographic variables as follows:
(1) Gender: male (G1); female (G2).
(2) Marital Status: unmarried (M1); married (M2); divorced (M3); widowed
(M4); no answer (M99).
(3) Educational level (highest attained): never attended school formally (S1);
literacy education29(S2); primary school (S3); middle school (S4); vocational high
school (S5); high school (S6); secondary specialized school (S7); apprentice school
29Adult illiteracy for China was nearly 80% in 1949. In order to reduce the adult illiteracy rate, the
newly-established Chinese government attached great importance to literacy education.
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(S8); specialized college (part-time) (S9); specialized college (full-time) (S10); Univer-
sity (part-time) (S11); University (full-time) (S12); graduate school and higher (S13).
(4) Age: born earlier than 1960 (A1); later than 1960 (A2); later than 1970 (A3);
later than 1980 (A4); later than 1990 (A5).
Other Supplementary Variable Data Below are the supplementary variables
in this empirical research:
(1) Relative socioeconomic position: compared to the peers, respondents are
asked to identify their current socioeconomic position as relatively higher (SIP1), mid-
dle (SIP2), or relatively lower (SIP3).
(2) Change of socioeconomic position: compared to the past three years,
respondents are asked to identify changes in socioeconomic position as having increased
(CSP1), stayed almost the same (CSP2), or decreased (CSP3).
5.3 Results and Interpretation
The 2015 CGSS received 10968 valid copies of survey responses, of which 6470 targeted
urban areas, and the rest of the 4498 targeting rural areas. According to data pub-
lished by the World Bank, 55.5% of the population of China live in urban settlements.
The proportion of urban samples to rural samples, thus, is technically appropriate to
comprehensively demonstrate the structural relations between urban and rural China.
5.3.1 Analysis of Inequality in Urban China
The underlying structure of the urban data set from the 2015 CGSS is analyzed using
multiple correspondence analysis. Figures 8-10 present how categories of political al-
iation, household registration (hukou status), and employment system are distributed
in urban China respectively. Approximately 14% of the 6470 urban respondents are
shown in Figure 8 as Communist Party members (CPM), which to some extent denotes
the makeup of the \elite class." It is revealed in Figure 9 that less than half of urban
residents have been identied as non-agricultural hukou holders (NHS) since birth.
In fact, due to the exible household registration policies, there is a large number of
urban residents that are agricultural hukou holders (AHS) and rural-to-urban hukou
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Figure 8: Distribution of party aliation among urban respondents
holders (RHS). It has been demonstrated from the 2015 CGSS data that nearly 20% of
the urban residents have transformed their original agricultural hukou status into per-
manent urban registration through a number of ways, including entering into college,
employment, serving in the army, marriage, etc. In addition, Figure 10 indicates that
even for the emergence and prosperity of the non-public sector of the economy, work
units of the state system still play a remarkable role.
Shown in Figure 12 is the correlation between 17 variables and MCA principle
dimensions. It is evident that the variables of gender and political aliation are most
correlated with the rst dimension, which explains the largest variation in the urban-
based data. Similarly, the variables of change of socioeconomic position, property
ownership, social prestige and inuence, and marital status are most correlated with
the second dimension that explains the second largest variation.
In order to investigate the role of persisting inequality in the socialist system in
stratifying social structure, a MCA of the symbolic categories of socialist hierarchies is
designed. Figure 13 displays a MCA map of the symbolic conguration of urban social
structure. As seen from the MCA map, the items \no party aliation" and \agri-
cultural hukou status" are located negatively in relation to \Communist Party mem-
ber" and \non-agricultural hukou status/rural-to-urban hukou status". It additionally
demonstrates through quadrant 1 (upper right) that both being a Party member and
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Figure 9: Distribution of hukou status among urban respondents
(a) Distribution of work unit type among
urban respondents
(b) Distribution of ownership sector
among urban respondents
Figure 10: Distribution of being employed by the state system in urban China
Note: WU1+IS
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Figure 11: Percentages of inertia explained by the MCA dimensions: based on urban samples
being employed in a public organization (state-owned) are the most evident traits of
the advantageous social group. Accordingly, quadrant 1 (upper right) and quadrant 3
(lower right) illustrates the persisting socialist inequality system. Conversely, quadrant
2 (upper left) and quadrant 4 (lower right) demonstrate the emerging classes, since the
non-public sectors of the economy are the fruits of economic transformation.
Figure 14 is a supplementary presentation that contains comprehensive variable
categories and speaks to the structural root of China's inequality. In the rst place,
located in the rst quadrant (upper right), the response item EC4 (economic condition
above average), SIP1 (self-identied relatively higher socioeconomic position), PO3 (3
properties), PO2 (2 properties), PV1 (full ownership of private vehicle), DP1 (strong
decision power) are close to each other. Such similarity denotes that the rst quadrant
describes the social groups or classes that are more likely to be positioned in the mid-
dle class and above. Shown in this quadrant, SP1 and SI1 are located far away from
the center point, which implies that compared to economic condition, social status
plays a more evident role in recognizing an individual's class position. Exhibited by
quadrant 1, it is found that item RHS (rural to urban hukou status), WU1(party and
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government agencies) and CPM (Communist Party membership) are close to the so-
cioeconomic characters shown in the social classes. With regard to middle class status
and above, the distance to center point suggests that being employed in the party and
government system (WU1) reects more representative traits than being a Commu-
nist Party member and being registered as an urban resident. It should also be noted
that, the items of those advantageous characteristics are located closer to S10, S11,
S12 and S13, which means that education level have a positive eect on one's socioe-
conomic achievements in market-oriented society. The opposite quadrant (lower left)
displays the negatively correlated variable categories, such as worse economic condition
(EC1, EC2), lower self-identied socioeconomic position (SIP3), and correspondingly
lower educational level (S1, S3). Introduced by all these traits is the urban vulnerable
group that is technically called the \lower class." Simultaneously, the spatial distance
demonstrates that, the lower class respondents are older in age (A1) and likely to be
non-Communist Party members (NPA). However, as the NPA item is situated next
to the center point, non-Communist Party membership is not a signicant factor for
characterizing this class.
The above interpretations of Figure 14 largely verify one of the hypotheses pro-
posed in this dissertation: even though item IS (inside the state system) exhibits a
deviant order, respondents who work in the party and government system continue to
be categorized into relatively higher social strata. However, the item that concerns the
employment of party and government agencies is invisible in Figure 13. Instead, this
location is occupied by item \Communist Party member." One possible explanation is
that, even though it is recruited as an elite group in schools and workplaces, Commu-
nist Party membership is no longer attached to the public-sector system. As a result,
compared to civil servants in the party and government system, Communist Party
membership doesn't necessarily claim absolute superiority. In addition, uncovered by
calculating the chi-square distance between response categories and then representing
them geographically as maps, the association reveals that respondents who are in bet-
ter economic conditions (PO2, PO3, PV1), higher in social status (SP1, SI1), stronger
in power (DP1, SN2), and/or in a relatively higher self-identied socioeconomic posi-
tion (SIP1) are more likely to be Communist Party members (CPM) and registered
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as urban residents originally registered under hukou status (RHS). Due to the eect
of educational credentials on social mobility, it is likely that, compared to individuals
who have been registered as urban residents since birth, the clusters of urban residents
that attended higher levels of schooling are more likely to be highly positioned in their
hierarchical structures.
The second quadrant (upper left) gives measures of a cloud of respondents who
are typically characterized as agricultural hukou holders (AHS) involved with small
individual businesses (WU5) in urban society. Usually, this cluster refers to \farmers-
turned-workers" (technically described as rural to urban migrants) who moved from
rural to urban areas for job opportunities without holding permanent urban residency.
Although relatively marginalized in urban society, the class exists as a result of so-
cioeconomic transformation and manifests as an emerging capitalist socioculture. The
opposite quadrant (lower right) shows a cluster of respondents who don't feel change
of socioeconomic position (CSP2) and are relatively weaker in power (DP3, SN4, SN5,
WU2). The spatial association between response categories further indicates that this
cluster is more likely to be identied as \working class" in cities. Meanwhile, these
respondents are more gathered together as non-agricultural hukou holders (NHS). The
close proximity of item WU2 and item IS tells a truth that lots of employees from
state-owned or holding enterprises are categorized into the urban working class. An
interesting nding is that, the distance to the center point explains a phenomenon that
respondents employed inside the state-owned or holding enterprises are even more ev-
idently recognized in the urban working class than respondents employed outside the
state system (OS). Aside from this, even though located in the same quadrant, the
distance between the response category of personnel employed inside the state system
(IS) and other inequality variables displays less evident similarities. That is to say, the
eect of employment status on dening a person's position in a social structure might
be dependent on a variety of factors.
As a statistical technique, it is possible for MCA to describe the distributional fea-
tures of urban residents by displaying the distribution of response categories. Seen
from the shade of dark blue in Figure 15, the working class depicted by quadrant 4
(lower right) is identied as the mainstream group in contemporary urban China. Par-
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Figure 15: Distribution of urban samples in the MCA map of all variable categories
128
ticularly, the majority in urban society is featured as the salaried group with relatively
weaker power living in average economic conditions. The shade of blue in quadrant 1
suggests the quick growth of the urban middle class whereas, corresponding to that,
as shown by the marginalized groups distributed in quadrant 2 and 3.
To sum up the main ndings, above are four clusters of response categories that
I dierentiate. The underlying structure for inequality in urban China can be shown
via the spatial proximity of each variable category. In terms of the social hierarchy of
socialist character, rstly, Communist Party members are more likely to be arranged
in the urban middle class and above than non-Communist Party members. Being
employed by the state system doesn't necessarily bring about positional advantages in
the market-oriented society, except for cadres in party and government. Next, non-
agricultural hukou holders (since birth) are distributed more in the urban working class
or lower middle class. Correspondingly, agricultural hukou holders (rural to urban
migrants) are relatively more marginalized and discriminated against in urban society.
Last but not the least, even though it is not quite apparent, being a non-Communist
Party member is a feature of marginalized groups in urban society. For middle class
people and above, being party and government cadres contributes more to being in
a higher socioeconomic position than being Communist Party members. The results
also present a trend that, although the persisting socialist hierarchical arrangement
inevitably exerts its force in constructing urban society, the inuence is limited by
the accelerating transformation. It is worth noting that the explanatory values of two
axises are low in the urban case (see: Figure 13 and Figure 14). This is due to the
fact that as a data analysis technique, MCA is not made to depict sociocultures in this
case. In contrast to other instruments, however, it provides an approach to observe the
socioculture by representing an underlying structure of a society.
5.3.2 Analysis of Inequality in Rural China
The results from the MCA on the same data set also reveal how China's rural society
is stratied. From Figure 16 to Figure 18, we can see how categories of party alia-
tion, household registration (hukou status), and employment structure are distributed
in rural China respectively. Compared to being in urban society, symbolic inequal-
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Figure 16: Distribution of party aliation among rural samples
Figure 17: Distribution of hukou status among rural samples
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(a) Distribution of work unit type among
rural samples
(b) Distribution of ownership sector
among rural samples
Figure 18: Distribution of being employed by the state system
Note: WU1+IS
ity of socialist character appears to be more apparent, which denotes a relatively less
complicated social structure in these rural areas. It is evident that the majority of
the rural population have been identied as the symbolically underprivileged groups
(i.e., agricultural hukou holders, non-Communist Party members, and non-state sys-
tem personnel). Shown in Figure 20 is the correlation between 19 variables. The MCA
principle dimensions of gender, political aliation, and social network are most corre-
lated with the rst dimension that explain the largest variation in the rural data set;
Meanwhile, the variables social inuence and prestige, relative socioeconomic position
(self-identied), change of socioeconomic position, acquaintance with neighbors, and
property ownership are most correlated with the second dimensions that explains the
second largest variation.
Figure 21 demonstrates the symbolic conguration of rural social structure. It is
evident that, in rural China, the socialist socioculture is solid, and has given rise to
class division lines between the socialist class system and the emerging class. The
privileged class, located in quadrant 1 (upper right), not only shows strong integration
of the party and the administration (including the army system), but also exhibits the
institutional advantages of non-agricultural hukou status in rural society (compared to
the underprivileged position of agricultural hukou status shown in the lower left oppo-
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Figure 19: Percentages of inertia explained by the MCA dimensions: based on rural samples
site quadrant ). Quadrant 4 (lower right) describe an emerging class that appears to be
the rural middle class after transformation. On the contrary, those in the self-employed
in individual business category, displayed in upper left quadrant 2, have been relatively
marginalized during the transformation. Seen as the results of capitalist transforma-
tion, variables shown in these two quadrant virtually reveal how liberalization comes
into being and grows in rural China.
Next, as an extension of Figure 21, Figure 22 presents an overall picture of the
structural root of inequality in rural society via the analysis of more variable cate-
gories. Quadrant 1 (upper right) depicts a more privileged class in rural areas. Being
employed in public organizations (WU3) is found to be one of the most prominent
features of this class. Non-agricultural hukou holders (NHS, RHS) and hired inside the
state system (IS) respondents show some similarities. Particularly in terms of the IS
item, the distance from the central point indicates that the WU3 item (public organi-
zation employee) is a more conspicuous trait of the rural privileged class, than WU4
(cadre in villagers' committees) and CPM (Communist Party member). The distance
of CPM and WU4 thus gives a visible measure of similarity. Aside from this, respon-
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dents who are/were involved with non-agricultural work outside the state system (OS)
also belong to this cluster. Essentially, quadrant 1 illustrates that this class gains po-
sitional advantages under the socialist hierarchical system. The interesting result is
that, however, none of the indicators related to economic condition are visible in this
quadrant. On the contrary, the opposite quadrant 3 (lower left) demonstrates the very
underprivileged class in rural society characterized by its lower educational level (S3)
and in agricultural work (and never in non-agricultural work, ES3). It is not surprising
that, no non-agricultural work experience is the biggest feature of this cluster.
Quadrant 2 (upper left) captures such a group with a relatively lower self-identied
socioeconomic position (SIP3) rating in rural society who are demographically char-
acterized to be at elder age (A1) and a very low educational level (S1). Symbolically,
respondents in this quadrant were originally born with agricultural hukou status (AHS),
and are non-Communist Party members (NPA). For the jobless (ES4) however, these
relationships with AHS and NPA are not fairly apparent among this group members. A
completely opposite picture of quadrant 2 is demonstrated in quadrant 4 (lower right),
which describes the characteristics of an emerging class in rural China. With regard to
those respondents who identify themselves in a middle socioeconomic position (SIP2),
although unrelated to redistribution power, they are self-established in a better eco-
nomic condition (PV1, PO2, EC4) and social network (SN2). It can be observed that
the cluster of these response categories primarily consists of individuals who are, or
were, in non-agricultural work (ES1, ES2), particularly engaged in individual business
(WU5), and were born in a reforming period (born after 1970s, A3).
The distribution of respondents shown in Figure 23 further reveals the fundamental
structure of rural society. The shade of dark blue covers a series of traits of mainstream
class, among which includes the feature of being at an older age implying that younger
people are more willing to seek for opportunities in cities. In the meantime, non-
agricultural work is increasingly facilitating the improvement of economic conditions,
leading to the emergence of a wealthy class in rural areas. Due to the fact that socio-
cultures are too complex to be depicted by MCA, the explanatory values of the two
axises are low in the rural case (see: Figure 21 and Figure 22). Apart from this, it is
worth noting that the positional advantages of socialist symbolic capital appear to be
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more signicant in dening the rural than the urban social structure.
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6 A Qualitative Illustration: Habitus and Its Con-
tribution to Inequality in Today's China
The mixed methods research employed in this study combines quantitative and quali-
tative research methods sequentially (e.g., ndings from one approach inform the other;
Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). As revealed by the quantitative research in chapter
5, the status-quo of inequality has been found to be, to some extent, reproduced from
the class system under state socialism. This reproduction of the class distinctions un-
der state socialism makes the status quo of inequality appear natural, explaining why
humans perceive inequality under reform as just and proper. I therefore propose a
sociocultural mechanism to examine how the reproduction of inequality happens. As
delivered in chapter 4, the socioculture is hypothesized to be the relevant habitus (or
practice tendency) that exist with some legacies of socialist hierarchies. Inequality in
today's China is thus presumed to be determined by the distribution of habitus triats,
which is anchored in the persisting socialist hierarchies.
Due to market transformation under the socialist political system, the sociocultural
framework is presupposed to be understood either as awareness of the socialist redistri-
bution system, or as awareness of the liberal market. This chapter introduces a quali-
tative view to develop a sociocultural understanding of the reproduction of inequality.
Through the operationalization of habitus and by conducting a series of in-depth in-
terviews, it was found that the maintenance of habitus acquired from the socialist
hierarchical systems is an invisible mechanism for reproducing inequality. First, in
both rural and urban societies, human habitus is, to some extent but not fully, sym-
bolically mediated by the socialist hierarchical legacies. Second, the capitalist habitus
type diers from the socialist practice tendency, which explains the dividing line be-
tween the privileged class and the emerging auent class in rural China. Next, the
urban middle (including upper middle class) class has developed out from the practice
of occupying state power and/or market share. The working class in urban China
is categorized into two subclasses: marginalized working class derived from economic
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liberalization and urban working class formed of the urban worker group within the
earlier cadre-worker dichotomy. In other words, the middle (including upper middle )
class and the working class in urban society are joint products of both socialist and
capitalist logics of practice.
Finally, in both rural and urban society, being a member of the lower classes is
linked to feelings of deprivation and exclusion. To sum up, inequality in today's China
is reproduced and accepted to be just, even if the earlier socialist logic of practice
remains unconscious and invisible.
6.1 Habitus and Its Operationalization
6.1.1 Habitus and Inequality in Today's China
The habitus theory derived from the sociocultural perspective will be adopted to ex-
plain how the conguration of inequality is informed under China's reform. Dened
by Pierre Bourdieu, habitus depicts the internalized behavioral tendency of humans,
learned from certain elds, which organize the practice modes of individuals cognitively,
without intentional calculation (Bourdieu, 1989, 1990b). With regard to the reproduc-
tion of inequality, habitus not only tends to repeat certain behavioral patterns, but
also unconsciously encourages individuals to seek conditions which are consistent with
its regeneration (see also: Jodhka et al., 2017). In this sense, human habitus signi-
es individual merit, which reveals the structural root of inequality in a meritocratic
society.
As an internalized practice mode, in this case, habitus reproduction explains how
social class is reproduced from a planned social system to a relatively autonomous
one. Therefore, the distribution of habitus that determines inequality under reform is
assumed to be partly compatible with the hierarchical system under the state-socialism
system. Based upon the underlying social structure of both urban and rural China
revealed in chapter 5, capitalist characteristics seem to be integrated into the socialist
milieus. This sociocultural amalgam is expected to reveal various habitus types, with
the socialist habitus reproducing itself from the state-socialist class system while the
capitalist habitus develops out of economic liberalism. To be concrete, human practice
of the state-socialist model signies individuals tending to act in compliance with
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the rules within the hierarchical system of redistribution. On the contrary, capitalist
habitus means that a human will tend to act as he/she has learned from the forces of
supply and demand. Habitus traits are assumed to refelct dierences in access to the
market, a quality that has been framed as meritorious by the state in China's reform.
I therefore presuppose following sociocultural frameworks that associate habitus with
inequality:
(1) Habitus traits acquired through the socialist tradition and valued in a transform-
ing society are distributed in both rural and urban advantaged classes in a concentrated
manner.
(2) Habitus traits acquired through the socialist tradition and less valued in a trans-
forming society are distributed in both rural and urban marginalized classes in a con-
centrated manner.
(3) Habitus traits acquired in liberal market are distributed in both rural and urban
emerging classes in a concentrated manner, and sparsely distributed in other social
classes.
Institutionalized through ideological tradition and policies, habitus types of social-
ist traits are regarded to be related to individual tendencies to address the system of
inequality from an earlier time. Transformation, in fact, conditionally brings about
changes in human practice: On one hand, there still remain policies that discriminate
against underprivileged groups to equally access some social resources. On the other
hand, these hierarchical systems are arranged in a more exible way, which means
individuals are allowed to conditionally switch their positions within the structural
systems. For instance, it is possible for original agricultural hukou holders to ob-
tain non-agricultural hukou status via several approaches (e.g., employment, school
attendance, entrepreneurship, etc.). Another example is that both regular opening
recruitment and voluntary resignation have been institutionalized by the personnel
management of the state system (see also: Chou, 2007). These changes in liberaliza-
tion suggest that a new common practice has been acquired and then incorporated as
an stable behavioral pattern by a large number of people. Basically, as a result of the
economic liberalization, upward mobility has been allowed, and even facilitated, in the
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Figure 24: How social inequality comes into being under China's reform
framework of the socialist hierarchical system.
Since individuals have been legally granted market opportunities in China, an un-
derstanding of such a habitus requires an emphasis on two things: First, how human
habitus types develop out of a hybrid of a socialist political system and a market econ-
omy; Second, due to the emergence of free competition, a human doesn't necessarily
develop a sense of the socialist hierarchies. The former examines the form and the
extent to which the socialist system of inequality is reproduced under reform, and the
latter concerns the emerging social class. Figure 24 illustrates how this conguration
of inequality is informed.
6.1.2 The Operationalization of Habitus
The operationalization of habitus, which forms the foundation for constructing habitus
types, which is insucient in Bourdieu's theory (see also: Jodhka et al., 2017). Usually,
operationalization is considered one of the most signicant facets in social science
research, for both quantitative and qualitative investigation. In quantitative research,
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operationalization is the process of creating scales or indicators to calculate the extent
to which abstract concepts exist, on the basis of concretizing the meaning of said
concepts (Berg, 2001; VanderStoep & Johnson, 2008). Similarly, qualitative study is
aimed at concretizing the meaning of a concept in relation to a given context and
exploring how that concept is to be identied (Berg, 2001).
In terms of the operationalization of habitus in the present study, two things must
be theoretically established: First, what specic behaviors are associated with social
stratication under China's reform? Second, how will these behavioral variables be
examined? The rst suggests the concrete aspects of habitus that are revealed as sig-
nicant and are unequally distributed, while the second reects an attempt to construct
habitus types. Since Weberian stratication is used to approach the investigation of
inequality, the observed behaviors are expected to relate to the achievements of eco-
nomic condition, social status and power. In the CGSS 2015, for example, the following
items are relevant and crucial to the qualitative interviews:
 Cognitive ability
 Social interaction
 Self-discipline30
 Adaptation to market system31
 Attitude toward the future
Theoretically, the above items are assumed to be responsible for explaining what
habitus means, because in a transforming society, people are dierently aware of the
30Here I apply self-discipline rather than self-regulation to the qualitative interview design. Accord-
ing to scholars' work, self-regulation is studied to be a part of cognitive processes and makes more
emphasis on strategy use. In contrast, self-discipline focuses on \performance processes designed to
cope with learning problems" (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 2014, p.146). In particular, self-discipline
signies human ability of having self-control over ones attitudes and behaviors in order to maintain
intention and impulsivity during problem solving (Salami, 2010; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 2014).
31With regard to this item, I encourage interviewees to talk about their perception and experience of
stock and property deals, as these two deals are the most common and touchable investment activities
in China.
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market-based institutions and make choices in the above aspects dierently, in such
a way that corresponds to their intrinsic understanding of surroundings. Portrayed
as the human ability to perform mental activities, cognitive ability is addressed by
scholars to predict human decision making (e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Human, & Sunde,
2010; Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013). The emphasis on cognitive ability further
reminds me of introducing humans' interaction in interviews. As intensively social
creatures, from the perspective of neuroscience, humans engage in social interactions
in order to recognize objects and to grasp them (Singer, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004). In the
domain of social psychology and education, self-discipline anticipates academic ability
and development for the future, albeit more modestly, as it arms the role of conscious
eorts during problem-solving (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2003; Zimmerman &
Kitsantas, 2014). Adaptation to the market system is utilized to observe an individual's
processes for making socioeconomic decisions. Attitude toward the future is relevant in
two aspects: one concerning self-condence in one's ability, which generally enhances
personal motivation (Benabou & Tirole, 2002); the other concerning satisfaction with
policies and the current life situation.
The second step of conceptual operationalization is identifying the term \habitus"
by the measurement of the above 5 variable items. The measurement indicators main-
tain the essential elements of each concrete aspect of habitus, which can be transformed
into habitus traits in transforming societies. An understanding of one's habitual lan-
guage use and use of media and social media is necessary to examine cognitive ability.
Language use has been shown to contribute to thinking patterns that concern mem-
ory strategies during problem-solving (e.g., Pederson, 1995). Media and social media
consumption as stimuli eectively gives rise to human perception of social reality, and
further reveal his/her underlying information processing and social cognition abilities
(Shrum, 2009). The operational denition of social interaction, self-discipline, and
adaptation towards market system make these items easier to measure. Given that, I
identify social interaction through the observation of how an individual organizes the
manner and the frequency of his/her social interactions. Self-discipline can therefore
be examined through the use of leisure time and sense of responsibility toward labour
endeavors, because these two factors signify people's attitudes towards problem-solving
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in their daily work and life. Likewise, personal investment activity can be viewed as
a crucial indicator for examining whether an individual is getting used to the market
system. For the last item, attitude towards the future, the measurement concerns two
aspects: condence in one's own ability and condence in the state system. The two
establishments shown in Table 7 combine to build a theoretical foundation in habitus
type construction.
Table 7: Concrete aspects of habitus and the measurements
Concrete Aspects of Habitus How the Item is Examined
Cognitive Ability
Habitual language use;
Media and social media consumption.
Social Interaction
Manner;
Frequency;
Contacts, etc.
Self-Discipline
The use of leisure time;
Sense of responsibility;
Motivation of problem-solving.
Adaptation to Market System
Personal investment activity;
Attitude towards risk-taking.
Attitude toward the Future
Self-condence in one's own ability;
Condence in policies.
6.2 Data Collection and Documentary Method
This study constructs ideal habitus types on the basis of data collected from qualitative
interviews, and applies these habitus types in order to trace how inequality is reected
in socioculture. Scholars tend to apply a more hermeneutic perspective in order to
understand Bourdieu's theory of practice (Kogler, 1997; Crossley, 2001). Hence, in
accordance with Jodhka et al. (2017), the \documentary method" (Bohnsack, 2014)
is used in this qualitative analysis. Up to the present, the documentary method has
covered a great variety of social science subjects, and has been adopted for the interpre-
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tation of varies kinds of text, including semi-structured interviews. In this qualitative
research, this method is used to construct \elementary categories" of human habitus
under China's reform, and to trace how habitus contributes to the reproduction of
inequality in today's China. This section introduces how data is collected from the
semi-structured interviews and understood by the documentary method, which will set
the stage for the later interpretation of \habitus."
6.2.1 Qualitative Interview Design and Data Collection
As summarized by Gall, Borg, and Gall (2003), there are three mainstream formats
for interview design that allow researchers to obtain thick and rich data: (a) the in-
formal conversational interview; (b) the general interview guide approach; and (c) the
standardized open-ended interview. This empirical study attempts to use the general
interview guide approach. The general interview guide approach provides a clear focus
on particular topics, while still allowing for a degree of adaptability and exibility in
obtaining information from the interviewees (e.g., Turner III, 2010). In other words,
the general interview guide approach is semi-structured and gives the interviewer much
more leeway for following up and, therefore, a greater chance of being made visible as
a knowledge-producing participant than would be the case in a more structured in-
terview and it provides more focus than would be found in an unstructured interview
(Turner III, 2010; Brinkman, 2013). This, in addition to the predetermined questions
that focus on the perspective of interviewees, interviewers are always permitted to
probe beyond their own questions to get at the full story (Berg, 2001).
The commonly accepted procedures (see: Berg, 2001; Warren, 2002; Turner III,
2010) for conducting qualitative interviews mainly include32:
 Preparing the interview schedule, which is required for researchers to have clear
ideas about the information they want to access and to process. This can be
further broken down into:
- Determining the type of interview (e.g., telephone interviews, one-on-one
interviews, group screening interviews, etc.)
32The particular steps are self-elaborated based on the principles recommended in relevant literature,
see: Berg (2001), Creswell (2007), and Turner III (2010).
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- Selecting the appropriate interviewees
- Pilot testing (if necessary)
 Developing the interview schedule, which relates to meaning-making and deals
with the interview process (Warren, 2002). This can be further broken down
into:
- Designing an interview protocol
- Developing interview questions, (namely demographic information, essential
questions, and extra questions)
 Implementing of the interview, which entails the collection of data.
The qualitative interviews in this dissertation are designed and conducted in accor-
dance with the principles and the procedures elaborated above. This interview is aimed
at dening habitus type and further guring out how habitus traits contribute to the
reproduction of inequality under China's reform. The target of this research is xed
based on the quantitative results revealed in chapter 5 that the status-quo of China's
inequality is to some extent reproduced from the hierarchal system under state social-
ism, in both rural and urban society. I have therefore conducted qualitative interviews
based on urban and rural residential areas respectively, and have utilized one-on-one,
face-to-face interviews. Below are the signicant processes of this qualitative interview:
Finding participants In the logic of the particular target of this qualitative inter-
view, participants could be selected based upon a priori research design (quantitative
results) and then sought out to act as key informants. For one-on-one interviewing, it is
eective to nd individuals who are not hesitant to share ideas and to speak (Creswell,
2007). Furthermore, all participants are selected voluntarily, in order to make the
conversational settings as neutral as possible.
In the urban social structure investigation, participants are chosen based on the
symbolic and socioeconomic characteristics that were revealed in chapter 5. I therefore
interviewed: a rural-to-urban migrant worker, a senior engineer in private enterprise,
a full professor in public university, a worker in state-holding enterprise, a worker
laid o from state-owned enterprise, a civil servant in a party agency, an individual
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entrepreneur, an express delivery man in private logistics company, a technician in
private enterprise, and a private entrepreneur.
Likewise, participants were selected and voluntarily interviewed in the rural social
structure investigation. I therefore interviewed: two village cadres (of dierent hukou
statuses), a village cadre who was a entrepreneur, an individual entrepreneur, two
peasants, and a traditional Chinese physician.
Designing protocol A brief protocol was designed in the Chinese language for in-
troducing this interview to the participants. The protocol was aimed at helping the
participants to understand the following questions: who is the interviewer? what is the
goal of this research project? why was the interviewee selected? The participants were
then informed they would be recorded, but would remain anonymous in the project
report.
Developing interview questions The following items, and the yielded questions,
were then developed:
 Demographic characteristics: What is your gender, age, education level, religion,
marital status, occupation, etc.?
 Symbolic capital of socialist character: What is your political aliation, house-
hold registration status, and position in ownership sector?
 Personal experience33 and family background: Could you please describe your
personal experience, your family background, and your relatives?
 Cognitive ability: How often did you use Mandarin or dialect during your early
development and how often do you use it now in your daily life? How familiar
are you with English? Can you talk about the media and social media you often
use?
33Classic behavioral perspective regards personal experience as a particularly powerful stimulus to
humans' actions (Weinstein, 1989). Performed to be more individual-specic, the personal experience
should be fundamentally integrated into the analysis of humans' behavioral choices, even if the action
concerns the tendency rooted in a milieus.
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 Social interactions: Please talk about the people you interact most and the kinds
of interaction entailed.
 Self-discipline: Could you talk about how you spend your leisure time? Please
describe the way you feel about your job.
 Adaptation to market system: Do you have any personal investment activities?
What do you think about investment activities?
 Attitude toward the future: Are you optimistic about the future? Please explain
your outlook.
 Economic condition: Please describe your economic condition and nancial situ-
ation.
 Social status: How would you describe the social status of your occupation?
 Power: Please talk about your social network and the decision power allotted to
your work organization.
 Self-assessment: How would you assess your position within society as a whole?
Implementing the interview The recording pen and some relevant materials were
prepared before the interview. While doing the interview, the circumstances, physi-
cal and mental status of the interviewees, appearances, utterances, micro-expressions,
and actions were observed. All apparently relevant information was tracked and trans-
formed to compose the qualitative data. A series of developed interview questions
were asked in such a way as to ensure interviewee comprehension. Some interviewees
were more talkative during the interview, leading to thicker and richer data. Others,
however, were more likely to be the question-guided respondents. In the latter cases,
developed questions served as the initial questions for opening the door to an issue,
and probes, or follow-up questions, were used to get the respondents to dig deeper. For
interviewees that tend to answer questions in an abbreviated ways, it is necessary to
clarify what they mean, before proceeding on to the details, thoughts, and feelings of
the interviewees. For example, the question \Please describe your economic condition
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and nancial situation." An interaction with such a respondent may look something
like this:
Q: Please describe your economic condition and nancial situation.
A: Just the average level.
Probe1: It sounds like you are not very satised with your economic condition, is
that a fair summary? (for the conrmation of respondent's subjective meaning)
Probe2: How many real estate properties do you own? Do you have your own
vehicle? Do you have any nancial problems? Are you satised with your savings?
While the interviewer works to extract substantial answers, respondents may pro-
vide important visual and verbal cues, for instance, hesitation or excitement, which
may reveal something about the interviewer that goes beyond the verbal report alone.
In such instances, it is necessary to ask follow-up questions in order to motivate and
facilitate to reveal the thoughts behind these cues (see also: Sturges & Hanrahan,
2004).
Furthermore, some unanticipated events may occur during interviews that become
challenges for the interviewing process. Such challenges may arise as a result of par-
ticipant behaviors and reactions not anticipated by the interviewer, highly sensitive
questions and topics (see: Roulston, DeMarrais, & Lewis, 2003). With the purpose of
keeping the interview going in such situations, I utilized the strategy of reorganizing
questions so they might feel more acceptable to the respondents, or switching the fo-
cus of the interview questions relative to the client's apparent emotional responsivity.
Unanticipated events can serve an important role in the interview process for under-
standing the experiences of interviewees. Following the audio recording, any other
relevant information was noted for later processing.
6.2.2 Documentary Method
The documentary method is utilized in the analysis of the interview data in this dis-
sertation, because documentary interpretation has been revealed to be an eective tool
for understanding human habitus (Bohnsack, 2010, 2014). Functionally, this method
approaches not only the narrative that is verbally and explicitly communicated in the
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interview, but helps with the reconstruction of the subjective meanings that underline
utterances or actions (Nohl, 2010). It is intended to help the researcher to observe a
form of social action that is incorporated in the body of the individual subject. Such
social actions form practice patterns, which describes the \frame of orientation" of a
respondent. As synonym for the term \habitus," \frame of orientation" helps to re-
mind us that habitus is a generative, rather than determined, concept (Lovell, 2003;
Bohnsack, 2014).
The anity between habitus and frame of orientation has been discussed by Bohn-
sack, who further distinguishes conjunctive knowledge, which refers to an orientation of
human practical action from communicative knowledge, or the level of knowledge. This
distinction helps to show us how the way to access an understanding of the human logic
of practice that is indexed by their utterances. That is to say that the communicative-
conjunctive dual structure of knowledge allows us to perceive which actions correspond
to what forms of knowledge the respondents draw from (see also: Bohnsack, 2014).
Technically, communicative knowledge concerns rule-guided actions and corresponds
to standardization. Canale (1987) explained that the sphere of knowledge, from the
perspective of applied linguistics, that communicative knowledge represents is of the
grammatical, sociolinguistic, and discourse-related competencies. Serving as an orien-
tation for practice action, conjunctive knowledge particularly describes the knowledge
that results from prior experience (or memory) rather than from rules and regula-
tions (Bohnsack, 2014). The frame of action generated by conjunctive knowledge is
the embodied practice pattern called habitus, as prior knowledge is found to domi-
nate the logical form, and to facilitate learning (Pazzani, 1991). To be concrete, in
terms of the topic of inequality, conjunctive knowledge doesn't correspond to a set of
explicit rules in a hierarchical system, but rather generates power that maintains its
implicit meaning through the sense of structural relations situated in a given context.
Based upon Bohnsack's description of the documentary method, this conception has
allowed researchers to better interpret through their qualitative data what habitus is
and how habitus works through implicit frames of orientation constructed by access to
conjunctive knowledge.
Three steps of documentary method are outlined in this practical empirical analy-
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sis: transcription, formulating interpretation, and reecting interpretation (see also:
Bohnsack, 2014). Transcription concerns the rst step: data preparation. There
are some principles or considerations that help researchers to systematically organize
textual data, even if the transcription format has not been technically standardized
(McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003). Many scholars usually agree that for devel-
oping transcription, it is required to preserve word form and text structure, to keep
the information complete and easy to learn, and to maintain the text independent
of researchers or third parties (Mergenthaler & Stinson, 1992; McLellan et al., 2003).
Formulating interpretation is aimed at decoding and emphasizing interviewees' explicit
meanings within the context of what they have literally said. The formulated explicit
documentary meaning virtually explains what has been discussed, and discourse topic
is rather detached from \in which framework the topic is dealt with" (Bohnsack, 2014,
p.225). Built upon the organization of discourse, reecting interpretation is in attempt
to particularly explore which frameworks of orientation (or habitus) generate human
practice patterns. Put another way, instead of producing denitive institutionalized
actions, reecting interpretation is utilized to reveal internalized interpretative practice
from implicit knowledge represented in narrations and descriptions.
6.3 Qualitative Data Analysis: Construction of Habitus Types
This part attempts to nd out the particular habitus types that are argued to be rel-
evant to the distribution of symbolic capital. Since the establishment of the People's
Republic of China, each period before and after the 1978 transformation has signied a
hypothetical socioculture that can be further distinguished into various habitus types.
Instead of organizing group discussions to construct habitus types at the group-level,
this empirical investigation is designed to focus on the perspective of individuals for
constructing collective implicit knowledge in a transforming context. The challenge
that I face in this task is the construction of group-based habitus from individual-level
qualitative interview data. Representative individual samples, thus, are selected for
analysis in order to demonstrate the methodological solutions of this qualitative study.
More specically, addressed by the results of the quantitative investigation in chapter
5, the conguration of China's inequality has given rise to characteristics representative
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of each social class, which denotes that habitus types could be organized by clustering
in a multiple correspondence analysis similar to the approach often taken in research
related to social class construction. In a nod to some existing work (e.g., Jodhka et
al., 2017), \elementary categories" are identied from practical actions and utterance
of interviewees in order to characterize habitus. Combined with theoretical consid-
erations and statistical results, the embodied dispositions developed from reecting
interpretation help to provide a picture of habitus types in China.
6.3.1 Habitus Types in Rural Society
In order to construct habitus types in rural society, I present interviewee proles and
selected text from interviews below:
Interviewee I is a village cadre with agricultural hukou status who joined the Com-
munist Party in 1997. Born in Ruanwan village (a less developed village of the Hubei
province in middle China) in 1965, he became a rural-to-urban migrant worker after
senior high school, and returned to the village in 1995. He has served as deputy sec-
retary of his village committee since 1999. My interview with him was implemented
in his well organized oce. During the interview, the cadre responded cautiously, in
a rather logical way with a strong dialectal accent. To the questions about everyday
practice, he expressed in the interview that:
\I speak in this dialect in my daily life and in my work, and I can only
speak very basic English. I don't have other business, and we are always
overworked because too much work is imposed on us. Due to increasing
civil service work, there is only one day o in a week. I even don't have
extra time to meet up with friends. I am more interested in political news
than other kinds of news. Like other indigenous villagers, I am insured
by the social security system rather than by commercial insurance, because
the economy is weak here. Even through I am a village cadre and much
better paid than other villagers, I don't have other ways to earn money or to
invest in properties and stocks. I believe the collective economy plays a more
signicant role than fund appropriations in village development. However,
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I am still condent about the future, because, as approved by the latest
policies, the Hubei International Logistics Hub will be built nearby. Cadres
serve the people, and the decisions by village committees are all made based
upon opinions of the villagers. I am too old to start up a business, I would
like to take care of my family and to do some agricultural work after my
retirement."
Interviewee II is a village cadre who is of rural-to-urban hukou status. She joined
the Communist Party in 2004. Due to Land Requisition, her original agricultural hukou
status was transformed to non-agricultural status in 2004. Born in 1968, this cadre is
married and has a son serving in the Army. With a middle school education level, she
serves as director of the women's committee in a well developed village in east China.
Before being ocially appointed as a village cadre, she had approximately ten-year
experience in non-agricultural work, which greatly increased her revenue. We had a
conversation in her oce. The interview was always interrupted a number of times by
the phone calls concerning her job. She explained:
\I spoke in my local dialect when I was young, but I learned to speak Man-
darin at school and have been getting used to speaking Mandarin as a result
of dealing with non-locals. Before ocially becoming a cadre, I was a con-
struction contractor. I was a hard job but with a high pay rate. In recent
years, we have been quite busy in the project of cultural and ethnic progress.
I don't have leisure time. I would tell you I worked over 12 hours almost
every day in the last week. Since my job concerns family planning, my team
and I are closely connected and have frequent interactions with gynecologists
in cities to help women to solve their relevant problems. The cadre work was
easier to do in the past years, but now it is getting harder. Knowledge and
information technology increasingly play an important role in daily work
and communication. I am trying to keep studying, but some computer skills
are still too hard for me to master. Due to the land requisition, lots of
manufacturing enterprises have been established nearby, increasing oating
populations here and encouraging me and other villagers to rent out our
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properties to migrant workers. I am satised with the rental yield. I be-
lieve it is getting better: all indigenous villagers are non-agricultural hukou
holders now, which means they have denitely beneted from urban-biased
policies."
Interviewee III is a traditional Chinese physician serving in a public hospital located
in an urban area. Born in 1984, the physician is an agricultural hukou holder with a
three-year specialized college degree. I was told by the physician that it was due to
the close relationship in rural neighborhood communities that encouraged him to settle
in a rural area rather than in city. We had a nice conversation in his clean and well-
organized oce. The interviewee looked excited when the subject of China's medical
industry came up:
\Both of my parents are peasants and less educated, but they are self-
disciplined and strict to my elder sister and I. My parents are also holding
conservative beliefs regarding patriarchy. I spoke a local dialect when I was
young, but I learned to speak Mandarin after I went to school. There were
not enough teachers qualied and willing to teach English during my school-
ing, so I fell far behind in my English training. Instead of playing with my
smart phone and video games, I prefer stick to reading professional liter-
ature in my leisure time. I am not interested in much social interaction,
but sometimes I would like to get together with friends and neighbors. I am
really concerned about medical-related policies, because they directly aect
my work. In my opinion, investments are important for familial wealth ac-
cumulation, and I invest some of my disposal income in stocks. With regard
to my pay grade, I expect to get a pay raise so I can buy a new SUV, but I
am relatively satised with my current economic condition. It is well known
that medical sta in China are under a great deal of pressure, but my par-
ents and neighbors believe that being salaried by the state is something to be
pound of. In fact, I am expecting policy reforms in the medical industry: I
think the government should invest more in medical innovations and treat-
ments. At the same time, I am concerned about the growing doctor-patient
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disputes in China."
Interviewee IV is a peasant holding agricultural hukou status. As an indigenous
villager in the Ruanwan village of the Hubei province, she has been engaged in agri-
cultural work all her life. This interview was completed in front of her dilapidated
house. She was dressed in plain clothes. The annual income of her family was less then
10,000 yuan (equal to 1300 Euro), putting her in the peasant class. She was talkative
and held an optimistic outlook, especially when we talked about the pension system
in rural areas. This was likely in part due to the fact her family was in debt. She told
me that:
\My parents were both involved in agricultural work. My brother was dis-
abled in the army and I had to quit high school to take care of him. I
have been in agricultural work all my life, and I have never worked in the
city. I used to only speak my local dialect, but I started to learn Mandarin
in my dance classes. I am not interested in the news and I am not all
that concerned about what is happening in the world. I like to play on my
smart phone and to dance with friends in my leisure time. I usually get
my information from WeChat34. I don't have any nancial investments,
but my husband and I have commercial insurance paid by our daughter-in-
law. Currently I feel condent about my future, because pension policies are
biased to rural areas."
Interviewee V is a disabled veteran living in Ruanwan village. He was a solider in
the Sino-Vietnamese War. As an agricultural hukou holder, he had to move back to
the village where he was born after getting injured in the war. Currently, he is left
jobless and being taken care of by his wife. As an injured veteran, for the moment, he
recieves 4,000 yuan per year through his pension. He couldn't speak Mandarin well,
looked tired, and not willing to talk much. He told me:
34WeChat is China's largest messaging, social media, and mobile payment app developed by Tencent
Holdings Limited.
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\I went to middle school, but I have a low education level. I don't use a
smart phone or a computer, and I think they are too dicult for me to
handle. Watching TV and reading newspapers take up my leisure time. I
don't have any investment experience or plans, but I am satised with my
life for the moment. It is good to hear that the Xi administration is making
an eort to improve the rural pension system, and I am looking forward to
it."
Interviewee VI runs a restaurant in the Ye village, adjacent to Jinhua City in east
China. He was born in this village in 1969 and held an agricultural hukou. He told me
that just a few months ago, his agricultural hukou was required to changed to uniform
local hukou by local policies. He stated that he was not interested in village elections
or other political aairs, even though his father was a party secretary for the village
committee. He has been working in the non-agricultural business sector for over 20
years. Although he doesn't have a high education level, he spoke clearly about his life
and business, and expresses himself quite logically:
I don't like go to school, so I only obtained a primary level of education.
Initially, I was an individual laborer in building materials transportation
Afterwards, my wife and I started to run this restaurant and to extend our
business to raw food materials. I speak a local dialect in my daily life, but I
also speak Mandarin well, because Mandarin is more widely used in business
and interaction and I therefore think I had to learn it. I am more interested
in international than domestic news. Compared to computers, I am more
familiar with my smart phone. In the earlier years of our business, my wife
and I felt a lot of pressure and were forced to work from 6 am to 10 pm.
It is getting better now and I have leisure time to play bridge cards with
my friends. I have invested in stocks and I own a property in the city. In
addition to this, I have invested over 150,000 yuan (nearly 20,000 Euro)
in commercial insurance for the whole family. My wife and I are quite
respected in this village. I believe that one's social network is quite signi-
cant so I denitely attempt to remain on good terms with powerful people. I
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don't want any political titles, and I believe it is a \money talks" world. Be-
sides, in rural society, clan councils have always overriden party branches
in making decisions about village aairs. Sometimes, villages cadres don't
necessarily signify access to power and resources. As for my outlook, I think
I am optimistic about the future, because our business is running well. Our
only concern is our son. He is serving in the army now. My wife made him
join the army ve years ago, so that he would learn self-discipline. We will
provide him with nancial support as long as he needs."
The stories of the six interviewees above suggest the major changes that have taken
place in rural Chinese social stratication. The interviewee I, II, and III are of the
advantaged group of rural society. On the contrary, interviewees IV and V are among
the marginalized. Basically the structural relations between these two clusters denote
the maintenance of the socialist inequality system in rural China. Interviewee VI
however reects the emerging middle class in rural society, a conclusion derived from
his general wealth and his robust social network. Changes in social fabric also signify
that the contemporary socialist milieus have absorbed some characteristics of capitalist
socioculture, which largely demonstrates my working hypothesis regarding China's
socioculture under reform. That is to say, in addition to ideological beliefs about the
redistribution system, one may be motivated to make decisions reliant on the market
force.
Two steps are necessary for constructing habitus types for China's rural society.
The rst step is to dierentiate actions yielded by communicative knowledge from
habitus generated by conjunctive experience based on what interviewees have literally
said. Second, habitus traits that are most relevant for the construction of each type
are elaborated upon. Although it is associated with some rural-to-urban hukou holders
(e.g., interviewee II), renting out a self-build house is ruled out from the investment
habitus generated by symbolic capital, as this action results from knowledge about the
rise in value after land requisition and the conversion of hukou status, rather than from
everyday practice. By reconstructing the topical structure of the text, relevant habitus
traits are found and shown in Table 8.
Typology is developed as a methodological strategy with the aim of developing a
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Table 8: List of relevant habitus traits in rural society
Cognitive Ability
Speaking either dialect or Mandarin;
Only speaking dialect;
Information learning;
No interest on information learning.
Social Interaction
No intention;
Relaxation-oriented social interaction;
Motivational social interaction.
Self-Discipline
Killing time by entertainment;
Busy in work and no leisure time;
Learning professional knowledge.
Adaptation to Market System
Investing money;
No idea about investment.
Attitude toward the Future
Self-condence;
Industry expectation;
Social security dependence.
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descriptive framework and orientation that is useful in constructing habitus types. The
typology of everyday practices is constructed through analysis of extensive observations
of interviewees' habitus traits within a transforming context. The application of ty-
pology in this interpretation needs to retain the congurational characters of habitus
types. Following steps for this are proposed: (1) type construction, (2) substruction,
(3) type identication by the reduction of the property-space the comparison.
Firstly, type construction develops a \scientic perception" of the regularities and
relationships that \ought" to be obtained in terms of the theoretical foundation and
prior research results (McKinney, 1969). In a market-oriented society, a human practice
tendency \ought" to be shaped by one's positions in a antagonistic class relationship.
With regard to competitiveness assessments, there is a dividing line between strong and
weak levels in social stratication. Extracted from the elaborated upon qualitative
interviews, the practice tendency of strong competitiveness in rural society mainly
concerns goal-orientation. Weak competitiveness however is characterized by lacking
goal-orientation.
Secondly, property-space could be seen as a swarm of empirically denable mea-
sures that are developed for typological construction (McKinney, 1969). This step
reveals the operational denitions of competitiveness indexes. Goal-orientation, theo-
retically, depicts humans' motivational disposition of developing and validating abilities
in achievement settings, and explains why some individuals adapt to changes better
(VandeWalle, 1997; DeShon & Gillespie, 2005). Such a disposition, therefore, has
particular relevance to specic habitus traits, including: use of Mandarin, informa-
tion learning, developing professional skills, being busy with work, motivation toward
social interaction, investing money, self-condence and industry expectation. Hetero-
geneously, individuals who lack this disposition tend to not speak Mandarin, not to
seek out information, spend more time involved in leisure activities, not be motivated
by social interaction, not invest money in nancial products, and be more dependent
on the social security system in rural China.
Next, the underlying continuum of the elaborated upon traits of goal-orientation
and lack of goal-orientation need to be further specied. In brief, some habitus traits
can be reduced to one habitus type. Goal orientation concerns two specic disposition
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types: learning orientation, which describes human traits related to approaching sit-
uations by mastering the acquisition of new knowledge and by pursuing an adaptive
response pattern, and performance orientation that is associated with maladaptive re-
sponse patterns that results from dispositional trait of seeking validation of competence
in order to receive favorable judgments (Bell & Kozlowski, 2002; DeShon & Gillespie,
2005). Since motivation that distinguishes habitus traits of goal-orientation between
learning orientation and performance orientation, habitus traits can be reduced to one
habitus type based on motivational homogeneity.
Finally, four habitus types emerge from the combination of dispositional types (see
Table 9). The rst is called determined habitus and it is comprised of positive learning
motivation and positive performance motivation. The second habitus type which I call
the pragmatic habitus, is composed of negative performance motivation and positive
learning motivation. The third, the performative habitus, consists of negative learning
motivation and positive performance motivation. The fourth, depressed habitus type, is
characterized by negative learning motivation and negative performative motivation.
Table 9: Habitus types in rural society
Habitus Types Dispositional Attributes
Determined Positive learning motivation, positive
performance motivation.
Pragmatic Positive learning motivation, negative
performance motivation.
Performative Negative learning motivation, positive
performance motivation.
Depressed Negative learning motivation, negative
performance motivation.
As I have interpreted from my interview data, the performative habitus type is a
part of socialist socioculture that has been integrated into cadre and Communist Party
membership, and is valued in rural China. The pragmatic habitus type can be seen as
a capitalist socioculture, as it is largely relevant to the rise in rural emerging class. The
determined habitus type signies the hybrid of performative and pragmatic traits. The
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depressed habitus type is characterized by holding a fatalistic view of being incapable
to do anything. Under economic reform, these four habitus types are fused together to
constitute a sociocultural system in rural society.
6.3.2 Habitus Types in Urban China
For constructing habitus types in urban China, interviewee proles and the literal text
of their interviews have been summarized below:
Interviewee VII was born in 1985 in a village in the Hebei province in northern
China. He currently runs a small grocery in capital city, Beijing. An agricultural
hukou holder with a three-year specied collage degree, he is now married, but doesn't
live with his wife and two children. He was talkative, logical, and revealed some insight
into himself and public policies. I was told that he would leave Beijing in two years,
because Beijing was getting increasing xenophobic:
\I have been getting used to speaking Mandarin since childhood, but my En-
glish is not good. After college, I worked in a company located in Guangzhou
(south China) for four years. Afterwards, I came to Beijing, because it is a
short distance from my hometown to here. I regularly read Chinese newspa-
per and watch news released by Phoenix Television. I am very interested in
international news. Currently I am busy with work, usually between 7 am
and 12 pm. I have a part-time logistics job, so there is no leisure time for
me. I believe social capital is signicant for one's career but, unfortunately,
I lack this capital. I invest in stocks and gold, and own a property in another
small city adjacent to my hometown. China's consumer ination is rising,
so I never save money in banks. The marketing environment has been good
in Beijing in these past few years, and I did make money in my business.
But now, the situation is getting worse. To be honest, I am confused about
my future. I was going to own a fruit orchards in my hometown and I am
good at that, but now it is not allowed due to environmental protection poli-
cies. People at my age are under pressure: I have parents to support. My
children will go to school soon, and I want to send them to good schools.
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After all, going to school is the only way for ordinary people to move up.
Interviewee VIII is an express delivery man in Beijing. He was born in a village in
the Shandong province of northern China in 1985. The interviewee is an agricultural
hukou holders with a high school education. This interviewee wore very ordinary dress
and looked tired. Due to his intensive work load, he was reluctant to talk to me, but
provided some information about his life and practice.
\I grew up in a poor village. I came to Beijing to make money, and I have
been here for seven years. I speak Mandarin now, only speaking my local
dialect when in my hometown. I am not interested in the news. I usually
use WeChat and QQ to contact people. I work 11-12 hours everyday, and I
don't have leisure time. I don't have the savings to make investments. I am
very depressed about the future. I am not well paid and the cost of living
is getting higher in Beijing. Beijing is currently forcing migrant workers
to leave, and so I may leave Beijing and go back to my hometown soon! I
don't have any plans for the future, and just take each day as it comes!"
Interviewee IX is a technician working for a biotechnology company in Beijing. She
was born in 1990 in a village in the Gansu province of northwestern China. She is an
agricultural hukou holder with a bachelor's degree in life science. She told me that
her father died when she was a kid, and so her mother had to raise four children on
her own. Before joining this company, she was a state-salaried employee working in a
public hospital in Tianjin. Since her mother was troubled with a disease, she had to
quit to take care of her mother for a whole year. The interviewee came across to me
as well-mannered and talkative. During the interview, she was quite willing to share
her experience and outlook:
\I started to learn Mandarin while in university. Compared to my peers,
my English is not good. There were not enough teachers qualied to teach
us English in my hometown. I usually work from 9am to 5pm, but once
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in a while I have to work overtime. However, I don't have leisure time
because my long commute drains my energy every day. I am not interested
in the news, and I use WeChat, QQ, and Weibo for social networking. I
don't invest in the nancial sectors. Beijing is not a good choice for me
in the long term: it is highly competitive and the property values here are
too high for me to aord. I plan on improving my professional skills in
Beijing, and then moving on to another city that ts my needs to settle
down. My boss expects to launch a business in Fujian (southeast China)
and, if everything goes well, it's possible I could get transferred there. I
think Southeast China is better developed and has better air quality. I am
condent in my professional abilities, and now I am making an eort to
build wealth through my professional skills."
Interviewee X is a full professor at a prestigious public university in Beijing. The
interview was rescheduled several times, due to the interviewee's schedule conicts.
He was born in late 1970s in the Heilongjiang province of northeastern China with
non agricultural hukou status. He is a Communist Party member and holds a Ph.D.
in political science. We had a conversation in a cafe, and he answered my questions
seriously, even expressing his support for junior researchers.
\I grew up in an intellectual family and my parents are both college teach-
ers. I speak Mandarin all my life and I am uent in English. Like most
Chinese people, I use WeChat to contact people. Of course I need to obtain
various kinds of information from dierent news media outlets, including
CNN and the BBC. Having several part-time jobs at government agencies
and with the media, I am occupied with work all day, so I don't have time
for leisure. Sometimes I have social interactions concerning professional
work. In consideration of the ination in China, my wife and I usually in-
vest 70%-80% of our assets in properties, stocks, and bonds. With the real
estate market slowing down, I am looking for other options for monetary
investment. I look for low risk investments, because my wife and I have
two kids, and their education is my rst concern. I am optimistic about the
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future. My wife and I are not indigenous to Beijing, but we are in a good
socioeconomic state due to relying on our own eorts. I am condent in
myself."
Interviewee XI is a worker who was laid o from a state-owned enterprise in Jinhua
City of the Zhejiang province. In the 1990s, due to the reform of state enterprises
launched by the Chinese government, tens of millions of people were put out of work
and marginalized in urban society. This interviewee is one of them. Born in 1970, she
is a rural-to-urban hukou holder with a middle school educational level. On the day of
the interview, she arrived in ordinary dress, and appeared to me to be warm-hearted.
I was told that she had to do some part-time work to support her daughter studying
in university.
\I grew up in the Hunan province, I came here to take over my father's job
in a state-owned enterprise, which was allowed by policy at that time. I used
to speak a local dialect in my hometown, and started to use Mandarin after
I joined the enterprise. I have part-time work and usually work 8 hours per
day. I am only interested in the news concerning bread-and-butter issues.
I usually do some housework, watch TV and chat with neighbors in my
leisure. I only use WeChat to contact people, and don't have experience in
other forms of social media. With less schooling, I don't think it is possible
for me to improve my professional skills or start up a business. I know
nothing about investments. As for the further, I hope everything goes well
for my daughter. She will graduate from a university soon and I am really
hoping she can nd a job salaried by the state system. I am not a goal-
oriented person. What will be, will be."
Interviewee XII is a civil servant in the Publicity Oce of Jinhua Municipal Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party. He was born in 1958 and served in the army
after the Cultural Revolution. He joined the Communist Party during his term of mil-
itary service. He has a three-year specialized college degree (part-time). He told me
that it was the college degree that allowed him to get into the party and administra-
tive system after leaving the military, and his hukou status was transferred from rural
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residency to urban residency after being a state-salaried civil servant. I found him to
be well-mannered and quite talkative with regard to his experience and opinions.
\My parents were state cadres, but both of them were sent back to the coun-
tryside during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution. So
I grew up in countryside. I spoke both the local dialect and Mandarin dur-
ing my childhood. After serving in the army, I nally started to get used
to speaking Mandarin. I can speak simple English, but I am not good at
it. I tend to get my information from newspapers and broadcastings. I
am interested in the news related to important social concerns. Social jus-
tice issues are my primary concern, and I am planning to write a book on
China's preschool eduction system after I retire. I am very busy with my
work, and I usually work over ten hours everyday. At the same time, I
have to deal with a number of social interactions while on business. Besides
QQ and WeChat, I also use Email to exchange messages with my colleges
at work. I don't invest my nances. I am not good at that kind of thing.
But, basically, I am satised with my economic condition. With regard to
the future, I am expecting reform of the political system. If the political
mistakes cannot be corrected, history might repeat itself."
Interviewee XIII is a rural-to-urban construction worker in Jinhua City of the Zhe-
jiang province. He originally came from southwest Guizhou, one of the poorest areas
in China. He is 55 years old, married, and he dropped out in primary school. I was
told that his wife came with him to the coastal city in 2010 to make money. They
had three children, one daughter and two sons. However, one of their boys died in an
accident and the other of disease. The interview was carried out in the interviewee's
simple home. I was asked by the interviewee that if he could get paid for the interview.
\I am almost illiterate, and without any professional skills. The transporta-
tion network in my rural hometown is very bad, and he people are very poor.
Most of my neighbors stay there for the agricultural work. I have come to
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this city because my niece has been here for several years, and she oers
her help to my wife and I. I only speak the dialect of my hometown. I
don't know anything about Mandarin, but I have to try to speak Mandarin
at construction sites. I watch Xinwen Lianbo35 everyday. It says pension
policies are made biased toward people like me, which anchors me. In my
hometown, I don't have farmland, I had to live on my own, so I left at my
age of 48. I will eventually go back to my hometown. I have two grandsons.
I hope they can go to college."
Interviewee XIV is a worker in a state-holding company in the city of Tianjin in
northern China. Born in Tianjin in 1958, he is a non-agricultural hukou holder with a
middle school education. He is going to ocially retire this year. I was told that due
to the Cultural Revolution, he had to become a factory worker after middle school.
This interviewee seemed to struggle to express his ideas, but was very easy-going.
\I usually speak my local dialect in my daily life, but I did learn Mandarin
in school. I can only speak a very small amount of English, for example,
`Long live chairman Mao!'(laughs). People of my generation were largely
inuenced by the Cultural Revolution. I became a factory worker when I was
16. I worked hard. I am not good at studying, so I didn't go to college or
develop professional skills, but rather continued to work in a factory within
the state system after the reform and opening up. I am not very sociable, but
I pet goldsh in my leisure time. I am interested in local news of Tianjin,
so I watch local programming everyday. I don't invest my money, but my
wife invests in stocks and funds. Regarding the future, we are supposed to
be optimistic, because of the `Two Contrary Goals' proposed in the 19th
Congress of the Communist Party of China. To be honest, however, I think
China is faced with lots of problems: we fall short of health care resources,
and have problems with ination and high housing prices, etc."
Interviewee XV is a communications engineer working for Huawei, a leading global
35A daily news program produced by China Central Television.
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private provider of information and communications technology infrastructure and
smart devices. He lives in the city of Hangzhou in eastern China with his newly-
wed wife. Born in Hangzhou in 1988, he is a non-agricultural hukou holder with a
Ph.D. in engineering. He joined in Chinese Communist Party while going to university
in 2009. During the interview, the interviewee came across as logically-organized and
appeared to be excited when we talked about technology development.
I grew up in an easygoing family. I am an only child of my parents. I
have been speaking Mandarin since childhood. My English is good, at least
in terms of uency in reading and listening. I work over 12 hours every-
day and almost have no leisure time. I use WeChat to contact with family
and friends. Email and telephone are my most frequently used forms of
communication at work. I prefer to use the Internet rather than legacy
media36 to obtain information. I am most interested in news that pertains
to technology. I go to parties with friends for public holidays, but not fre-
quently. I have purchased some wealth investment products, and I expect
yield stability on them. In consideration of the development of the IT in-
dustry, I am optimistic about the future. China is in a leading position in
the eld of articial intelligence, which provides us lots of opportunities to
develop and apply professional skills. I think people at my age are expected
to have about one million yuan (120,000 Euro) in liquid savings, so I should
denitely keep on working hard. Professional networking is important for
career development in the technology industry, in fact, I have been noticed
by some head hunters (laugh). My job is well paid but under pressure. It
is impossible for me to make a great fortune overnight, and I don't expect
that."
Interviewee XVI is a well-known private entrepreneur in the Hubei province. He was
born in a village in the Zhejiang province in 1963. He earned his bachelor's degree in
management science from a very prestigious university in China. It was his university
36Legacy media refers to traditional media, such as radio, television, and newspaper.
168
degree that allowed him to transfer his original agricultural hukou to a non-agricultural
hukou in the 1980s. He is a Communist Party member, and was going to make a career
in politics. He served in government agencies for several years, but he missed a chance
at promotion in the 1990s due to a serious illness. After this period, he had to turn to
running his own business to make his gains.
I spoke a local dialect when I was a child, and learned Mandarin in school.
After leaving my hometown, it became a necessity to speak Mandarin in
order to communicate with people. I speak very little English. Of course
I read news everyday. In China, it is very important to interpret news
discourse, because policy signals are always released through this discourse.
I don't have time for leisure, because I am very busy coordinating complex
projects everyday. I have to deal with social interactions on business. As
you know, it is important for one's career development to develop good
connections with professional and powerful people. I denitely invest money,
and I also encourage my relatives and friends to invest money in properties,
because ination is inevitable in China and it is possible to use nancial
leverage for property investments. With regard to the future, China is not
a completely market-oriented country, and its development relies highly on
policies and regulations, so let's just see how it goes. But I am nevertheless
still condent on my self."
The ten interviewees above were selected based upon the statistical relationship
between symbolic capital and socioeconomic characteristics that is revealed in chapter
5. Reected by the interview texts, the action traits appear to be complicated in
urban society, signifying the complexity of social structure in urban China. The actions
emphasized by the narration of interviewees and the descriptions I developed constitute
two layers of knowledge: the communicative knowledge corresponding to the level of
knowledge and the conjunctive knowledge generated within human everyday practice.
It is reected in interview texts that the use of English, which has relevance to cognitive
ability, doesn't serve as an orientation for practical action but, rather, directly results
from a shortage of English teachers in specic historical contexts. The habitual use of
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English, thus, is ruled out of determining habitus traits.
Table 10: List of relevant habitus traits in urban society
Cognitive Ability
Speaking either dialect or Mandarin;
Only speaking Mandarin;
Only speaking dialect;
Information learning via traditional media;
Information learning via social media;
No interest on information learning;
Attention to news relevant to particular issues;
Attention to general news;
No attention to news.
Social Interaction
No intention;
Relaxation-oriented social interaction;
Business-oriented social interaction.
Self-Discipline
Killing time at leisure;
Busy in work and no leisure time;
Learning professional knowledge regularly.
Adaptation to Market System
Investing money with systematic judgment;
Investing money with heuristic judgment;
No idea about investment.
Attitude toward the Future
Self-condence;
Concerning industry prospects;
Expecting government regulation;
No idea.
As shown in Table 10, the relevant habitus traits are listed through a reconstructed
topical structure of the literal text. These habitus traits will be classied within a
framework of socialist-capitalist divided socioculture, which is in accordance with our
hypothetical sociocultural system. Likewise, typology is applied as a methodological
strategy in this section to develop a descriptive framework of orientation for construct-
ing habitus types in urban society. The application of typology in habitus types con-
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struction is based upon the analysis of extensive observations of interviewees' habitus
traits within a reforming context. The four steps mentioned in last section are employed
to reduce the habitus traits to general categories.
Firstly, type construction is used to develop a \scientic perception" of how human
tendencies \ought" to be categorized. As revealed by multiple correspondence analysis
of social classes in chapter 5, more social strata exist in urban society, which suggests
greater antagonistic class relationships. The characteristic of goal-orientation can be
interpreted as the main distinction among class groups, as it is associated with capa-
bilities of accessing either redistributive power or market value. From the qualitative
interviews, interviewees can be found to be engaged in one of two levels of this charac-
teristic: Strong goal-orientation or lacking a well-dened goal (weak goal-orientation).
The second step reveals the operational denitions of goal-orientation indexes that
serve as measures of human capabilities for accessing capital. This step is implemented
by observing property-space among habitus traits. Seen as a dispositional trait that is
used to predict why some individuals adapt to changes better, (strong) goal-orientation
has signicant relevance for the following habitus traits: attention to news relevant to
particular issues, business-oriented social interactions, busy work with no leisure time,
learning professional knowledge regularly, investing money with systematic judgment,
high self-condence, and concern over industry prospects. Heterogeneously, people
who lack goal-orientation are characterized by little to no interest for information
learning and news, killing signicant amount of time for leisure, little to no idea about
investment, and few thoughts or concerns about the future. Aside from this, some
habitus traits, for example, attention to general news, investing money with heuristic
judgment, and expecting government regulation can be viewed as characteristics of
lacking a well-dened goal.
Next, I reduce habitus traits to general categories based upon motivational ho-
mogeneity under market forces. Conceptualized as a disposition or as a state that
predicts achievements in dierent settings, goal-orientation has its relevance in two
kinds of motivations: one that is aimed at the more positive goals of attaining success,
and the other is aimed at avoiding failure (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996). In place of
the learning-performance orientation dichotomy, the approach-avoidance distinction is
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employed in this section to appropriately depict achievement goals in urban society. In
particular, approach orientation is characterized by a preference for challenging tasks,
a positive attitude towards learning, and persistence in the face of diculties, which
is referred to as mastery motivation. On the contrary, avoidance orientation is evoked
by the self-protection motivational tendency, aimed at avoiding potential negative out-
comes. Approach and avoidance goals are viewed as \exerting their dierential eects
on achievement behavior by activating divergent sets of motivational processes" (Elliot
& Harackiewicz, 1996, p. 462).
The last step consists of constructing ve habitus types based upon the combina-
tion of dispositional attributes (see: Table 11). The rst is dened as ambitious habitus
type, which is characterized by positive mastery motivation and positive self-protection
motivation. The second is called professional habitus type, which is comprised of pos-
itive mastery motivation and moderate self-protection motivation. The third type is
exible habitus type, which describes people with moderate mastery motivation and
moderate self-protection motivation. Negative mastery motivation and moderate self-
protection motivation constitute the fourth type called passive habitus type. The fth
is deprived habitus type, characterized by negative mastery motivation and negative
protection motivation.
Table 11: Habitus types in urban society
Habitus Types Dispositional Attributes
Ambitious Positive mastery motivation, positive self-
protection motivation.
Professional Positive mastery motivation, moderate self-
protection motivation.
Flexible Moderate mastery motivation, moderate
self-protection motivation.
Passive Negative mastery motivation, moderate
self-protection motivation.
Deprived Negative mastery motivation, negative self-
protection motivation.
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The motivational heterogeneity in mastery and self-protection denotes human aware-
ness of the transforming society. Mastery motivation reveals how an individual deals
with potential opportunity, while self-protection motivation signies how an individual
avoids potential risks. Seen from the perspective of interviewee actions and utterances,
market force facilitates socialist milieus to absorb some characteristics of capitalist so-
cioculture. In particular, the ambitious and professional habitus types in urban China
are neither typical socialist socioculture nor capitalist socioculture. The qualitative in-
terviews revealed by dierent means that these two habitus groups absorb valued traits
from both sociocultural systems to keep themselves competitive in this transforming
society. Individuals that constitutes a exible habitus type are dened by their initia-
tive displayed within the market economy, typical of capitalist socioculture in urban
society. However, this habitus type is usually short of the symbolic capital under a
socialist political system. The passive habitus type can be viewed as the vestige of
the socioculture of the socialist worker, as its everyday practice was very aected by
the planned economy in cities before the socioeconomic transformation. As a matter
of fact, this dispositional tendency won't t within an environment dened by market
competition anymore. The deprived habitus type is characterized by a lack of traits
that are valued in society.
6.4 Qualitative Data Analysis: Habitus and Its Contribution
to Inequality
6.4.1 Symbolic Capital, Habitus, and Class in Rural Society
The quantitative results found in chapter 5 demonstrate that the conguration of social
classes in rural China is to some extent informed by the earlier state-socialist inequality
system. The following groups are statistically categorized into privilege classes: village
cadres, the Communist Party members, non-agricultural hukou holders, and employees
inside the state system. This is to say that the hierarchical system within the socialist
socioculture nearly has not been destroyed by the socioeconomic transformation in rural
society. Meanwhile, an evident dividing line is found between privileged classes and
an emerging auent class. Commercial villagers appear in the capitalist socioculture
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and live under much better economic conditions, especially in rural areas of coastal
regions. Peasants who have never engaged in non-agricultural work are becoming even
more marginalized.
Through these in-depth interviews, it was found that village cadres and Communist
Party members are best categorized as maintaining a positive performance motivation.
During the interviews, two interviewees repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
judgments of villagers with regard to their work. These utterances denote that, for
people who are conferred a title of village cadre or Communist Party member in rural
society, performance orientation has been internalized as a disposition. Determined
habitus type and performative habitus type are most relevant to the privileged class.
However, determined habitus type is more likely to be identied among village cadres in
regions of developed market. I was told by interviewee II and interviewee VI that since
the 1990s, villagers who are successful in commercial business have been warmly wel-
comed to apply for Communist Party membership and to run in village-level elections,
particularly in rural areas of coastal regions. With experience of commercial business,
these candidates tend to pursue adaptive and eective response patterns in rural gov-
ernance and personal self development. In order to test this, I interviewed a village
cadre in the Zhejiang province who had a family-owned business before becoming a
Communist Party member and a village cadre:
\I grew up in this village and was invited by fellow villagers to come back
to run in an election. Before that, I ran a private company and did it well.
I was welcomed because villagers wanted a cadre that excelled in economic
development. In recent years, my main job has been to develop the collec-
tive economy, to settle ownership disputes, and to encourage private sector
investment. I also made a decision to use the collective economy to help
provide other public services to villagers."
In contrast, as a village cadre from a less developed region, interviewee I didn't
seem to concern himself with market-adaptive governance, but rather to relied on
traditional thought rooted in the planned economy system. Performative habitus type,
therefore, is more likely to be shared by village cadres in rural areas of inland regions.
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It is the performance orientation practice that to some extent grants village cadres
the trust to carry out their authority, to settle domestic disputes, and to allocate
socioeconomic resources. In this sense, village cadres usually have evident advantages
in social status and power. It was also acknowledged by interviewee I that even though
village cadres are located in agricultural-based regions, their annual pay, provided by
the local government nance bureaus, is almost twice that of an on-farm peasant.
MCA results also show that people employed or even salaried by the state system
in cities that are still living in rural areas are spatially clustered around privileged
classes. As revealed in the interview discourses, individuals of this group tend to
develop capitalist/socialist hybrid orientations. Seeing as how they are in a relatively
higher educational bracket, developing professional skills for their careers has become a
part of everyday practice for these people. In this sense, even in rural society, education
plays a signicant role in facilitating people's learning orientation and class situation.
A emerging auent class is developing out of the capitalist socioculture. This class
group tends to embody the pragmatic habitus type, focusing on how to be advantageous
in market competition. Found from both statistical results and qualitative interviews,
it is the pragmatic habitus type that orients people in rural society to respond to
market transformation in an adaptive way. As a result, individuals characterized by
this pragmatic orientation are in a much better economic situation and tend to be
concentrated in rural areas of coastal regions. During the interview, I was informed by
interviewee VI that with the support of clans, some wealthy villagers might be willing
to run in elections.
As two forms of symbolic capital in rural China, the Communist Party membership
and village cadre signicantly dierentiate determined and performative habitus from
pragmatic habitus in seeking political inuences and favorable judgments. In this sense,
the economic advantages of auent class and the power advantages of privileged class
revealed by quantitative research have been justied by the unequal access to symbolic
capital as well as habitus traits.
On-farm peasants have remained distant from redistributive power and from the
market transformation, and therefore have become further marginalized in rural society.
The depressed habitus type is found among the population that lacks goal-orientation.
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People with the depressed orientation hold a fatalistic view that they are incapable
to do anything other than what they actually do. Representatives of this habitus
don't jump at the chances to improve their economic situation, but rather remain un-
changed. In particular, people with the depressed orientation deliver heavy dependence
on the newly-established rural pension system. Moreover, as quantitatively revealed in
chapter 5, marginalized groups are more likely to be lacking o-farm work experience,
which makes it hard for them to realize what characteristics are valued after the shift
towards economic liberalism. Interviewee IV and Interviewee V are the representa-
tives of this marginalized group with depressed orientation. For diering reasons, they
didn't migrate to urban areas for jobs and better earnings, or initiate individual busi-
ness in their village. Consequently, their attitudes towards the future were found to be
highly dependent on how the rural social security system would go. As seen from both
quantitative and qualitative results, the depressed orientation appears to comprise the
majority of the population in rural society, particularly in rural inland China.
6.4.2 Symbolic Capital, Habitus, and Class in Urban Society
As demonstrated by the results of the MCA in chapter 5, the social structure of urban
China is changing rapidly, but the state-socialist class system persists and to some
extent informs the structures and habitus. Firstly, as elite groups that beneted from
the Party's monopolization of all decision-making processes before the reform and
opening up, civil servants employed by party-state system and the Communist Party
members transformed into the urban middle class and above within the reforming
context. Cadres serving in party and government agencies thus tend to hold higher
social status and power. This was further conrmed by interviewee XII who is a cadre in
a Communist Party agency. He explicitly acknowledged that state cadres employed by
party-state system have closer social connections with upper class people and therefore
the ability to inuence certain decision-making processes. Due to the proximity to
redistributive power and the consolidation of privileged status under reform, I call
these cadres serving in party and government agencies middle (and upper middle)
class of socialist elite. In addition, another middle and upper middle class bracket
grew out of economic liberalism, and has became associated with higher education and
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income. I use the term proposed by Goodman (2014) to call this group the aspirational
middle (and upper middle) class. Aside from the expansion of market institutions, the
re-initiation of college entrance examinations also provides a crucial opportunity for
people, especially for those originally holding agricultural hukou, to move up in urban
society. Entrepreneurs and professional and technical talents are the representatives of
this emerging class. Even though some of these people are employed inside the state
system, they don't necessarily rely on the redistributive institutions, but rather on
professional skills to access socioeconomic resources.
Ambitious and professional habitus types are strongly linked to the urban middle
class and above. This is to say that middle and upper middle class people tend to
be motivated by persistence in goal directed activities. This trait was reected in the
utterances of interviewees X, XII, XV, and XVI, representing this urban advantaged
class in my research. In terms of practice, there is a dierence in how dierent individ-
uals strive to achieve these goals among these people. Both interviewee XII and XVI
emphasized the importance of establishing good connections with government ocials
for achieving goals. In contrast, as professional and technical talents, interviewee X
and XV tended to use professional networking to seek opportunities. It is found that,
individuals with work experience in party and government agencies were more willing
to acknowledge the role of state power in capitalist activities. Compared to intervie-
wees X, XII, and XVI, interviewee XV tended to avoid potential negative outcomes
by assessing heuristic rather than systematic information. One speculation I have is
that, due to the lack of experience in judgment, young middle class people are more
likely to be oriented by moderate self-protection. In addition, through the experience
of interviewee XV, who is a Communist Party member working for a leading private in-
formation communication technology manufacturer, it was further veried that unless
inside the state system, the Communist Party membership doesn't reveal privileges
with respect to career promotion or economic returns. It is hard to tell if these two
habitus types explain how Communist Party members perceive the world around them
and react to it, because since the post-Mao era, the Chinese Communist Party has
shifted from loyalty recruitment to politically screened elite recruitment37.
37For the Chinese Communist Party, there is a dynamic model of political screening. After the
initiation of the reform and opening up in the late 1970s, the Party explicitly deemphasized family
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Secondly, the worker group within the cadre-worker dichotomy has transformed
into the urban working class under market forces. Statistical results from chapter 5
show that individuals from this class are more likely to be employed by the state-owned
enterprises, state-holding enterprises, and some pubic organizations, and are often non-
agricultural hukou holders with little accumulated economic capital, for example having
full ownership of only one property, in cities. Practically, Compared to the marginalized
working class, individuals of this class still benet from a series of urban-biased policies.
Therefore, I call this class urban working class. Furthermore, the results of MCA
demonstrate that, this class constitutes the majority of the urban population.
Passive habitus type marks this urban working class. More specically, this habitus
type denotes a reluctance to reorient toward the market economy. As mentioned in
chapter 5, the state-socialist occupational hierarchy is determined by political loyalty,
at its height in China during the Cultural Revolution between 1966-1976. Before the
initiation of the reform of state-owned enterprises, workers employed by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) were identied as the ideologically correct occupational group and
were guaranteed lifelong job security (Walder, 1986; Bian, 1996). During the period of
planned economy, workers employed by SOEs were in a relatively advantaged position
in urban society. Interviewee XIV, a representative of this working class, stated that
due to the previously promised iron rice bowl, he was not able to develop professional
skills that might be useful in market competition:
\I don't have a university degree or professional skills. Previously, we were
encouraged to donate ourselves to socialist industrialization, rather than to
develop professional skills. I think it is lucky that I kept myself from being
laid o during the SOE reform, because I wouldn't be qualied in the labour
market. At least, the social security system in Tianjin is fair to people like
me."
Seen from the results of MCA, individuals like XIV constitute the majority of the
class origin as an important indicator of political loyalty, but rather screened people by the extent
to which they accepted and were able to make a contribution to the current political system through
their educational credentials (see: Bian et al., 2001).
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population in urban China. Within a state-socialist sociocultural paradigm, although
people of this group were in a relatively disadvantaged position in the worker-cadre
dichotomy, they were still guaranteed a steady income and social benets that could
not be obtained by most Chinese citizens. At the same time, most of them didn't
possess cultural or administrative capital that can now be used to exchange favors in
the market environment. The reliance on the \iron rice bowl" system culturally led
people to fail to gain the adaptive edge that would benet them during the transition to
the eciency-oriented system. Consequently, there has been a decline in socioeconomic
strata of the class dominated by workers employed inside state-owned or state-holding
enterprises under economic reform.
Under China's economic reform, ambitious, professional, and passive habitus types
are found to be anchored in symbolic domination of employment structure. Speci-
cally, this symbolic construction establishes class status by reinforcing human habitus
dierences in dealing with market competition. Seen from quantitative results, this
mechanism has justied the symbolic congurations of both urban middle class and
urban working class.
Next, a working class with capitalist characteristic develops out of economic liber-
alism in urban China. Statistical results from chapter 5 demonstrate that there is a
cloud of individuals who are characterized as agricultural hukou holders that own small
individual businesses. These characteristics mainly describe the discriminated against
group of rural-to-urban migrants who move from rural to urban areas for jobs and
better lives without obtaining permanent urban residency. Practically, besides self-
employed individuals, some white collars workers migrating from rural areas have also
been categorized into this class. The emergence of such class is a result of China's lib-
eral economic reform and rapid socioeconomic growth that in turn has created millions
of job vacancies and expanded market demand (Kuang & Li, 2012). I call this social
class marginalized working class within China's reforming context: On the one hand,
due to the possession of little economic and/or social capital, this group cannot be de-
scribed as proletariat or of the lower class; On the other hand, seen as an urban caste
system, the hukou system has resulted in discriminatory policies against migrants and
\intensied the tension between urbanites and migrants" (Tang & Yang, 2008, p. 768).
179
Interviewee VII and IX are the representatives of this marginalized working class.
It has been found that exible habitus type is the maker of the marginalized working
class. Moving to cities for better earnings and better lives reects an adaptive attitude
towards poverty in a relatively liberal economic context, although the hukou system
still doesn't necessarily grant the migrants permanent urban residency rights. Partic-
ularly compared to ambitious and professional habitus types, the exible type reects
a conservative orientation toward goal achievement. It might be ascribed to discrimi-
natory residency policies and/or an ordinary educational background. For instance, I
was told by interviewee VII:
\I was going to start a new grocery nearby, however, it is not allowed under
the policies of old city reconstruction. China won't relax restrictions on
settling in megacities like Beijing, but it has rather relaxed its control of
migrants settling in small and medium cities. I may start my business in
a small city adjacent to my hometown to make sure my children are well
educated."
For some people of this class, it is very possible to gain upward mobility through
the accumulation of capital or through market opportunities. Interviewee IX expressed
her own expectations in this regard during her interview:
\It's a good opportunity to be transferred to the branch oce in Fujian. It is
known that Beijing is a highly competitive city lled with intellectuals from
all around the world. I think I have advantages in a medium-sized city, and
it is possible for me to aord the apartment there, to settle into city life and
to get upward mobility."
As a form of symbolic domination, China's hukou system is found to partly inform
the distinctions between passive and exible habitus types. The role of hukou status in
informing urban social classes concerns two aspects: On one hand, this urban-biased
registration system economically benets people who are in non-agricultural hukou
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status. For this reason, on the other hand, in terms of habitus, although many rural-
to-urban migrants are motivated to seek opportunities in cities, they still tend to be
more conservative in decision-making and more anxious about the future.
Finally, deprived habitus type is linked to the social class of deprivation and
marginalization. I thus use the term urban lower class to describe this class. Re-
vealed by the results of the MCA in chapter 5, people of this urban lower class are
more likely to be in a poor economic state, of a lower educational level and at an older
age. Statistically, there are few Communist Party members in this social class. To
be concrete, deprived habitus is incorporated by those without life chances in urban
society, such as some of the rural-to-urban migrant workers and the laid-o workers.
Interviewees VIII, XI, and XIII exemplify this habitus type. Compared to passive
and exible habitus types, this habitus type is characterized more by a lack of knowl-
edge of the market system. Interviewee VIII was a younger representative sample of
this habitus type and its corresponding social class. He did complete high school. Al-
though he has been working in Beijing for several years, he is confused about his future
and without any concrete plan. During the interview, he complained that he came to
Beijing to earn money, however, policies were absolutely unfair to migrant workers. I
was also told that he didn't want to quit his current job, but he was aware that he had
to.
As an elder rural-to-urban migrant worker without any educational background,
interviewee XI has to earn money through unskilled construction labor. Registered in
one of the poorest areas in China, he is the person without land in the village. He
didn't complete elementary school and never accumulated any social respect or social
ties. Fortunately, he is still in good health, which makes it possible for him to earn
money for his retired life. During the interview, he constantly complained that life
was unfair to him. Interviewee XIII who is a laid-o worker shares some similar traits
with interviewee XI. She has been working a part-time job since she was laid o from
a state-owned enterprise. Without any social relationships or respect, she didn't have
any particular life goals, but just continued to save money for her retired life. Unlike
interviewee XI, she was optimistic and didn't complain that Chinese government broke
its promise on SOE reform. These two interviewees also completely placed their hope
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on descendants, something out evident from the answers of other interviewees. At the
same time, they were more willing to believe that it is very possible to achieve upward
mobility in China.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Main Findings
This dissertation has tried to understand inequality under China's reform and its legit-
imacy based on a sociocultural framework. Within the framework, our main argument
is that a legitimate system is a system of being reproduced. Firstly, sociocultural per-
spective stresses that humans tend to perceive domination, or social arrangements, in
a way that reects how they have learned from their experiences. In this sense, as
a result of meritocratic competition, inequality is legitimized when it reects a long-
lasting order of domination. Secondly, with regard to a meritocratic society, inequality
is socioculturally rooted in earlier times, as habitus signies individual merit, which
contributes to the reproduction of inequality. The earlier social structure that shapes
the human perceptual process and behavioral tendency I call a socioculture.
The conguration of social structure in China is now characterized by meritocracy,
as the reform and opening up establishes a system of rewards based on merits. Based
on the presumption that the social stratication under China's reform is the outcome
of merit but also reects a longstanding order of domination, I have tried particularly
to explore whether and, if so, how the inequality under reform is reproduced from the
earlier established class boundaries under state socialism. In spite of the legacies of
state-socialist inequalities, the introduction of the market force has dierentiated the
statuses of individuals with regard to resources of production, further characterizing the
Chinese social structure by mutually antagonistic relationships (Weber, 1946; Parkin,
1972). This stratied society under reform is assumed to be, to some extent, expressed
as a form of the state-socialist class system, otherwise, it wouldn't appear natural and
be accepted by Chinese citizens as just.
These persistent state-socialist division lines exist as symbolic socialist class bound-
aries in the transforming society. Particularly, despite the initiation of economic lib-
eralization, Chinese citizens are symbolically and hierarchically categorized as follows:
non-agricultural hukou holders vs. agricultural hukou holders, Communist Party mem-
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bers vs. non-Communist Party members, and employees inside the state system vs.
employees outside the state system. Through multiple correspondence analysis of the
individual and household data from the 2015 Chinese General Social Survey, it has
been found that the social stratication under reform is partly reproduced from state-
socialist hierarchical arrangements. Apart from this, the socialist hierarchical legacies
manifest more evidently in rural society than in urban society.
Habitus theory, developed by Bourdieu, is utilized as a sociocultural mechanism to
explain class reproduction in a transforming society. Habitus signies the internalized
logic of human practice that is shaped by structural relations within a sign system (e.g.,
Bourdieu, 1990b). Thus, I have conducted a series of qualitative interviews to construct
habitus types within this hybrid sociocultural system and have associated those habitus
types to social class under China's reform. The habitus traits acquired through the
socialist hierarchical relations have been found in the form of an invisible and fractional
mechanism in the stratication process under market reform. In particular, habitus
orients an awareness of market force and state power among Chinese citizens, which
signies individual merit that aects socioeconomic attainments in this system. At
the same time, it was found from the qualitative data that the strength of symbolic
boundaries varies cross-regions and, in particular, that these boundaries are weaker in
coastal regions and urban areas.
Four habitus groups emerged from the habitus traits elaborated on the rural-based
interviews. These habitus types are: described as the determined, performative, prag-
matic, and depressed, respectively. Of these four habitus types, the performative habi-
tus type represents the behaviors aected specically by the socialist class system,
while the pragmatic one represents a practice acquired from the free market environ-
ment. The distinctions between these two practice modes contribute to the dividing
line between the privileged class and the auent emerging class in rural society. The
determined habitus type signies a practice that integrates valued capitalist habitus
into the socialist milieus. This habitus group is more likely to be found among the vil-
lage cadres in rural societies of developed regions. The depressed habitus type featured
by fatalistic philosophy is a maker of the rural marginalized class, which constitutes
the majority of population in rural China. This depressed orientation characterizes
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members of the rural marginalized class powerless to change anything and dependent
on the rural social security.
Five habitus types develop out of urban societies, they are the ambitious, the pro-
fessional, the exible, the passive, and the deprived types. The ambitious and the
professional practices are the habitus types that absorb valued dispositions from both
the socialist and the capitalist systems. These two habitus types are distributed in the
middle (and upper middle) class of socialist elites and the aspirational middle (and
upper middle) class respectively. The exible habitus type develops out of economic
liberalism and is mainly distributed among the rural-to-urban migrants who move from
rural to urban areas for better lives. This habitus type is the maker of the marginalized
working class in urban China. The passive habitus type denotes reluctance toward the
shift to market competition, as this practice has been learned from the promise of a \job
for life" under state socialism. This habitus type is the maker of the urban working class
that constitutes the majority of the population in urban China. The deprived habitus
is characterized by lacking valued traits in a transforming society, and contributes to
the urban lower class that is mainly composed of marginalized rural-to-urban migrant
workers and laid-o workers.
The ndings of this dissertation interpret inequality as the unequal distribution of
symbolic capital and habitus. Accordingly, the symbolic mediation of human practice
is the structural root of inequality. The symbolically mediated habitus denes class as a
self-perceived position in a structural relation, and matches interior group distinctions
to exterior categories. In this sense, inequalities or group distinctions are viewed just
and acceptable as long as they are expressed in the form of symbolic inequality. In
a capitalist society, particularly, the maintenance of symbolic boundaries legitimizes
inequality and makes it durable by merit.
7.2 Future Work
Four important questions remain and require further discussion following the work
outlined in this dissertation:
(1) How are capitalist meritocracy and socialist socioculture intertwined with each
other deserves more precise research. The higher education system that was destroyed
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during the Cultural Revolution has been re-established since 1977. Afterwards, the
Chinese Communist Party has been making innovative eorts to incorporate a series
of merit principles in managing party and government system, in order to attract more
intellectuals and professionals to serve the party and the country (L. Chen, Chan, Gao,
& Yu, 2015). In this sense, it is worth working further on how merit selection merges
with those socialist hierarchical designations.
(2) The top elite group in urban China is missing from the qualitative data. As
a result, the habitus of these elites couldn't be directly observed, but it does need to
be observed. Apart from this, the constructed habitus types and their contributions
to social structure should be understood as dynamic processes in the future work.
On the one hand, the dynamic interaction between the market force and state power
may produce new sociocultural foundations in Chinese society. On the other hand,
the longevity of the market economy may alter how people, especially the younger
generation, perceive the surroundings, which will further aect how habitus groups are
constructed and distributed.
(3) Some symbolic recognitions are neglected in this qualitative analysis, such as
gender. The results of multiple correspondence analysis in chapter 5 reveal an associa-
tion between gender and social class. Particularly, in rural China, men are more likely
to have, or to have had non-agricultural work experience and to enter in to the emerging
class, while women are more distributed in relatively lower socioeconomic conditions.
Similarly, in urban society, men are more likely to be positioned in the middle class
and above, whereas women are more likely to be marginalized. However, the quanti-
tative results also suggest that social classes in both rural and urban societies are not
characterized by gender. Given this, future work is encouraged to focus on the habitus
distinctions between men and women, and to explore whether the dierent logics of
practice contribute to dierent class situations in a transforming society. As a matter
of fact, other forms of symbolic inequality, such as gender inequality and interethnicity
inequality, also provide alternative sociocultural perspectives on inequality research.
(4) The contribution of education to inequality in China and its reproduction needs
to be further studied. Both quantitative and qualitative results conrm that since the
reform and opening up, education has had a very positive eect on the socioeconomic
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achievements of individuals under market force and, to some extent, has weakened
the symbolic mediation of practice to facilitate upward mobility. However, the fact
is that in China, the compulsory education system took eect in 1980s, the national
college examination system was re-established after the Cultural Revolution, and the
stratication process happens in the educational arena almost at the same pace as in
the social structure. Two subquestions thus need to be deeply investigated: The rst
concerns the eect of education inequality in China on social upward mobility; the
second concerns whether or not and (if so) how the performance of Chinese citizens
in educational institutions are symbolically dierentiated. Additionally, in order to
address the tension between the call for eciency and pressure of social warfare, China
has managed to decentralize or privatize public education over the past 20 years (Mok
& Han, 2017). Whether the privatization of education highlights deeper problems of
social cleavage in China is a question worth asking.
187
References
Abdi, H., & Valentin, D. (2007). Multiple correspondence analysis. In N. J. Salkind
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of measurement and statistics (pp. 651{657). Sage Publica-
tions.
Acker, J. (2006). Inequality regimes: Gender, class, and race in organizations. Gender
& Society , 20 (4), 441{464.
Afridi, F., Li, S. X., & Ren, Y. (2015). Social identity and inequality: The impact of
China's hukou system. Journal of Public Economics , 123 , 17{29.
Ajzen, I. (2002). Residual eects of past on later behavior: Habituation and reasoned
action perspectives. Personality and Social Psychology Review , 6 (2), 107{122.
Aldwin, C. M. (2007). Stress, coping, and development: An integrative perspective
(The Second ed.). The Guilford Press.
Alfred, M. V. (2003). Sociocultural contexts and learning: Anglophone caribbean
immigrant women in us postsecondary education. Adult Education Quarterly ,
53 (4), 242{260.
Andreas, J. (2009). Rise of the red engineers: the Cultural Revolution and the origins
of China's new class. Stanford University Press.
Anthias, F. (2001). The concept of `social division' and theorising social stratication:
Looking at ethnicity and class. Sociology , 35 (4), 835{854.
Archer, M. S. (2004). Being human: The problem of agency. Cambridge University
Press.
Arnold, N. S. (1989). Marx, central planning, and utopian socialism. Social Philosophy
and Policy , 6 (2), 160{199.
Baars, B. J., & Franklin, S. (2003). How conscious experience and working memory
interact. Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 7 (4), 166{172.
Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. American Psychologist ,
44 (9), 1175{1184.
Bandura, A. (1999). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Asian Journal
of Social Psychology , 2 (1), 21{41.
Banister, J. (1987). China's changing population. Stanford University Press.
188
Barbalet, J. M. (1980). Principles of stratication in Max Weber: an interpretation
and critique. British Journal of Sociology , 31 (3), 401{418.
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior:
Direct eects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology , 71 (2), 230{244.
Barton, D., Chen, Y., & Jin, A. (2013, June). Mapping China's middle class. McKinsey
Quarterly , 54{60.
Baum, R. D. (1964). \Red and expert": The politico-ideological foundations of China's
Great Leap Forward. Asian Survey , 4 (9), 1048{1057.
Bell, B. S., & Kozlowski, W. (2002). Goal orientation and ability: Interactive eects on
self-ecacy, performance, and knowledge. Journal of Applied Psychology , 87 (3),
497{505.
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2002). Self-condence and personal motivation. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics , 117 (3), 871{915.
Bendix, R. (1974). Inequality and social structure: a comparison of marx and weber.
American Sociological Review , 39 (2), 149{161.
Benjamin, D. J., Brown, S. A., & Shapiro, J. M. (2013). Who is `behavioral'? cog-
nitive ability and anomalous preferences. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 11 (6), 1231{1255.
Bereiter, C. (1994). Constructivism, socioculturalism, and Popper's world 3. Educa-
tional Researcher , 23 (7), 21{23.
Berg, B. L. (2001). Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. Allyn &
Bacon.
Berlau, A. J. (1970). The German Social Democratic Party, 1914-1921. Octagon
Books.
Bertram, C. (2004). Routledge philosophy guidebook to Rousseau and the social contract.
Psychology Press.
Bian, Y. (1996). Chinese occupational prestige: A comparative analysis. International
Sociology , 11 (2), 161{186.
Bian, Y. (2002). Chinese social stratication and social mobility. Annual Review of
Sociology , 28 (1), 91{116.
189
Bian, Y., & Li, L. (2012). The Chinese General Social Survey (2003-8): Sample designs
and data evaluation. Chinese Sociological Review , 45 (1), 70{97.
Bian, Y., & Logan, J. R. (1996). Market transition and the persistence of power: The
changing stratication system in urban China. American Sociological Review ,
61 (5), 739{758.
Bian, Y., Shu, X., & Logan, J. R. (2001). Communist Party membership and regime
dynamics in China. Social Forces , 79 (3), 805{841.
Bian, Y., Wang, W., Zhang, L., & Cheng, C. (2012). Kuatizhi shehui ziben jiqi shouru
huibao (Institutional-crossing social capital and its income returns). Zhongguo
Shehui Kexue (Social Sciences in China)(2), 110{126.
Blanchar, J. C., & Eidelman, S. (2013). Perceived system longevity increases sys-
tem justication and the legitimacy of inequality. European Journal of Social
Psychology , 43 (4), 238{245.
Blasius, J., & Thiessen, V. (2001). Methodological artifacts in measures of political
ecacy and trust: A multiple correspondence analysis. Political Analysis , 9 (1),
1{20.
Blasius, J., & Thiessen, V. (2006). Assessing data quality and construct comparabili-
tyin cross-national surveys. European Sociological Review , 22 (3), 229{242.
Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. Pacic Sociological
Review , 1 (1), 3{7.
Bodnar, J., & Borocz, J. (1998). Housing advantages for the better connected? Insti-
tutional segmentation, settlement type and social network eects in Hungary's
late state-socialist housing inequalities. Social Forces , 76 (4), 1275{1304.
Bohnsack, R. (2010). Documentary method an group discussions. In R. Bohnsack,
N. Pfa, & W. Weller (Eds.), Qualitative analysis and documentary method in
international educational research (p. 99-124). Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Bohnsack, R. (2014). Documentary method. In U. Flick (Ed.), The sage handbook of
qualitative data analysis (pp. 217{233). SAGE Publications Ltd.
Boisot, M., & Child, J. (1996). From efs to clans and network capitalism: Explaining
China's emerging economic order. Administrative Science Quarterly , 41 (4), 600{
628.
190
Bond, N. (2011). Ferdinand Tonnies and academic socialism. History of the Human
Sciences , 24 (3), 23{45.
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2006). Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence
of racial inequality in America. Rowman & Littleeld Publishers.
Bonilla-Silva, E., Goar, C., & Embrick, D. G. (2006). When whites ock together:
The social psychology of white habitus. Critical Sociology , 32 (2-3), 229{253.
Bottomore, T., Harris, L., Kiernan, V., & Miliband, R. (Eds.). (1991). The Marxist
Thought. Blackwell Publishers Inc.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1979). Symbolic power. Critique of Anthropology , 4 , 77{85.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Harvard
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook
of theory and research for the sociology of education (pp. 241{258). Greenwood
Publishing Group.
Bourdieu, P. (1987). What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical
existence of groups. Berkeley Journal of Sociology , 32 , 1{17.
Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social space and symbolic power. Sociological Theory , 7 (1),
14{25.
Bourdieu, P. (1990a). In other words: Essays towards a reexive sociology. Stanford
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1990b). The logic of practice. Polity Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Polity Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1996). On the family as a realized category. Theory, Culture & Society ,
13 (3), 19{26.
Bourdieu, P. (2005). The social structures of the economy. Polity Press.
Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1990). Reproduction in education, society and culture.
Sage Publications.
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (2013). Symbolic capital and social classes. Journal of
Classical Sociology , 13 (2), 292{302.
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. (1992). The purpose of reexive sociology. In
191
P. Bourdieu & L. J. Wacquant (Eds.), An invitation to reexive sociology (pp.
61{202). Polity Press.
Brighenti, A. M. (2011). Power, subtraction and social transformation: Canetti and
Foucault on the notion of resistance. Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social
Theory , 12 (1), 57{78.
Brinkman, S. (2013). Qualitative interviewing: Understanding qualitative research.
Oxford University Press.
Brdsgaard, K. E. (2002). Institutional reform and the bianzhi system in China. The
China Quarterly , 170 , 361{386.
Brdsgaard, K. E. (2006). Bianzhi and cadre management in China: The case of
Yangpu. In K. E. Brdsgaard & Y. Zheng (Eds.), The Chinese Communist
Party in reform (pp. 113{131). Routledge.
Brdsgaard, K. E. (2012). Politics and business group formation in China: the Party
in control? The China Quarterly , 211 , 624{648.
Brdsgaard, K. E., & Rutten, K. (2017). From accelerated accumulation to the socialist
market economy: Chinese economic discourse and development from 1953 to
present. Brill.
Brubaker, R. (1985). Rethinking classical theory. Theory and Society , 14 (6), 745{775.
Buber, M. (1996). Paths in utopia. Syracuse University Press.
Bunce, V. (1999). Subversive institutions: The design and the destruction of socialism
and the state. Cambridge University Press.
Burkitt, I. (2002). Technologies of the self: Habitus and capacities. Journal for the
Theory of Social Behaviour , 32 (2), 219{237.
Cai, F. (2011). Hukou system reform and unication of rural{urban social welfare.
China & World Economy , 19 (3), 33{48.
Cai, H., & Treisman, D. (2006). Did government decentralization cause China's eco-
nomic miracle? World Politics , 58 (4), 505{535.
Cai, Y. (2009). Regional inequality in China: Mortality and health. In D. S. Davis
& F. Wang (Eds.), Creating wealth and poverty in post-socialist China (pp. 143{
155). Stanford University Press.
Canale, M. (1987). The measurement of communicative competence. Annual Review
192
of Applied Linguistics , 8 , 67{84.
Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2003). Personality traits and academic
examination performance. European Journal of Personality , 17 (3), 237{250.
Chan, A. (1997). Chinese danwei reforms: convergence with the Japanese model. In
X. L & E. J. Perry (Eds.), Danwei: The changing Chinese workplace in historical
and comparative perspective (pp. 91{113). M. E. Sharpe.
Chan, A. L. (2001). Mao's crusade: politics and policy implementation in China's
Great Leap Forward. Oxford University Press.
Chan, K. W., & Buckingham, W. (2008). Is China abolishing the hukou system? The
China Quarterly , 195 , 582{606.
Chan, K. W., & Zhang, L. (1999). The hukou system and rural-urban migration in
China: Processes and changes. The China Quarterly , 160 , 818{855.
Chang, C., & Wang, Y. (1994). The nature of the township-village enterprise. Journal
of Comparative Economics , 19 (3), 434{452.
Charles, M. (2008). Culture and inequality: Identity, ideology, and dierence in
postascriptive society. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 619 (1), 41{58.
Chen, C., & Fan, C. C. (2016). China's hukou puzzle: Why don't rural migrants want
urban hukou? China Review , 16 (3), 9{39.
Chen, L., Chan, H., Gao, J., & Yu, J. (2015). Party management of talent: Building
a party-led, merit-based talent market in China. Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 74 (3), 298{311.
Cheng, C., Wang, Y., & Bian, Y. (2015). Zhongguo laodongli shizhang zhongde
xingbieshouru chayi: Yige shehuiziben de jieshi (Gender-earining dierentials
in China's urban labor market: A social capital perspective). Renkou Yanjiu
(Population Research), 39 (2), 3{16.
Cheng, T., & Selden, M. (1994). The origins and social consequences of China's hukou
system. The China Quarterly , 139 , 644{668.
Chia, R., & Holt, R. (2006). Strategy as practical coping: A Heideggerian perspective.
Organization Studies , 27 (5), 635{655.
Chou, B. K. (2007). Does good governance matter? Civil Service reform in China.
193
International Journal of Public Administration, 31 (1), 54{75.
Chun, C.-A., Moos, R. H., & Cronkite, R. C. (2006). Culture: A fundamental context
for the stress and coping paradigm. In P. T. P. Wong & L. C. J. Wong (Eds.),
Handbook of multicultural perspectives on stress and coping (pp. 29{53). Springer.
Clark, T. N., & Lipset, S. M. (1991). Are social classes dying? International Sociology ,
6 (4), 397{410.
Cochoy, F. (1998). Another discipline for the market economy: Marketing as a perfor-
mative knowledge and know-how for capitalism. The Sociological Review , 46 (S1),
194{221.
Cohen, J. (1986). Structure, choice, and legitimacy: Locke's theory of the state.
Philosophy & Public Aairs , 15 (4), 301{324.
Cohen, P. N., & Wang, F. (2009). Market and gender pay equity: Have Chinese
reforms narrowed the gap. In D. S. Davis & F. Wang (Eds.), Creating wealth and
poverty in postsocialist China (pp. 37{53). Stanford University Press.
Costa-Lopes, R., Dovidio, J. F., Pereira, C. R., & Jost, J. T. (2013). Social psycho-
logical perspectives on the legitimation of social inequality: Past, present and
future. European Journal of Social Psychology , 43 (4), 229{237.
Crandall, C. S., & Beasley, R. K. (2001). A perceptual theory of legitimacy: Politics,
prejudice, social institutions, and moral value. In J. T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.),
The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and
intergroup relations (pp. 77{102). Cambridge University Press.
Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative inquiry & research design choosing among ve
approaches. SAGE Publications Ltd.
Creswell, J. W., Hanson, W. E., Clark Plano, V. L., & Morales, A. (2007). Qualitative
research designs: Selection and implementation. The Counseling Psychologist ,
35 (2), 236{264.
Cross, S. E. (1995). Self-construals, coping, and stress in cross-cultural adaptation.
Journal of cross-cultural psychology , 26 (6), 673{697.
Crossley, N. (2001). The phenomenological habitus and its construction. Theory and
Society , 30 (1), 81{120.
Crossley, N. (2003). From reproduction to transformation: Social movement elds and
194
the radical habitus. Theory, Culture & Society , 20 (6), 43{68.
Crossley, N. (2008). Social class. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts
(pp. 87{100). Acumen Publishing.
Csanadi, M. (1997). The legacy of party-states for the transformation. Communist
Economies and Economic Transformation, 9 (1), 61{85.
Davis, D. S. (2000). Social class transformation in urban China: Training, hiring, and
promoting urban professionals and managers after 1949. Modern China, 26 (3),
251{275.
De Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., & Zhu, N. (2005). The role of non-farm incomes in
reducing rural poverty and inequality in China. CUDARE Working Papers .
de Sauvigny, G. d. B. (1970). Liberalism, nationalism and socialism: The birth of
three words. The Review of Politics , 32 (2), 147{166.
DeShon, R. P., & Gillespie, J. Z. (2005). A motivated action theory account of goal
orientation. Journal of Applied Psychology , 90 (6), 1096{1127.
Dickson, B. J. (2007). Integrating wealth and power in China: The Communist Party's
embrace of the private sector. The China Quarterly , 192 , 827{854.
Dickson, B. J. (2014). Who wants to be a communist? career incentives and mobilized
loyalty in China. The China Quarterly , 217 , 42{68.
Dickson, B. J., & Rublee, M. R. (2000). Membership has its privileges: The socioeco-
nomic characteristics of Communist Party members in urban China. Comparative
Political Studies , 33 (1), 87{112.
Dittmer, L., & Lv, X. (1996). Personal politics in the Chinese danwei under reform.
Asian Survey , 36 (3), 246{267.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Human, D., & Sunde, U. (2010). Are risk aversion and
impatience related to cognitive ability? American Economic Review , 100 (3),
1238{60.
Dollar, D. (2007). Poverty, inequality, and social disparities during China's economic
reform. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper(4253).
Du, Y., Park, A., & Wang, S. (2005). Migration and rural poverty in China. Journal
of Comparative Economics , 33 (4), 688{709.
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A dual-process motivational model of ideology,
195
politics, and prejudice. Psychological Inquiry , 20 (2-3), 98{109.
Dutton, M. (1988). Policing the Chinese household: A comparison of modern and
ancient forms. Economy and Society , 17 (2), 195{224.
Dutton, M. (1992). Policies and punishment in China. Cambridge University Press.
Dyzenhaus, D. (2001). Hobbes and the legitimacy of law. Law and Philosophy , 20 (5),
461{498.
Elliot, A. J., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (1996). Approach and avoidance achievement
goals and intrinsic motivation: A mediational analysis. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology , 70 (3), 461{475.
Engels, F. (1999). Socialism: Utopian and scientic. Resistance Books.
Evens, T. M. (1999). Bourdieu and the logic of practice: Is all giving indian-giving or
is \generalized materialism" not enough? Sociological Theory , 17 (1), 3{31.
Feldman, M. S., & Orlikowski, W. J. (2011). Theorizing practice and practicing theory.
Organization Science, 22 (5), 1240{1253.
Feltenstein, A., & Iwata, S. (2005). Decentralization and macroeconomic performance
in China: Regional autonomy has its costs. Journal of Development Economics ,
76 (2), 481{501.
Feng, S. (2011). Zhongguo guojia yundong de xingcheng yu bianyi (The formation and
variation of China's political movement: A comprehensive interpretation based
on the regime). Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), 1 , 73{97.
Fleisher, B., Li, H., & Zhao, M. Q. (2010). Human capital, economic growth, and
regional inequality in China. Journal of Development Economics , 92 (2), 215{
231.
Fox, N. J. (1998). Foucault, Foucauldians and sociology. British Journal of Sociology ,
49 (3), 415{433.
Frawley, W. (1997). Vygotsky and cognitive science: Language and the unication of
the social and computational mind. Harvard University Press.
Gall, M., Borg, W., & Gall, J. (2003). Educational research: An introduction (7th
edition). A & B Publications.
Gane, N. (2005). Max Weber as social theorist: `class, status, party'. European Journal
of Social Theory , 8 (2), 211{226.
196
Gao, Y. (1987). Born red: A chronicle of the Cultural Revolution. Stanford University
Press.
Garrahan, P. (1977). Housing, the class milieu and middle-class conservatism. British
Journal of Political Science, 7 (1), 126{127.
Gee, J. P. (1997). Thinking, learning, and reading: The situated sociocultural mind.
In D. Kirshner & J. A. Whitson (Eds.), Situated cognition: Social, semiotic, and
psychological perspectives (pp. 235{260). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Gerber, T. P. (2000). Membership benets or selection eects? why former communist
party members do better in post-Soviet Russia. Social Science Research, 29 (1),
25{50.
Gerth, H. H., & Mills, C. W. (1953). Character and social structure: The psychology
of social institutions. Harvest, Brace and Company, INC.
Gherardi, S. (2000). Practice-based theorizing on learning and knowing in organiza-
tions. Organization, 7 (2), 211{223.
Goldstein, L. F. (1982). Early feminist themes in French utopian socialism: The
St.-Simonians and Fourier. Journal of the History of Ideas , 43 (1), 91{108.
Goodman, D. S. (2014). Class in contemporary China. Polity Press.
Gordon, R. (1949). An investigation into some of the factors that favour the formation
of stereotyped images. British Journal of Psychology , 39 (3), 156{167.
Gordon, R. H., & Li, W. (1991). Chinese enterprise behavior under the reforms. The
American Economic Review , 81 (2), 202{206.
Greenacre, M. (2006). From simple to multiple correspondence analysis. In
M. Greenacre & J. Blasius (Eds.), Multiple correspondence analysis and related
methods (pp. 41{76). Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Greenacre, M., & Lewi, P. (2009). Distributional equivalence and subcompositional
coherence in the analysis of compositional data, contingency tables and ratio-scale
measurements. Journal of Classication, 26 (1), 29{54.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review , 102 (1), 4{27.
Gregory, P. R. (2004). The political economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet
secret archives. Cambridge University Press.
197
Greifeneder, R., & Bless, H. (2017). Introduction: What is social cognition research
about? In R. Greifeneder, H. Bless, & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Social cognition: How
individuals construct social reality? (pp. 1{15). Routledge.
Guang, L. (2001). Reconstituting the rural-urban divide: Peasant migration and
the rise of `orderly migration' in contemporary China. Journal of Contemporary
China, 10 (28), 471{493.
Guo, S. (2001). The party-state relationship in post-Mao China. China Report , 37 (3),
301{315.
Guo, X. (2014). Controlling corruption in the party: China's Central Discipline In-
spection Commission. The China Quarterly , 219 , 597{624.
Guo, Y. (2016). State power as a determinant of life chances. In Y. Guo (Ed.),
Handbook on class and social stratication in China (pp. 85{106). Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Gustafsson, B. A., Shi, L., & Sicular, T. (2008). Inequality and public policy in China.
Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1999). The social construction of what? Harvard University Press.
Haeri, N. (1997). The reproduction of symbolic capital: Language, state, and class in
egypt. Current Anthropology , 38 (5), 795{816.
Hallett, T. (2003). Symbolic power and organizational culture. Sociological Theory ,
21 (2), 128{149.
Han, C., & Whyte, M. K. (2009). The social contours of distributive injustice feelings
in contemporary China. In D. S. Davis & F. Wang (Eds.), Creating wealth and
poverty in postsocialist China (pp. 193{212). Stanford University Press.
Han, L., & Kung, J. K.-S. (2015). Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local govern-
ments: Evidence from China. Journal of Development Economics , 116 , 89{104.
Hannum, E., & Meiyan, W. (2006). Geography and educational inequality in China.
China Economic Review , 17 (3), 253{265.
Harasymiw, B. (1969). Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's leadership
recruitment system. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne
de Science Politique, 2 (4), 493{512.
Harker, R. (1990). Bourdieu: Education and reproduction. In R. Harker, C. Mahar, &
198
C. Wilkes (Eds.), An introduction to the work of Pierre Bourdieu (pp. 86{108).
Palgrave Macmillan.
Harker, R., Mahar, C., & Wilkes, C. (Eds.). (1990). An introduction to the work of
Pierre Bourdieu: The practice of theory. Palgrave Macmillan.
Harker, R., & May, S. A. (1993). Code and habitus: Comparing the accounts of
Bernstein and Bourdieu. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 14 (2), 169{
178.
Hatt, P. K. (1950). Occupation and social stratication. American Journal of Sociol-
ogy , 55 (6), 533{543.
Healy, P. (2008). Misreading Mao: On class and class struggle. Journal of Contempo-
rary Asia, 38 (4), 535{559.
Hebdige, D. (1979). Subculture: The meaning of style. Routledge.
Henry, P. J., & Sears, D. O. (2002). The symbolic racism 2000 scale. Political
Psychology , 23 (2), 253{283.
Hobbes, T. (2002). Leviathan. Broadview Press.
Hodge, R. W., Siegel, P. M., & Rossi, P. H. (1964). Occupational prestige in the
United States, 1925-63. American Journal of Sociology , 70 (3), 286{302.
Ho, K., & Pandey, P. (2006). Discrimination, social identity, and durable inequalities.
American Economic Review , 96 (2), 206{211.
Homann, D. L. (2011). Cultivating the masses: Modern state practices and Soviet
socialism, 1914{1939. Cornell University Press.
Hollingshead, A. B., et al. (2011). Four factor index of social status. Yale Journal of
Sociology , 8 , 21{52.
Hong, Y., & Zhao, Y. (2014). Cong ziben dao guanxi: Zhongguo chengshi jiatingjiaoyu
de jiecengfenhua (From capital to habitus: The class dierentiation of family
educational pattern in urban China). Shehuixue Yanjiu (Sociological Studies)(4),
73{94.
Honneth, A. (2001). Recognition or redistribution? changing perspectives on the moral
order of society. Theory, Culture & Society , 18 (2-3), 43{55.
Hoppe, H.-H. (1989). A theory of socialism and capitalism: Economics, politics and
ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
199
Hsing, Y.-t. (2006). Land and territorial politics in urban China. The China Quarterly ,
187 , 575{591.
Hsueh, R. (2016). State capitalism, Chinese-style: Strategic value of sectors, sectoral
characteristics, and globalization. Governance, 29 (1), 85{102.
Hu, J., Li, C., & Wei, L. (2012). Social class structure. In X. Lu (Ed.), Social structure
of contemporary China (pp. 397{436). World Scientic Publishing.
Hu, R., & Chen, S. (2008). Shishangxiaofei de fuhao yiyi yu shehuijieceng jiangou
(The symbolic signicance of fashion consumption and the construction of social
class). Shehui Kexue Yanjiu (Social Science Research)(6), 110{114.
Huang, P. C. (1995). Rural class struggle in the Chinese revolution: Representational
and objective realities from the Land Reform to the Cultural Revolution. Modern
China, 21 (1), 105{143.
Huang, Y. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the
state. Cambridge University Press.
Hurd, I. (1999). Legitimacy and authority in international politics. International
Organization, 53 (2), 379{408.
Im, D.-K. (2014). The legitimation of inequality: Psychosocial dispositions, education,
and attitudes toward income inequality in China. Sociological Perspectives , 57 (4),
506{525.
Inkeles, A., & Rossi, P. H. (1956). National comparisons of occupational prestige.
American Journal of Sociology , 61 (4), 329{339.
Jacobs, J. A. (1996). Gender inequality and higher education. Annual Review of
Sociology , 22 (1), 153{185.
Jodhka, S. S., Rehbein, B., & Souza, J. (2017). Inequality in capitalist societies. Taylor
& Francis.
Johnson, C., Dowd, T. J., & Ridgeway, C. L. (2006). Legitimacy as a social process.
Annual Review of Sociology , 32 , 53{78.
Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a denition of
mixed methods research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1 (2), 112{133.
Johnston, A. I. (2004). Chinese middle class attitudes towards international aairs:
Nascent liberalization? The China Quarterly , 179 , 603{628.
200
Joseph, W. A. (1986). A tragedy of good intentions: Post-Mao views of the Great
Leap Forward. Modern China, 12 (4), 419{457.
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justication
theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the
status quo. Political Psychology , 25 (6), 881{919.
Kahma, N., & Toikka, A. (2012). Cultural map of Finland 2007: Analysing cultural
dierences using multiple correspondence analysis. Cultural Trends , 21 (2), 113{
131.
Kaminski, B. (2014). The collapse of state socialism: The case of Poland. Princeton
University Press.
Kanbur, R., & Zhang, X. (1999). Which regional inequality? the evolution of rural{
urban and inland{coastal inequality in China from 1983 to 1995. Journal of
Comparative Economics , 27 (4), 686{701.
Kaplan, H. B., & Liu, X. (2000). Social movements as collective coping with spoiled
personal identities: Intimations from a panel study of changes in the life course
between adolescence and adulthood. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R. W. White
(Eds.), Self, identity, and social movements (pp. 215{238). University of Min-
nesota Press Minneapolis, MN.
Keliher, M., & Wu, H. (2016). Corruption, anticorruption, and the transformation of
political culture in contemporary China. The Journal of Asian Studies , 75 (1),
5{18.
King, A. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A practicalcritique of the
habitus. Sociological Theory , 18 (3), 417{433.
King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How censorship in China allows government
criticism but silences collective expression. American Political Science Review ,
107 (2), 326{343.
Ko, K., & Weng, C. (2012). Structural changes in Chinese corruption. The China
Quarterly , 211 , 718{740.
Kogler, H. H. (1997). Alienation as an epistemological source. Social Epistemology ,
11 (4), 141{164.
Kornai, J., Lukacs, I., et al. (1986). Contradictions and dilemmas: Studies on the
201
socialist economy and society. MIT Press.
Kraus, R. C. (1977). Class conict and the vocabulary of social analysis in China. The
China Quarterly , 69 , 54{74.
Kraus, R. C. (1981). Class conict in Chinese socialism. Columbia University Press.
Kryshtanovskaya, O., & White, S. (1996). From Soviet nomenklatura to Russian elite.
Europe-Asia Studies , 48 (5), 711{733.
Kuang, L., & Li, L. (2012). Discrimination against rural-to-urban migrants: The role
of the hukou system in China. PloS One, 7 (11), 1{8.
Kumar, K. (1993). Civil society: An inquiry into the usefulness of an historical term.
British Journal of Sociology , 44 (3), 375{395.
Kung, J. K.-S., & Chen, S. (2011). The tragedy of the nomenklatura: Career incentives
and political radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine. American Political
Science Review , 105 (1), 27{45.
Kung, J. K.-S., & Lin, J. Y. (2003). The causes of China's Great Leap Famine,
1959{1961. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52 (1), 51{73.
Kuo, B. C. (2013). Collectivism and coping: Current theories, evidence, and measure-
ments of collective coping. International Journal of Psychology , 48 (3), 374{388.
Lamaison, P., & Bourdieu, P. (1986). From rules to strategies: An interview with
Pierre Bourdieu. Cultural Anthropology , 1 (1), 110{120.
Lamont, M., & Fournier, M. (Eds.). (1992). Cultivating dierences: Symbolic bound-
aries and the making of inequality. University of Chicago Press.
Lane, D. (2013). The capitalist transformation of state socialism: The making and
breaking of state socialist society, and what followed. Routledge.
Lantolf, J. P., & Pavlenko, A. (1995). Sociocultural theory and second language
acquisition. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics , 15 , 108{124.
Larwood, L., Gutek, B., & Gattiker, U. E. (1984). Perspectives on institutional
discrimination and resistance to change. Group & Organization Studies , 9 (3),
333{352.
Lau, R. W. (2004). Habitus and the practical logic of practice: an interpretation.
Sociology , 38 (2), 369{387.
Lave, J. (1997). The culture of acquisition and the practice of understanding. In
202
D. Kirshner & J. A. Whitson (Eds.), Situated cognition: Social, semiotic, and
psychological perspectives (pp. 63{82). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Lee, H. Y. (1991). From revolutionary cadres to party technocrats in socialist China.
University of California Press.
Lee, J., & Zhu, Y.-p. (2006). Urban governance, neoliberalism and housing reform in
China. The Pacic Review , 19 (1), 39{61.
Lenski, G. E. (1966). Power and privilege: A theory of social stratication. McGraw-
Hill New York.
Le Roux, B., & Rouanet, H. (2010). Multiple correspondence analysis. Sage Publica-
tions.
Leung, W.-Y. (1988). Smashing the iron rice pot: Workers and unions in China's
market socialism. Asia Monitor Resource Center.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1974). Structural anthropology. Basic Books.
Li, B., & Walder, A. G. (2001). Career advancement as party patronage: Sponsored
mobility into the Chinese administrative elite, 1949{1996. American Journal of
Sociology , 106 (5), 1371{1408.
Li, C. (2010). Characterizing China's middle class: Heterogeneous composition and
multiple identities. In C. Li (Ed.), China's emerging middle class: Beyond eco-
nomic transformation (pp. 135{156). Brookings Institution Press.
Li, C., & Lin, S. (2019). China's explicit social security debt: How large? China
Economic Review , 53 , 128{139.
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., & Zhou, L.-A. (2008). Political connections, nancing and
rm performance: Evidence from Chinese private rms. Journal of Development
Economics , 87 (2), 283{299.
Li, S., Sato, H., & Sicular, T. (Eds.). (2013). Rising inequality in China: Challenges
to a harmonious society. Cambridge University Press.
Li, W., & Yang, D. T. (2005). The great leap forward: Anatomy of a central planning
disaster. Journal of Political Economy , 113 (4), 840{877.
Liberatos, P., Link, B. G., & Kelsey, J. L. (1988). The measurement of social class in
epidemiology. Epidemiologic Reviews , 10 (1), 87{121.
Liechty, M. (2003). Suitably modern: Making middle-class culture in a new consumer
203
society. Princeton University Press.
Lin, J. Y. (1987). The household responsibility system reform in China: A peasant's
institutional choice. American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 69 (2), 410{
415.
Lin, J. Y. (1990). Collectivization and China's agricultural crisis in 1959-1961. Journal
of Political Economy , 98 (6), 1228{1252.
Lin, J. Y. (1992). Rural reforms and agricultural growth in China. The American
Economic Review , 82 (1), 34{51.
Lin, N. (1995). Local market socialism: Local corporatism in action in rural China.
Theory and Society , 24 (3), 301{354.
Lin, N. (1999). Building a network theory of social capital. Connections , 22 (1), 28{51.
Lin, N., & Bian, Y. (1991). Getting ahead in urban China. American Journal of
Sociology , 97 (3), 657{688.
Lin, N., & Xie, W. (1988). Occupational prestige in urban China. American Journal
of Sociology , 93 (4), 793{832.
Lin, T., & Wu, X. (2009). The transformation of the Chinese class structure, 1978{
2005. In K. bun Chan (Ed.), Social stratication in Chinese societies (pp. 81{
112). Brill.
Lin, T., & Wu, X. (2010). Zhongguo de zhidubianqian, jieji jiegou zhuanxing, he shouru
bupingdeng: 1978-2005 (China's instititional changes, class structure, and income
inequality: 1978-2005). Shehui (Chinese Journal of Sociology), 30 (6), 1{40.
Liu, J. (2013). White-collar workers: Gender and class politics in an urban organi-
zation. In D. S. Goodman & M. Chen (Eds.), Middle class China: Identity and
behaviour (pp. 75{89). Edward Elgar.
Liu, T., & Sun, L. (2016). Pension reform in China. Journal of Aging & Social Policy ,
28 (1), 15{28.
Lizardo, O. (2004). The cognitive origins of Bourdieu's habitus. Journal for the Theory
of Social Behaviour , 34 (4), 375{401.
Lizardo, O. (2010). Beyond the antinomies of structure: Levi-Strauss, Giddens, Bour-
dieu, and Sewell. Theory and Society , 39 (6), 651{688.
Loader, I. (1997). Policing and the social: Questions of symbolic power. British Journal
204
of Sociology , 48 (1), 1{18.
Locke, J. (1988). Two treatise of government (P. Laslett, Ed.). Cambridge University
Press.
Lovell, T. (2003). Resisting with authority: Historical specicity, agency and the
performative self. Theory, Culture & Society , 20 (1), 1{17.
Lu, M., & Chen, Z. (2006). Urbanization, urban-biased policies, and urban-rural
inequality in China, 1987-2001. Chinese Economy , 39 (3), 42{63.
Lu, Q. (2018). Gaigekaifang yilaide zhongguo yanglayang zhidu: Yanbian luoji yu lilun
sikao (China's pension system since the reform and opening up: The evolotion
logic and theoretical consideration). Shehui Baozhang Pinglun (Chinese Social
Security Review), 2 (4), 43{55.
Lu, X. (2004). Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The impact on Chinese
thought, culture, and communication. University of South Carolina Press.
Luo, R. (2012). Across the institutional passage of migration: The hukou-system in
China. Journal of History and Sociology , 3 (1), 120{147.
Luo, R. (2014). Becoming urban: State and migration in contemporary China. kassel
University Press.
Mahar, C., Harker, R., & Wilkes, C. (1990). The basic theoretical position. In
R. Harker, C. Mahar, & C. Wilkes (Eds.), An introduction to the work of Pierre
Bourdieu (pp. 1{25). Palgrave Macmillan.
Major, B. (1994). From social inequality to personal entitlement: The role of social
comparisons, legitimacy appraisals, and group membership. Advances in Exper-
imental Social Psychology , 26 , 293{355.
Manis, J. G., & Meltzer, B. N. (Eds.). (1978). Symbolic interaction: A reader in social
psychology. Allyn and Bacon Boston.
Marx, K. (1904). A contribution to the critique of political economy. Charles H. Kerr
& Company.
Marx, K. (2008). The poverty of philosophy. Cosimo.
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2007). The Communist Manifesto. International Publisher.
Maton, K. (2008). Habitus. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), Pierre Bourdieu: Key concepts (pp.
49{66). Acumen Publishing.
205
Mauss, M. (1973). Techniques of the body. Economy and Society , 2 (1), 70{88.
McAll, C. (1990). Class, ethnicity, and social inequality. McGill-Queen's University
Press.
McKinney, J. C. (1969). Typication, typologies, and sociological theory. Social Forces ,
48 (1), 1{12.
McLaughlin, J. S. (2017). Does communist party membership pay? Estimating the
economic returns to party membership in the labor market in China. Journal of
Comparative Economics , 45 (4), 963{983.
McLellan, E., MacQueen, K. M., & Neidig, J. L. (2003). Beyond the qualitative
interview: Data preparation and transcription. Field Methods , 15 (1), 63{84.
McMillan, J., Whalley, J., & Zhu, L. (1989). The impact of China's economic reforms
on agricultural productivity growth. Journal of Political Economy , 97 (4), 781{
807.
Meng, X., & Kidd, M. P. (1997). Labor market reform and the changing structure of
wage determination in China's state sector during the 1980s. Journal of Com-
parative Economics , 25 (3), 403{421.
Mergenthaler, E., & Stinson, C. (1992). Psychotherapy transcription standards. Psy-
chotherapy Research, 2 (2), 125{142.
Mertha, A. C. (2005). China's \soft" centralization: Shifting tiao/kuai authority
relations. The China Quarterly , 184 , 791{810.
Miao, Y. (2017). Middle class identity in China: Subjectivity and stratication. Asian
Studies Review , 41 (4), 629{646.
Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual Review of
Psychology , 52 , 527{553.
Miller, W. B. (1958). Lower class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency.
Journal of Social Issues , 14 (3), 5{19.
Mok, K. H., & Han, X. (2017). Higher education governance and policy in China:
Managing decentralization and transnationalism. Policy and Society , 36 (1), 34{
48.
Morley, L., & Lugg, R. (2009). Mapping meritocracy: Intersecting gender, poverty
and higher educational opportunity structures. Higher Education Policy , 22 (1),
206
37{60.
Morris, W. N., Worchel, S., Bois, J. L., Pearson, J. A., Rountree, C. A., Samaha,
G. M., . . . Wright, S. L. (1976). Collective coping with stress: Group reactions
to fear, anxiety, and ambiguity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,
33 (6), 674{679.
Mouzelis, N. (2000). The subjectivist{objectivist divide: Against transcendence. So-
ciology , 34 (4), 741{762.
Nakao, K., & Treas, J. (1994). Updating occupational prestige and socioeconomic
scores: How the new measures measure up. Sociological Methodology , 24 , 1{72.
Nasstrom, S. (2007). The legitimacy of the people. Political Theory , 35 (5), 624{658.
Nee, V. (1989). A theory of market transition: From redistribution to markets in state
socialism. American Sociological Review , 54 (5), 663{681.
Nee, V. (1991). Social inequalities in reforming state socialism: Between redistribution
and markets in China. American Sociological Review , 56 (3), 267{282.
Nee, V. (1992). Organizational dynamics of market transition: Hybrid forms, property
rights, and mixed economy in China. Administrative Science Quarterly , 37 (1),
1{27.
Nee, V. (1996). The emergence of a market society: Changing mechanisms of strati-
cation in China. American Journal of Sociology , 101 (4), 908{949.
Nee, V., & Lian, P. (1994). Sleeping with the enemy: A dynamic model of declining
political commitment in state socialism. Theory and Society , 23 (2), 253{296.
Nee, V., & Matthews, R. (1996). Market transition and societal transformation in
reforming state socialism. Annual Review of Sociology , 22 (1), 401{435.
Nenadic, O., & Greenacre, M. (2007). Correspondence analysis in R, with two-and
three-dimensional graphics: The ca package. Journal of Statistical Software,
20 (3), 1{13.
Newman, M. (2005). Socialism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
Noble, G., & Watkins, M. (2003). So, how did Bourdieu learn to play tennis? Habitus,
consciousness and habituation. Cultural Studies , 17 (3-4), 520{539.
Nohl, A.-M. (2010). Narrative interview and documentary interpretation. In R. Bohn-
sack, N. Pfa, & W. Weller (Eds.), Qualitative analysis and documentary method
207
in international educational research (pp. 195{217). Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Pager, D., & Shepherd, H. (2008). The sociology of discrimination: Racial discrimina-
tion in employment, housing, credit, and consumer markets. Annual Review of
Sociology , 34 , 181{209.
Pakulski, J. (1986). Legitimacy and mass compliance: Reections on Max Weber and
soviet-type societies. British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1), 35{56.
Parish, W. L. (1984). Destratication in China. In Class and social stratication in
post-revolution China (pp. 84{120). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Parish, W. L., Zhe, X., & Li, F. (1995). Nonfarm work and marketization of the
Chinese countryside. The China Quarterly , 143 , 697{730.
Parkin, F. (1972). Class inequality and political order: Social stratication in capitalist
and communist societies. Paladin.
Parkin, F. (1974). Strategies of social closure in class formation. In F. Parkin (Ed.),
The social analysis of class structure (pp. 1{18). Tavistock Publications.
Parry, C. E., Hibbard, B., Fetter, F. A., Carver, T., Hourwich, I. A., Dewey, D. R.,
. . . Martin, J. (1911). Socialism: Discussion. The American Economic Review ,
1 (2), 355{367.
Pazzani, M. J. (1991). Inuence of prior knowledge on concept acquisition: Experimen-
tal and computational results. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 17 (3), 416{432.
Pedersen, J. S., & Dobbin, F. (2006). In search of identity and legitimation: Bridging
organizational culture and neoinstitutionalism. American Behavioral Scientist ,
49 (7), 897{907.
Pederson, E. (1995). Language as context, language as means: Spatial cognition and
habitual language use. Cognitive Linguistics , 6 (1), 33{62.
Pei, X. (1996). Township-village enterprises, local governments and rural communities:
The chinese village as a rm during economic transition. Economics of Transition,
4 (1), 43{66.
Perry, E. J. (1994). Trends in the study of Chinese politics: State-society relations.
The China Quarterly , 139 , 704{713.
Pettit, P. (1977). The concept of structuralism: A critical analysis. University of
208
California Press.
Pittner, M. S., & Houston, B. K. (1980). Response to stress, cognitive coping strategies,
and the type a behavior pattern. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ,
39 (1), 147{157.
Poulantzas, N. (2000). State, power, socialism. Verso.
Pozen, R. C. (2013). Tackling the Chinese pension system. Paulson Policy Memoran-
dum.
Pratto, F., Liu, J. H., Levin, S., Sidanius, J., Shih, M., Bachrach, H., & Hegarty, P.
(2000). Social dominance orientation and the legitimization of inequality across
cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology , 31 (3), 369{409.
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance ori-
entation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology , 67 (4), 741{763.
Rakowski, E. (1991). Equal justice. Oxford University Press.
Reckwitz, A. (2002). Toward a theory of social practices: A development in culturalist
theorizing. European Journal of Social Theory , 5 (2), 243{263.
Rehbein, B. (2015). Critical theory after the rise of the Global South: Kaleidoscopic
dialectic. Routledge.
Rehbein, B., & Souza, J. (2015). The incorporation of symbolic inequality. Transcience,
6 (1), 20{32.
Reiss, A. J. (1951). Delinquency as the failure of personal and social controls. American
Sociological Review , 16 (2), 196{207.
Riley, P. (1973). Will and legitimacy in the philosophy of Hobbes: Is he a consent
theorist? Political Studies , 21 (4), 500{522.
Rogers, P., & Lea, M. (2005). Social presence in distributed group environments: The
role of social identity. Behaviour & Information Technology , 24 (2), 151{158.
Rogo, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context.
Oxford University Press.
Rohlen, T. P. (1979). For harmony and strength: Japanese white-collar organization
in anthropological perspective. University of California Press.
Rona-Tas, A. (1994). The rst shall be last? Entrepreneurship and communist cadres
209
in the transition from socialism. American Journal of Sociology , 100 (1), 40{69.
Rothfels, H. (1938). Bismarck's social policy and the problem of state socialism in
Germany. The Sociological Review , 30 (3), 288{302.
Roulston, K., DeMarrais, K., & Lewis, J. B. (2003). Learning to interview in the social
sciences. Qualitative Inquiry , 9 (4), 643{668.
Rousseau, J.-J. (2013). The social contract, 1762. In S. Lazer (Ed.), The anthropology
of citizenship: A reader. Wiley Blackwell.
Salami, S. O. (2010). Emotional intelligence, self-ecacy, psychological well-being
and students attitudes: Implications for quality education. European Journal of
Educational Studies , 2 (3), 247{257.
Sanderson, C. A. (2010). Social psychology. Hoboken.
Sanderson, S. K. (2007). Conict theory. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclo-
pedia of sociology. Blackwell Publishing.
Sapio, F. (2008). Shuanggui and extralegal detention in China. China Information,
22 (1), 7{37.
Sato, H., & Eto, K. (2008). The changing structure of Communist Party membership
in urban China, 1988{2002. Journal of Contemporary China, 17 (57), 653{672.
Sauder, M., Lynn, F., & Podolny, J. M. (2012). Status: Insights from organizational
sociology. Annual Review of Sociology , 38 , 267{283.
Sawyer, R. K. (2002). Unresolved tensions in sociocultural theory: Analogies with
contemporary sociological debates. Culture & Psychology , 8 (3), 283{305.
Scheer, S. (2003). What is egalitrianism? Philosophy & Public Aairs , 31 (1), 5{39.
Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., & Kappen, D. M. (2003). Attitudes toward group-
based inequality: Social dominance or social identity? British Journal of Social
Psychology , 42 (2), 161{186.
Schneider, M. A. (2007). Legitimacy. In R. George (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia
of sociology. Wiley Online Library.
Schneider, W., & Shirin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information
processing: I. detection, search, and attention. Psychological Review , 84 (1),
1{66.
Schrift, A. D. (2014). The logic of the gift: Toward an ethic of generosity. Routledge.
210
Schumpeter, J. A. (2010). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Routledge.
Scott, J. (2014). Redistributive impact and eciency of Mexicos scal system. Public
Finance Review , 42 (3), 368{390.
Screpanti, E., & Zamagni, S. (2005). An outline of the history of economic thought.
Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1991). Consciousness, unconsciousness and intentionality. Philosophical
Issues , 1 , 45{66.
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. Simon & Schuster.
Searle, J. R. (2006). Social ontology: Some basic principles. Anthropological Theory ,
6 (1), 12{29.
Searle, W., & Ward, C. (1990). The prediction of psychological and sociocultural ad-
justment during cross-cultural transitions. International Journal of Intercultural
Relations , 14 (4), 449{464.
Sears, D. O., Lau, R. R., Tyler, T. R., & Allen, H. M. (1980). Self-interest vs. symbolic
politics in policy attitudes and presidential voting. American Political Science
Review , 74 (3), 670{684.
Segall, M. H., Lonner, W. J., & Berry, J. W. (1998). Cross-cultural psychology as a
scholarly discipline: On the owering of culture in behavioral research. American
Psychologist , 53 (10), 1101{1110.
Sewell Jr, W. H. (1992). A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation.
American Journal of Sociology , 98 (1), 1{29.
Shen, C., Jin, J., & Zou, H.-f. (2012). Fiscal decentralization in China: History, impact,
challenges and next steps. Annals of Economics & Finance, 13 (1), 1{51.
Shen, C., & Williamson, J. B. (2010). China's new rural pension scheme: Can it
be improved? International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy , 30 (5/6),
239{250.
Sherman, J. W. (1996). Development and mental representation of stereotypes. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology , 70 (6), 1126{1141.
Shi, S.-J. (2006). Left to market and family{again? Ideas and the development of the
rural pension policy in China. Social Policy & Administration, 40 (7), 791{806.
Shirin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information
211
processing: Ii. perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory.
Psychological Review , 84 (2), 127{190.
Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999). Stereotype susceptibility: Identity
salience and shifts in quantitative performance. Psychological Science, 10 (1),
80{83.
Shrum, L. J. (2009). Media consumption and perceptions of social reality: Eects
and underlying processes. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media eects:
Advances in theory and research (pp. 66{89). Routledge.
Shu, X. (2005). Market transition and gender segregation in urban China. Social
Science Quarterly , 86 (s1), 1299{1323.
Shu, X., & Bian, Y. (2003). Market transition and gender gap in earnings in urban
China. Social Forces , 81 (4), 1107{1145.
Sicular, T., Ximing, Y., Gustafsson, B., & Li, S. (2008). The urban-rural income gap
and income inequality in China. In G. Wan (Ed.), Understanding inequality and
poverty in China (pp. 30{71). Springer.
Sidanius, J., Levin, S., Liu, J., & Pratto, F. (2000). Social dominance orientation,
anti-egalitarianism and the political psychology of gender: An extension and
cross-cultural replication. European Journal of Social Psychology , 30 (1), 41{67.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (2001). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social
hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge University Press.
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Martin, M., & Stallworth, L. M. (1991). Consensual racism and
career track: Some implications of social dominance theory. Political Psychology ,
12 (4), 691{721.
Sigley, G. (2006). Chinese governmentalities: Government, governance and the socialist
market economy. Economy and Society , 35 (4), 487{508.
Siisiainen, M. (2003). Two concepts of social capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam. Interna-
tional Journal of Contemporary Sociology , 40 (2), 183{204.
Silva, E. B. (2016). Habitus: Beyond sociology. The Sociological Review , 64 (1), 73{92.
Singer, T., Wolpert, D., & Frith, C. (2004). Introduction: The study of social in-
teractions. In C. D. Frith & D. M. Wolpert (Eds.), The neuroscience of social
interaction: Decoding, imitating, and inuencing the actions of others (pp. xiii{
212
xxvii). Oxford University Press.
Skinner, G. W. (1985). Rural marketing in China: Repression and revival. The China
Quarterly , 103 , 393{413.
Smart, A. (1993). Gifts, bribes, and guanxi : A reconsideration of Bourdieu's social
capital. Cultural Anthropology , 8 (3), 388{408.
Smart, A., & Hsu, C. L. (2007). Corruption or social capital? tact and the perfor-
mance of guanxi in market socialist China. In M. Nuijten & G. Andres (Eds.),
Corruption and the secret of law: A legal anthropological perspective (pp. 167{
190). Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
So, A. Y. (2003). The changing pattern of classes and class conict in China. Journal
of Contemporary Asia, 33 (3), 363{376.
Solinger, D. J. (1993). China's transition from socialism?: Statist legacies and market
reforms, 1980-90. M. E. Sharpe.
Solinger, D. J. (1995). The Chinese work unit and transient labor in the transition
from socialism. Modern China, 21 (2), 155{183.
Steinmetz, G. (2006). Bourdieu's disavowal of Lacan: Psychoanalytic theory and the
concepts of \habitus" and \symbolic capital". Constellations , 13 (4), 445{464.
Stevens, G., & Hoisington, E. (1987). Occupational prestige and the 1980 U.S. labor
force. Social Science Research, 16 (1), 74{105.
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1986). Milieu and structure updated. Theory and Society , 15 (6),
901{914.
Stolte, J. F. (1983). The legitimation of structural inequality: Reformulation and test
of the self-evaluation argument. American Sociological Review , 48 (3), 331{342.
Strayer, J. F. (2012). How learning in an inverted classroom inuences cooperation,
innovation and task orientation. Learning Environments Research, 15 (2), 171{
193.
Stryker, R. (1994). Rules, resources, and legitimacy processes: Some implications
for social conict, order, and change. American Journal of Sociology , 99 (4),
847{910.
Sturges, J. E., & Hanrahan, K. J. (2004). Comparing telephone and face-to-face
qualitative interviewing: a research note. Qualitative Research, 4 (1), 107{118.
213
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches.
Academy of Management Review , 20 (3), 571{610.
Sun, W. (2013). Inequality and culture: A new pathway to understanding social
inequality. In W. Sun & Y. Guo (Eds.), Unequal China: Political economy and
the cultural politics of inequality (pp. 43{58). Routledge.
Swartz, D. (1997). Culture and power: The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. University
of Chicago Press.
Sweetman, P. (2009). Revealing habitus, illuminating practice: Bourdieu, photography
and visual methods. The Sociological Review , 57 (3), 491{511.
Swift, A., & Marshall, G. (1997). Meritocratic equality of opportunity: Economic
eciency, social justice, or both? Policy Studies , 18 (1), 35{48.
Szelenyi, I. (1976). The housing system and social structure in Hungary. In B. L. Faber
(Ed.), The social structure of eastern Europe (pp. 301{331). Praeger.
Szelenyi, I. (1978). Social inequalities in state socialist redistributive economies. In-
ternational Journal of Comparative Sociology , 19 (1-2), 63{87.
Szelenyi, I. (1983). Urban inequalities under state socialism. Oxford University Press.
Szelenyi, I., & Szelenyi, B. (1994). Why socialism failed: Toward a theory of system
breakdowncauses of disintegration of East European state socialism. Theory and
Society , 23 (2), 211{231.
Szelenyi, S. (1987). Social inequality and party membership: Patterns of recruit-
ment into the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. American Sociological Review ,
52 (5), 559{573.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology.
Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psy-
chology , 33 (1), 1{39.
Tang, W., & Yang, Q. (2008). The Chinese urban caste system in transition. The
China Quarterly , 196 , 759{779.
Taormina, R. J., & Gao, J. H. (2010). A research model for Guanxi behavior: An-
tecedents, measures, and outcomes of Chinese social networking. Social Science
Research, 39 (6), 1195{1212.
214
Taylor, K. (1982). Political ideas of the utopian socialists. Routledge.
Thaxton, R. (2008). Catastrophe and contention in rural China: Mao's Great Leap
Forward Famine and the origins of righteous resistance in Da Fo village. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Thomson, P. (2008). Field. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts (pp.
67{86). Acumen Publishing.
Tilly, C. (1998). Durable inequality. University of California Press.
Tomba, L. (2004). Creating an urban middle class: Social engineering in Beijing. The
China Journal(51), 1{26.
Torpey, J. (1997). Revolutions and freedom of movement: An analysis of passport
controls in the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. Theory and Society ,
26 (6), 837{868.
Treiman, D. J. (1977). Occupational prestige in comparative perspective. Academic
Press.
Treisman, D. (1999). Political decentralization and economic reform: A game-theoretic
analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 43 (2), 488{517.
Trigilia, C. (2001). Social capital and local development. European Journal of Social
Theory , 4 (4), 427{442.
Troyer, L. (2007). Legitimacy. In R. George (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of
sociology. Wiley Online Library.
Tsang, E. W. (1998). Can guanxi be a source of sustained competitive advantage for
doing business in China? Academy of Management Perspectives , 12 (2), 64{73.
Tsang, E. Y.-H. (2014). The new middle class in China: Consumption, politics and
the market economy. Springer.
Tsui, K.-y., & Wang, Y. (2004). Between separate stoves and a single menu: Fiscal
decentralization in China. The China Quarterly , 177 , 71{90.
Tuomela, R. (2003). Collective acceptance, social institutions, and social reality.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 62 (1), 123{165.
Tuomela, R. (2013). Social ontology: Collective intentionality and group agents. Oxford
University Press.
Turner, B. S. (Ed.). (2006). The cambridge dictionary of sociology. Cambridge Uni-
215
versity Press.
Turner, S. (1994). Social theory of practices: Tradition, tacit knowledge and presuppo-
sitions. Polity Press.
Turner III, D. W. (2010). Qualitative interview design: A practical guide for novice
investigators. The Qualitative Report , 15 (3), 754{760.
Tyler, T. R. (1997). The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on volun-
tary deference to authorities. Personality and Social Psychology Review , 1 (4),
323{345.
Tyler, T. R. (2004). Enhancing police legitimacy. The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 593 (1), 84{99.
Tyler, T. R. (2006a). Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. Annual
Review of Psychology , 57 , 375{400.
Tyler, T. R. (2006b). Why people obey the law. Princeton University Press.
Unger, J. (2012). Status groups and classes in a Chinese village: From the mao era
through post-Mao industrialization. In B. Carrillo & D. S. Goodman (Eds.),
China's peasants and workers: Changing class identities (pp. 15{39). Edward
Elgar Publishing.
Vaara, E., & Whittington, R. (2012). Strategy-as-practice: Taking social practices
seriously. Academy of Management Annals , 6 (1), 285{336.
Valsiner, J. (2007). Culture in minds and societies: Foundations of cultural psychology.
Sage Publications.
Van der Pijl, K. (1993). State socialism and passive revolution. In S. Gill (Ed.), Gram-
sci, historical materialism and international relations (pp. 237{258). Cambridge
University Press.
VanderStoep, S. W., & Johnson, D. D. (2008). Research methods for everyday life:
Blending qualitative and quantitative approaches. John Wiley & Sons.
VandeWalle, D. (1997). Development and validation of a work domain goal orientation
instrument. Educational and Psychological Measurement , 57 (6), 995{1015.
Venkatesh, V., Brown, S. A., & Bala, H. (2013). Bridging the qualitative-quantitative
divide: Guidelines for conducting mixed methods research in information sys-
tems. MIS Quarterly , 37 (1), 21{54.
216
Vincent, A. (2010). Modern political ideologies. Wiley-Blackwell.
Vincent, C., & Ball, S. J. (2007). Making up'the middle-class child: Families, activities
and class dispositions. Sociology , 41 (6), 1061{1077.
Vitt, L. A. (2007). Class. In R. George (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of sociology.
Wiley Online Library.
Volensky, M. (1984). Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet ruling class. London, The
Bodley Head.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1980). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological
processes. Harvard University Press.
Wacquant, L. J. (1992). Towards a social praxeology: The structure and logic of
Bourdieu's sociology. In P. Bourdieu & L. J. Wacquant (Eds.), An invitation to
reexive sociology (pp. 1{60). Polity Press.
Wacquant, L. J. (2016). A concise genealogy and anatomy of habitus. The Sociological
Review , 64 (1), 64{72.
Wagner, W., Kronberger, N., & Seifert, F. (2002). Collective symbolic coping with new
technology: Knowledge, images and public discourse. British Journal of Social
Psychology , 41 (3), 323{343.
Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese
industry. University of California Press.
Walder, A. G. (1992). Property rights and stratication in socialist redistributive
economies. American Sociological Review , 57 (4), 524{539.
Walder, A. G. (1995). Career mobility and the communist political order. American
Sociological Review , 60 (3), 309{328.
Walder, A. G. (1996). Markets and inequality in transitional economies: Toward
testable theories. American Journal of Sociology , 101 (4), 1060{1073.
Walder, A. G. (2002). Markets and income inequality in rural China: Political advan-
tage in an expanding economy. American Sociological Review , 67 (2), 231{253.
Walder, A. G. (2003). Elite opportunity in transitional economies. American Socio-
logical Review , 68 (6), 899{916.
Walder, A. G. (2015). China under Mao. Harvard University Press.
Walder, A. G., Li, B., & Treiman, D. J. (2000). Politics and life chances in a state
217
socialist regime: Dual career paths into the urban Chinese elite, 1949 to 1996.
American Sociological Review , 65 (2), 191{209.
Walker, D., & Myrick, F. (2006). Grounded theory: An exploration of process and
procedure. Qualitative Health Research, 16 (4), 547{559.
Walker, H. A. (2014). Legitimacy and inequality. In J. D. Mcleod, E. J. Lawler, &
M. Schwalbe (Eds.), Handbook of the social psychology of inequality (pp. 353{
377). Springer.
Wang, F. (2008). Boundaries and categories: Rising inequality in post-socialist urban
China. Stanford University Press.
Wang, F.-L. (2004). Reformed migration control and new targeted people: China's
hukou system in the 2000s. The China Quarterly , 177 , 115{132.
Wang, F.-L. (2005). Organizing through division and exclusion: China's hukou system.
Stanford University Press.
Wank, D. L. (1996). The institutional process of market clientelism: Guanxi and
private business in a South China city. The China Quarterly , 147 , 820{838.
Ward, C., & Kennedy, A. (1996). Crossing cultures: The relationship between psycho-
logical and socio-cultural dimensions of cross-cultural adjustment. In J. Pandey,
D. Sinha, & D. P. Bhawuk (Eds.), Asian contributions to cross-cultural psychology
(pp. 289{306). Sage Publications.
Ward, C., & Kennedy, A. (1999). The measurement of sociocultural adaptation.
International Journal of Intercultural Relations , 23 (4), 659{677.
Ward, T. B. (1994). Structured imagination: The role of category structure in exemplar
generation. Cognitive Psychology , 27 (1), 1{40.
Warren, C. A. (2002). Qualitative interviewing. In J. F. Gubrium & J. A. Holstein
(Eds.), Handbook of interview research: Context & method (pp. 83{101). SAGE
Publications Ltd.
Weatherford, M. S. (1992). Measuring political legitimacy. American Political Science
Review , 86 (1), 149{166.
Weber, M. (1946). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Oxford University Press.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Univer-
sity of California Press.
218
Weiner, A. (1999). Nature, nurture, and memory in a socialist utopia: Delineating
the Soviet socio-ethnic body in the age of socialism. The American Historical
Review , 104 (4), 1114{1155.
Weinstein, N. D. (1989). Eects of personal experience on self-protective behavior.
Psychological Bulletin, 105 (1), 31{50.
Weitzman, M. L., & Xu, C. (1994). Chinese township-village enterprises as vaguely
dened cooperatives. Journal of Comparative Economics , 18 (2), 121{145.
Wellisch, D., & Wildasin, D. E. (1996). Decentralized income redistribution and
immigration. European Economic Review , 40 (1), 187{217.
Wertsch, J. V. (1986). Culture, communication, and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives.
CUP Archive.
Whyte, M. K. (2010a). Fair versus unfair: How do Chinese citizens view current
inequalities. In J. C. Oi, S. Rozelle, & X. Zhou (Eds.), Growing pains: Tensions
and opportunity in Chinas transformation (pp. 305{332). Walter H. Shorenstein
Asia-Pacic Research Center.
Whyte, M. K. (2010b). Myth of the social volcano: Perceptions of inequality and
distributive injustice in contemporary China. Stanford University Press.
Whyte, M. K. (Ed.). (2010c). One country, two societies: Rural-urban inequality in
contemporary China. Harvard University Press.
Wood, E. M. (1998). The retreat from class: A new \true" socialism. Verso.
Wright, T. (2010). Accepting authoritarianism: State-society relations in China's
reform era. Stanford University Press.
Wu, X. (2006). Communist cadres and market opportunities: Entry into self-
employment in China, 1978{1996. Social Forces , 85 (1), 389{411.
Wu, X. (2009). Income inequality and distributive justice: A comparative analysis of
mainland China and Hong Kong. The China Quarterly , 200 , 1033{1052.
Wu, X. (2013). Redrawing the boundaries: Work units and social stratication in
urban China. Chinese Sociological Review , 45 (4), 6{28.
Wu, X., & Zheng, B. (2018). Household registration, urban status attainment, and
social stratication in China. Research in Social Stratication and Mobility , 53 ,
40{49.
219
Wu, Y. (2008). Cultural capital, the state, and educational inequality in China, 1949{
1996. Sociological Perspectives , 51 (1), 201{227.
Xie, Y., Thornton, A., Wang, G., & Lai, Q. (2012). Societal projection: Beliefs
concerning the relationship between development and inequality in China. Social
Science Research, 41 (5), 1069{1084.
Xie, Y., & Zhou, X. (2014). Income inequality in today's China. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences , 111 (19), 6928{6933.
Xu, Q., Perkins, D. D., & Chow, J. C.-C. (2010). Sense of community, neighboring,
and social capital as predictors of local political participation in China. American
Journal of Community Psychology , 45 (3-4), 259{271.
Yang, D. L. (2017). Chinas troubled quest for order: Leadership, organization and
the contradictions of the stability maintenance regime. Journal of Contemporary
China, 26 (103), 35{53.
Yang, D. T. (1999). Urban-biased policies and rising income inequality in China.
American Economic Review , 89 (2), 306{310.
Yang, M. M.-h. (1988). The modernity of power in the Chinese socialist order. Cultural
Anthropology , 3 (4), 408{427.
Ye, X. (2010). Chinas urban-rural integration policies. Journal of Current Chinese
Aairs , 38 (4), 117{143.
Young, G. (1986). Mao Zedong and the class struggle in socialist society. The Australian
Journal of Chinese Aairs(16), 41{80.
Young, J. (2013). China's Hukou system: Markets, migrants and institutional change.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Zang, X., & Chen, N. (2015). How do rural elites reproduce privileges in post-1978
China? Local corporatism, informal bargaining and opportunistic parasitism.
Journal of Contemporary China, 24 (94), 628{643.
Zeng, J., Pang, X., Zhang, L., Medina, A., & Rozelle, S. (2014). Gender inequality in
education in China: A meta-regression analysis. Contemporary Economic Policy ,
32 (2), 474{491.
Zeuthen, J. W., & Griths, M. B. (2011). The end of urban{rural dierentiation
in China? Hukou and resettlement in Chengdu's urban{rural integration. In
220
B. Alpermann (Ed.), Politics and markets in rural China (pp. 218{232). Rout-
ledge.
Zhan, L., & He, Y. (2012). Understanding luxury consumption in China: Consumer
perceptions of best-known brands. Journal of Business Research, 65 (10), 1452{
1460.
Zhang, J. (2004). Zhongguoren shehuidiwei de huode: Jieji jicheng he dainei liudong
(The attainment of Chinese social status: Class succession and the intergenera-
tional mobility). Shehuixue Yanjiu (Sociological Studies)(4), 76{90.
Zhang, J., Giles, J., & Rozelle, S. (2012). Does it pay to be a cadre? Estimating the
returns to being a local ocial in rural China. Journal of Comparative Economics ,
40 (3), 337{356.
Zhang, M. Y. S., & Barnett, M. S. (2014). Fiscal vulnerabilities and risks from local
government nance in China. IMF Working Paper(14).
Zhang, Q., Guo, Y., & Li, M. (2015). Yanchang tuixiu nianling haishi zengjia jiaofei
jishu: Yanglaojin gaige de lujingxuanze yu zhengcexiaoying (Raise retirement age
or payment base: The path choice and policy eect of pension reform). Jingji
Lilun yu Jingji Guanli (Economic Theory and Business Management), 35 (2),
80{88.
Zhang, S., & Cao, X. (2017). Zhenggui jiuye yu feizhenggui jiuye zhong hujiqishi lidu
tanjiu: Jiyu qingxiangzhi pipei de fenxi (Research on discrimination on hukou
status in formal employment and informal employment: An analysis based on
propensity score matching). Nanjing Caijing Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Nanjing
University of Finance and Economics)(1), 72{80.
Zhang, W.-W. (2000). Transforming China: Economic reform and its political impli-
cations. Palgrave Macmillan.
Zhang, X. (2004). Land reform in yang village: Symbolic capital and the determination
of class status. Modern China, 30 (1), 3{45.
Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Im-
plications for growth and inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics , 34 (4),
713{726.
Zhang, X., & Kanbur, R. (2005). Spatial inequality in education and health care in
221
China. China Economic Review , 16 (2), 189{204.
Zhang, Z., & Treiman, D. J. (2013). Social origins, hukou conversion, and the wellbeing
of urban residents in contemporary China. Social Science Research, 42 (1), 71{
89.
Zhao, S. (2010). The China Model: Can it replace the Western model of modernization?
Journal of Contemporary China, 19 (65), 419{436.
Zheng, B., Yu, H., & Gao, Q. (2010). Xinzhongguo liushinian shehuibaozhang zhidu
huigu (Review of the New China's social security system over the past 60 years).
Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu (Contemporary China History Studies)(2), 48{58.
Zheng, H., & Hong, D. (1996). Dangdai zhongguo shehuijiegou zhuanxing de zhuyao
neihan (The connotation of the transformation of social structure in contempo-
rary China). Shehuixue Yanjiu (Sociological Studies)(1), 58{63.
Zhou, X., Tuma, N. B., & Moen, P. (1996). Stratication dynamics under state
socialism: The case of urban China, 1949{1993. Social Forces , 74 (3), 759{796.
Zhu, Y. (2002). Recent developments in China's social security reforms. International
Social Security Review , 55 (4), 39{54.
Zimmerman, B. J., & Kitsantas, A. (2014). Comparing students' self-discipline and self-
regulation measures and their prediction of academic achievement. Contemporary
Educational Psychology , 39 (2), 145{155.
222
